DISSENT

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Short Shots

The Snobbism Of Charles Reich

THE LATEST INTELLECTUAL FAD, certain to last almost six months, is *The Greening of America* by Professor Charles Reich of Yale University. It is an eyes-wide paean to Consciousness III, that superior state of love and freedom which "the young" are said to have reached, as against Consciousness I and II, the benighted conditions of ordinary slobs. Because he is so *tolerant* and *loving*, Professor Reich urges his readers to be equally *tolerant* and *loving* toward American workers—the teamsters and mechanics whom his young friends sometimes aren't sufficiently *tolerant* and *loving* toward. And here, please read Professor Reich:

> Look again at a "fascist"—tight-lipped, tense, crew cut, correctly dressed, church-going, an American flag on his car window, a hostile eye for communists, youth, and blacks. He has had very little of love, or poetry, or music, or nature, or joy. He has been dominated by fear. He has been condemned to narrow-minded prejudice, to a self-defeating materialism, to a lonely suspicion of his fellow men. He is angry, envious, bitter, self-hating. He ravages his own environment. He has fled all his life from consciousness and responsibility. He is turned against his own nature; in his agony he has recoiled upon himself. He is what the machine left after it had its way.

It's been a long time since anyone, let alone a self-announced agent of Superior Consciousness, put into print anything so snobbish, so ridden with contempt for the plebes, so ready to dismiss the lives of ordinary people as beneath contempt, so smug in its dime-store (or Random House) version of Marcuse-ism. But to say that is unfair to Marcuse, who by comparison to Professor Reich seems to be overflowing with affection for his fellow-creatures.

Who is it that "has fled all his life from consciousness and responsibility"—the millions of American workers who organized trade unions which won this country social benefits from which we all profit, or Yale professors myopic with elitist fantasy? Reading this passage in Professor Reich's book, one feels that almost any "Consciousness," I, II, IV, VII or XXXVII, must be better than his "III." But perhaps it is unfair to identify him with III, since, as a friend has remarked, Professor Reich's is really Consciousness IX—Consciousness III squared. —L. M. ■

Fourteen Years Later

BACK IN 1956, when it was everybody's pride to look down on "mass culture," we had a little controversy in the pages of DISSENT and elsewhere. Günther Anders wrote a strange piece in which he argued that—to take one example—Rembrandt's superb painting of Christ's meeting with the disciples at Emmaus was a unique event, but "when the event can be reproduced virtually any number of times, it acquires the characteristics of an assembly-line product; and when we pay for having it delivered to our home [in Europe, TV-owners pay a monthly fee], it becomes a commodity."

I took the liberty to remark that Mr. Anders failed both as an art historian and as a philosopher. For the famous painting was prepared by Rembrandt himself for home delivery—he made an etching of it, assuring it the widest mass distribution then available through mechanical means. As to the logic of Mr. Anders's reasoning, I wrote: "If I buy a print of a Rembrandt etching, not the meeting of Christ with his disciples is reproduced but its likeness; neither the event nor Rembrandt's conception of it has become a commodity."

To these remarks Mr. Anders wrote a reply so unprintable that the editors broke all principles and refused to publish it. Bernard Rosenberg and David M. White, however, included the controversy in their popular reader, *Mass*

(continued on page 100)

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NEW FROM YALE

The Wild Prayer of Longing

Poetry and the Sacred

by Nathan A. Scott, Jr.

In his newest book Nathan A. Scott continues his exploration of the new forms in which the religious imagination finds expression in contemporary cultural life. He uses the immensely fruitful ideas of Martin Heidegger to suggest how a sacramental vision of the world may define itself without resort to supernaturalism. Finally, he analyzes the poetry of Theodore Roethke as a significant example in recent literature of a sacramental vision unencumbered by supernaturalist illusion. This volume is the clearest and most penetrating statement Mr. Scott has yet made about the relationship between contemporary developments in the arts and theological dilemmas. $6.75

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Authority in a Good Society

by Robert A. Dahl

Amidst all the emotional uproar about democracy and the widespread talk of revolution comes this clear call to reason—a mind-stretching book that equips the young and the old suddenly to see an ageless problem of society in a new and exciting way. Mr. Dahl guides his reader through a thoughtful examination of the principles on which the authority of democratic government rests, the question of who "the people" should be in the concept of "rule by the people," and the several different kinds of democracy that fit different situations. Everything he says can be applied in a fascinating way to the governing of any human enterprise involving more than one person—whether it is a nation-state, a political party, a business firm, or a university. cloth $8.50; paper $2.45

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by Paul Ramsey

No less than the future of man as we know him hangs on the issues discussed by Paul Ramsey in this provocative book. He moves from his examination of now common measures of birth control and artificial insemination to such issues as asexual reproduction of man and the breeding of human beings for special purposes. He offers no easy answers, but hard questions concerning the control of genetic experimentation. The alternative, he suggests, may well be species suicide.
cloth $7.50; paper $1.95

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Culture—The Popular Arts in America (Free Press, Glencoe, 1957).

Who can describe my amazement when I read in the August 1970 issue of the German magazine *Merkur* a lamentation by Günther Anders, concerning a wooden hand created by Donatello that was being eaten by the worms: "Maybe it is time for us esthetes to abandon our conceit and to admit that there is something to be said for mechanical reproductions. No number of worms in the world will be able to eat all copies of this statue." In case the author of these lines should be the same Mr. Anders, I extend my hand to him, saying: welcome to the low-brow culture of mass consumption.

—H. R. ■

Who's More Radical — You or Me?

I HAVE JUST READ, for the 439th time, an attack on myself charging that I am "less radical" than I was at some point in the past. One premise behind such charges is that radicalism is a quantity: the more, the better. This is a very old notion and usually it flourishes in countries where radicalism itself does not. For once the politics of the Left has been reduced to impotence, there is little it can do but maintain the sincere stance, or vain posture, of rectitude. From rectitude to righteousness—you need to be very agile morally to avoid the latter once you've slipped into the former.

Sometimes, too, radicalism is seen as a token of integrity or even virtue, akin to chastity. And just as you can't divide chastity into portions, so presumably you must preserve your radicalism in its state of original purity. Since this transforms radicalism from a politics into a mode of private salvation, it becomes disingenuous, or even dishonest, when those who cling to such a radicalism attack others on *political* grounds. For what they really mean is that I or Mike Harrington or X isn't as virtuous as they: a proposition all just men will immediately take to be self-evident.

In the Marxist world, the ideological stepbrother of chastity has always been "correctness." How many discussions I have sat through as to whether "the line" was "correct," and how few about what we could possibly have meant by being "correct." If, say, you think it makes no sense to speak of "revolution" in the U.S. as a political goal, or if you come to feel that those who proclaim "revolution" would upon gaining power institute a regime not very different from that of counterrevolution, then it's pointless to be told that one doesn't have the "correct line." For the truth is that the two (or more) lines in question are not crossing on the same political and moral planes.

In behalf of our goals—say, a democratic socialist society in the long run and reforms stretching the welfare state right now—there *may* be good reason to be "less radical" than before. Twenty years ago, for instance, most socialists thought it was wrong in principle to vote for a candidate on any old-party line. Then we changed our views (and some saw this too as a retreat into being "less radical") to allow for support to an (alas) nonexistent labor party. Today we believe that, if there is a significant choice between candidates, we ought to vote for liberal as against conservative—without thereby supposing our socialist virtue to be threatened.

Is this a sign of being "less radical"? You can say so if you wish: it's a free country. But when you say it, you're masking a political disagreement with a quasi-moralistic accusation. And to do that is to muddle thought and assuage emotions in about equal degree. So—I believe socialists should vote for certain old-party candidates; or I believe they should do X and Z. Maybe I'm wrong, that's not the point. But what's even less to the point is whether in so believing I'm either "more" or "less" radical.

Let me be honest enough to admit that when the charge of "less radical" is made, it can sometimes still carry a sting. Why? Because once we were pure and now are fallen? I think not. I think we remain as devoted as ever to the socialist ideal, and the evidence for that is that we have actually tried to think about it and thereby have changed our conception of it. No; such a thrust can still carry a sting precisely because it isn't really a political criticism at all but is an implied personal accusation. It touches on the root emotion, so deep in radical environ-

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Over the Top (a Little)

We are happy to report that our fund drive has brought in approximately $12,000, slightly more than we had asked for. The number of contributions exceeded by 50 percent those in the previous fund drive; the size of contributions was, on the average, smaller. Which may tell us something about both the loyalties of our readers and the current economic situation.

We wish we could say that this solves our financial problems for the coming period; but it does not. Inflationary pressures remain inexorable—quite apart from the impossible economics of a small magazine. So, we would of course welcome late contributions. And to those who have already sent in their pledges, our warmest thanks!

THE EDITORS

P.S. There's one little thing you can do to help DISSENT: check to see whether your local or university library subscribes.

SHORT SHOTS

ments that have been confined to powerlessness, that to be radical means to be . . . *more* radical. Means, that is, a state of being, a condition of intransigeance, rather than a politics.

That younger New Leftists find gratification in making charges of virtue abandoned, indicates that, no matter what their number, they are still caged into the life of the sect. That Mass Media wiseacres indulge in the same sort of talk indicates something still more depressing: the way, in America, left-wing politics has become assimilated to popular entertainments and styles of cultural marginality. How sharp are your pants creases? How round your bell bottoms? How bushy your Afros? How radical your radicalism?

So, tell me: who's more radical, you or me? I know what you're going to say, and *let me tell you*. . . . But better yet: the beginning of a serious radicalism might be to brush aside this dormitory-and-cocktail-party game as unworthy of serious people.

—I. H. ■

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Two Conversations

In the Kremlin

—"Here it is, Vissarion Mikhailovitch, he talked and talked. . . ."
—"Nikita Sergeyevitch? On tape?"
—"Reams of it, the transcript here; some of it is as earthy as only he can make it."
—"Of course, we are not going to publish it."
—"God forbid; nevertheless, it may be useful, nevertheless."
—"How so?"
—"Well, there are things in it to hang him with."
—"Such as?"
—"He says we should rehabilitate all victims."
—"You mean he says 'all,' including Trotsky?"
—"He says all, but we can make it sound as though he were deliberately including Trotsky. That will finish him."
—"That's good; he is apt to make such lapses, he is really getting old."
—"Yes, he is getting old; he confuses dates and places."
—"That makes it less valuable."
—"On the contrary, that makes it more valuable!"
—"How so?"
—"Number one, it proves these memoirs are authentic; a forger would have checked the dates more carefully."
—"They didn't check in the Great Trials."
—"But the world believed us nevertheless."
—"That's to say we leave all the mistakes in?"
—"Of course, they make the transcript believable."
—"Don't they also make it less believable?"
—"Yes, they do, and that is good; if anything happens we can always point to the mistakes and say it's inauthentic."
—"It is to look authentic and inauthentic at the same time?"
—"Yes; they are going to debate the fine points, haha, and won't know. And he can repudiate it, and they will prove he is wrong."
—"The Western Kremlinologists? Then you are going to publish it just the same?"
—"We are and we are not. Depends on whether there is more in it."
—"Vissarion Mikhailovitch, you can't; there are things that are very embarrassing. . . ."
—"Such as?"
—"Well, he says, for instance, that in 1954, when the imperialists threw in the towel at Dienbienphu, our people in Vietnam thought they had lost the war."
—"Well, that's true, they were ready to throw in the towel."
—"But you can't publish that."
—"Of course, we must publish that. Suppose Nixon reads that and thinks, maybe today it's a similar situation, I must not give up as long as there is a chance that Hanoi thinks they must give up."
—"Is that good?"
—"Of course it's good. The longer the Americans are bogged down in Indochina, the better."
—"Then you are going to publish it?"
—"No, I'm not going to publish it; I'm letting the capitalist publishers publish it."
—"And pay for it?"
—"Sure, this should be worth millions."
—"If what you say is right, it must be worth more than millions to us!"

In Washington

—"Mr. President, have you seen this?"
—"*LIFE Magazine?* What do they want now, can't the damn press leave me in peace?"
—"No, it's something that should interest you."
—"What?"
—"Here Khrushchev says that in 1954, you remember, Mr. President, when you and Mr. Dulles suggested sending some bombers to help the French in Dienbienphu?"
—"Well?"
—"Here Khrushchev says you were right. The Vietcong were ready to give up."
—"Does he say that?"
—"Not in so many words. He says they were surprised when we offered to divide the country at the 17th parallel; he says that was their maximum hope."
—"Sounds interesting."
—"Yes, Mr. President."
—"Sounds great, Professor, how are we going to exploit that?"
—"Mr. President, does that perhaps suggest to you that even today. . . .?"
—"They might be closer to surrender than we imagine?"
—"Yes, Mr. President!"
—Professor, do you think these memoirs are authentic?

H. P.

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THE BATTLE STALIN LOST

Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953 by Vladimir Dedijer



They had been faithful followers of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe. Why then did Stalin turn against them and begin the "silent strangulation" of Yugoslavia in 1948? The answers are here in Vladimir Dedijer's personal account of the Soviet/Yugoslav confrontation. From his unique vantage point, this renowned historian, journalist, and friend of Tito illuminates Yugoslavia's bloodless but searing struggle for control of her national destiny. The relationship between Yugoslavia, 1948, and Czechoslovakia, 1968, is obvious. And the growing neo-Stalinism in Russia today makes this insightful look back even more important.

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Here are some hard, vital answers to the questions Americans are asking about what's really happening in Southeast Asia today: *What are North Vietnam's long-term goals in Laos? What is North Vietnam's role in the Lao Communist movement? How is the war conducted in the Lao Communist zone and on the Ho Chi Minh trail?* This report by two experts on Southeast Asia — based on North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao documents, official papers, broadcast transcripts, and unprecedented on-the-scene interviews — is unquestionably the most complete, *documented* account published about today's crucial war in Laos. 5 maps. $5.95

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PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LAOS

PAUL F. LANGER AND JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF

A Rand Corporation Research Study

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DISSENT

APRIL 1971

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

"Okay, you monsters! You're getting smaller and SMALLER AND SMALLER"

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The Courier-Journal
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Nat Goldfinger

Inflation, Wages & Profits

March 1, 1971

THERE ARE DIFFERENT KINDS and degrees of inflation at different times and in different places. The search for a universally applicable, simplistic and workable solution must therefore prove elusive.

Attempts to explain the causes of inflation simply by mechanical, mathematical comparisons of changes in unemployment, workers' wages, and the price level tell us little, if anything, about business pricing policies, income distribution, social forces, and changes in the economy's structure. They frequently also contain strong elements of hostility or bias against workers. And comparisons of inflation in the U.S. with other countries neglect substantial economic and social differences. The U.S. is certainly not a developing country like Brazil. Nor is it like Sweden, Holland, or Germany. Despite similarities among industrial countries, the highly productive and continental-sized American economy—with its diverse, decentralized nature and heterogeneous society—is significantly different from much smaller, more centralized and homogeneous nations, such as Japan and those of Western Europe.

The search for workable solutions in a rapidly changing and complex American economy requires examination of specific social and economic developments. Workable solutions are needed, although inflation is surely not America's most crucial social and economic problem —witness the urban crisis of the past decade and the high unemployment among the unskilled, Negroes, and disadvantaged even in relatively good times. But a widespread fear of inflation—as it persisted even in the twilight years of the Weimar Republic, despite the depression, mounting unemployment of workers and impoverishment of the middle class—can immobilize economic policy.

THE INFLATION PROBLEM that plagued the country increasingly in 1965–70 had its origins in the early 1960s—in an unsustainable capital-goods boom, largely based on a sharply rising flow of after-tax cash to corporations, government encouragement, and government subsidies. In 1962, for example, the 7 percent tax credit for business investment in equipment was instituted and depreciation write-offs of plant and equipment were accelerated. These two federal government actions resulted in the annual addition of several billion dollars to the after-tax cash flow to corporations. They fueled the fires of a sharp rise of business investment in plant and equipment during most of 1963–69, after sales and production rose sufficiently to increase industry's use of productive capacity. In addition, since depreciation write-offs are listed as cost of doing business, the step-up of these write-offs increased reported costs, with implications for prices. And these two measures also provided corporations with funds for a very sharp increase of investments in foreign subsidiaries.

The theory of the "New Economics" group, which pushed this program, was that such a regressive shift of income distribution was required to spur economic growth and increased employment after the near-stagnation of most of the 1950s. By 1965—after the 1964 adoption of the additional and major stimulus of a large tax cut on both personal and business incomes to boost demand for goods, services, and employment—economic growth had stepped up and unemployment had declined. But the national economy was unbalanced by a one-sector capital-goods boom.

An indication of this unbalanced development, in the early part of the decade, can be seen in the following trends from 1962, after

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the upturn from the 1960–61 recession, in the period 1962–65. While total personal after-tax income rose about in line with the gross national product, the cash-flow to corporations (after tax profits plus depreciation allowances) and business investment in plants and machines rose about 50 percent faster.

	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME AFTER FEDERAL TAXES
1965	$684.9 billion	$473.2 billion
1962	$560.3 billion	$385.3 billion
	+22%	+23%
	CORPORATE AFTER-TAX CASH-FLOW	BUSINESS FIXED INVESTMENT
1965	$82.9 billion	$71.3 billion
1962	$61.3 billion	$51.7 billion
	+35%	+37%

By 1965 this lopsided trend was creating localized cost and price pressures in the capital-goods sector of the economy. In addition, the rise of business investment in plants and machines was so sharp, in relation to total national production, that it was unsustainable; there was a clear danger that the very rapid addition of new and frequently automated productive capacity would gradually build up a considerable amount of idle plant and equipment, the usual prelude to a recessionary decline.

Moreover, the capital-goods boom involved —at least in part—such industries as electrical machinery, which are dominated by key price-leading corporations, industries in which there is little effective price competition.

Simultaneously, in the early 1960s, the government promulgated a so-called wage-price guidepost policy. Average increases in wages and fringe benefits were supposed to be limited voluntarily to the trend figure of rising real private output per man-hour (productivity) in the previous five years—a percentage that was soon nailed down to 3.2 percent and with the passage of time developed into a rigid 3.2 percent fixation.

By contrast, the "voluntary guidepost" for prices was a vague theoretical truism, devoid of operational policy implications: the price level would remain stable, if prices of rapidly rising productivity industries would decline while prices of other industries would remain stable or increase, depending on their rates of productivity increase in relation to the national average.

From this theoretical formulation, those who devised the guidepost simply leaped over all the realities of price-setting and assumed that the price level would indeed remain stable. This assumption led them in turn to assume that the 3.2 percent rise in average wages and fringe benefits would fully represent 3.2 percent gains in purchasing power, equal to the trend increase in productivity. On this basis, the distribution of income among the factors of production—labor and property—would supposedly remain the same.

In reality, the "voluntary guidepost" policy contained a precise percentage guideline for increases in workers' wages and fringe benefits, but no effective guideline for prices. And there was no guideline at all for profits, dividends, executive compensation, and other forms of income.

For a time, the wage guideline appeared to hold down wage increases—the public pressure of the 3.2 percent guideline was reinforced by continuing high levels of unemployment and the high priority placed by the trade union membership on job security. In the absence of any effective guideline for prices, the Administration engaged in occasional, ad hoc actions to prevent or curtail some specific price increases. But there was no operational policy, and there were no ad hoc actions, to reduce prices in industries whose productivity was rising very rapidly. Price cuts did not offset price increases, and the price level moved up slowly.

The guidepost policy was set within the conceptual framework of the business executive. Wages were considered as a cost of doing business, which they are. But the other side of the coin—that wages are workers' incomes and the primary income source of most families—was essentially ignored. Moreover, the policy ignored all costs other than workers' wages—such as executive compensation, materials, power, and rent. It also ignored other incomes such as profits, dividends, capital gains, and the incomes of self-employed professionals. So other incomes were free of government re-

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straint—including the salary increases of the professors who devised the policy.

Because of these inherent difficulties, the theory of the guidepost policy did not work from its very inception. The theory assumed a stable price level but had no operational mechanism to achieve it, while it provided employers with some additional weight to hold down workers' wage increases.

Wages and fringe benefits increased only 3–4 percent per year in this period. After accounting for the slow 1–1.5 percent yearly rise of living costs, increases in the buying power of employee compensation were less than the 3.2 percent productivity guideline. The actual operation of the guidepost policy, therefore, reinforced the regressive fiscal measures in shifting the shares of expanding national output to the cash flow to corporations, dividends, capital gains, and investment in plants and machines.

Unit employment costs in manufacturing declined slightly in the first half of the 1960s, while the wholesale price level of manufactured goods moved up slowly. In the total private economy, there was a similar trend; there were slight increases in unit employment costs, while the Consumer Price Index rose slowly, but more than twice as fast as unit employment costs. With other unit costs relatively stable or declining, profit margins widened and, with the rise of production and sales, total profits shot up—bolstering the fiscal measures to accelerate the rise of the corporate cash flow and the business-investment boom.

As a result, from 1960 to 1965, the rise in purchasing power of employee compensation per man-hour lagged considerably behind the increase of productivity. While total real private output per man-hour increased at an average yearly rate of about 3.6 percent, the buying power of employee compensation per hour, in the private economy, increased only about 2.9 percent per year. The lag for nonsupervisory workers was even greater.

By the mid-1960s, therefore, there was a profit inflation and a one-sector capital-goods boom, which was beginning to generate localized, inflationary demand pressures.

In addition, during 1964 and particularly in 1965, there was an outburst of liberal energy—the adoption of scores of federal programs to modernize and reform American economy and society. One need only mention a few—the historic breakthrough of civil rights legislation, federal aid for education, medicare, the model-cities law, and the antipoverty program. Most of these programs involved federal grants to the states and to local governments, particularly to the cities. The vast outpouring of federal legislation in 1965 set up scores of programs, with small expenditures and built-in increases, as the efforts proved themselves, expanded, and developed experience. But for the first couple of years, the expenditure levels for most of these separate programs were relatively small.

Then, toward the end of 1965, the acceleration of Vietnam expenditures was superimposed on this situation—with further sharp increases in demand in defense-related industries, many of which were also involved in the government-encouraged capital-goods boom. And in the offing was the impact on the federal budget of the delayed-fuse operations of much of the social and economic reform program enacted in 1964 and 1965.

II

FROM THE VIEWPOINT of economic policy—and with the advantage of hindsight—it is now conventional wisdom to state that a tax increase was needed in early 1966 to offset the rise of military expenditures. But this conventional wisdom of most conservative and liberal economists is much too simplistic and superficial in respect to a huge economy with many different sectors, income groups, product and labor markets. It also neglects the social consequences of economic policy decisions.

What was needed were pinpointed policies and measures to reduce specific pressures. What was needed was not simply a tax increase in itself—but tax measures to curb the soaring rise of after-tax profits, to remove the 7 percent tax-credit subsidy for investment in equipment, to curtail the sharp increases of dividends and capital gains. *The primary objectives should have been to redress the regressive shift of income distribution and to curb the one-sector capital-goods boom,* the only sector of the private economy that was rising sharply.

Moreover, in February 1966, as military spending was beginning to accelerate, the AFL–CIO Executive Council stated that if the President determined the necessity of an overall

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stabilization effort, the AFL–CIO would cooperate—provided the mandatory controls were even-handed on all costs, prices, rents, and incomes, including profits, dividends, and executive compensation, as well as the wages and salaries of workers.

But the Administration made no major effort for a tax increase until 1967, and even then there were no moves for an overall and equitable mandatory stabilization program. The federal budget deficit soared, in a period of increasing economic activity, increasing employment and declining unemployment. At the same time, the government-encouraged capital-goods boom continued. The Federal Reserve applied a temporary dose of very tight money and high interest rates in 1966—resulting in a temporary money crunch, a temporary slowing of the economy, and a temporary slow-down of the capital-goods boom. But the budget deficit continued to rise—applying pressures in the money markets, as a great volume of federal borrowing was floated, while business loans, to finance the capital-goods boom and business mergers, also shot up.

One should recall, here, that the period of the late 1960s saw the biggest wave of business mergers in American history—increasing the concentration of economic power in a narrowing group of large corporations and banks and increasing the price-raising ability of the dominant companies in key industries. So interest rates moved up in the later 1960s, the price level rose, and the cash flow to corporations continued upward. Workers, whose buying power was being eroded by the accelerating rise of consumer prices, sought larger wage increases to try to offset the rise in the price level and to gain some improvements in living standards. The pace of wage- and fringe-benefit settlements began to step up in 1966–68, though only after many months of the accelerated rise of living costs.

Unit labor costs rose, following their relative stability in 1960–65. But prices moved up at a fast pace, and in the entire period, 1960–69, the increase of real employee compensation lagged considerably behind the rise of productivity, with an even greater lag in the increase of real hourly compensation of nonsupervisory workers in the private economy.

The temporary tax increase that was belatedly adopted by Congress in mid-1968 was hardly progressive, and it was not directed at the economy's pressure spots. The 10 percent surtax was applied to all corporations and all individuals alike, except the poor. And the tax increase was combined with a hold-down on federal expenditures.

In the second half of 1968, after the surtax went into effect, the rise of economic activities began to slow somewhat. At the same time, the rise of military spending began to taper off, after nearly three years of very sharp increases. Fearing a sharp drop of economic activities, the Federal Reserve increased the money supply rather rapidly, for several months.

Then the Republicans won the presidential election in November 1968. Almost immediately, a new economic policy was installed. An economic squeeze began in December, when the Federal Reserve tightened its monetary policy, and in January 1969 the Nixon administration took office and reinforced the squeeze. In the name of combatting inflation, the government set out to choke off economic expansion.

By May and June 1969, the government's squeeze on the economy tightened. The nation's money supply hardly increased at all between June 1969 and February 1970; interest rates skyrocketed to the highest peaks since the Civil War: federal construction projects were cut. Even President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers states that the steep rise of interest rates "may well have been unprecedented."

Interest rates on triple A corporate bonds, for example, soared from 6.18 percent in 1968 to an 8.48 percent peak in June 1970—a shocking increase of 37 percent, pushing up costs and prices, all along the line. And the effective interest rate on new FHA-insured home mortgages rose from 7.13 percent in 1968 to a peak of 9.29 percent in March 1970—a rise of about 30 percent, which, in combination with the soaring rise of interest rates on builders' loans, clobbered residential construction, boosted housing costs for consumers, and added to a housing shortage.

Yet there was no classical inflationary condition of too many dollars chasing too few goods that could possibly justify putting the American economy through such a tight wringer. There were no general, widespread shortages of goods and manpower. Defense expenditures were leveling off after a sharp rise in the previous three years. Industry was operating at merely

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84 percent of its productive capacity. As a result of the capital-goods boom, plants and machines were being installed at a rapid pace and increasing industry's capacity to produce.

The most immediate and devastating impact of the government's economic squeeze was on residential construction. Housing starts, which were at a 1.9 million annual rate in January 1969 began to decline in February. They dropped sharply through 1969 and through April and May 1970, when the yearly rate of housing starts was down to 1.2 million. The nation's housing goal of 26 million new and rehabilitated housing units in ten years was set back drastically.

With the steep advance of interest rates, state and local governments were compelled to put off building hospitals, roads, and public buildings. Federal government restraints on public construction further aggravated such postponements in 1969 and early 1970. Attempts to meet high-priority social needs—such as housing and community facilities—were hit first and hardest.

Small and medium-sized businesses found it impossible to obtain bank credit or could do so only at extortionate interest rates.

Skyrocketing interest rates raised costs and prices all along the line from the farmer and manufacturer to the wholesaler, retailer, and consumer—adding to inflationary pressures in the name of combatting inflation. Soaring interest rates also increased the costs of federal, state, and local governments. Moreover, these peak interest rates built in high costs and prices for years to come—on long-term residential mortgages, for example.

The rise in the government's interest rate on FHA and VA mortgages from 7.5 to 8.5 percent, in January 1970, provides merely one example of the impact of skyrocketing interest rates on living costs. On a 30-year, $20,000 mortgage, that rise in the mortgage rate increased monthly payments on principal and interest by about 10 percent—to be paid every month for 30 years. Over the 30-year life of the mortgage, that increase alone would be approximately $5,000—more than the total wages and fringe benefits of the construction workers who built that house. In fact, a $20,000 mortgage would cost the home-owner a total of $55,362, in payments on principal and interest.

These discriminatory consequences of the Administration's policies also brought a recessionary decline in economic activities—urgently needed home-building dropped, consumers cut their purchases of expensive items, and smaller businesses as well as state and local governments postponed projects.

The inevitable results brought additional, inequitable developments, as layoffs and production cutbacks spread. Workers were hit by rising unemployment, cuts in working hours, and accelerated increases in living costs—a combination of inflation and recession.

Moreover, these developments added further to inflationary pressures, as the recessionary decline of sales and production suppressed the rise of productivity and boosted unit costs and prices. The rise of the Consumer Price Index accelerated from 4.2 percent in 1968 to 5.4 in 1969 and to 6 percent in 1970.

III

THE SEVERE SQUEEZE on the economy had very little quick effect on the activities of most big, blue-chip corporations through 1969 and into early 1970—with their huge profits, large depreciation allowances, and lines of credit at the banks. Through 1969, they continued to fuel the fires of the only inflationary demand sector of the private economy—the capital-goods boom—despite unprecedented interest rates and increasing amounts of idle capacity.

Although the federal government's economic squeeze was supposed to be socially neutral, the record shows that it was not. Despite the severe monetary restraint that affected most groups in the economy, Vice Chairman J. L. Robertson of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors pointed out on May 14, 1970, that "commercial bank lending was not effectively curbed in 1969." Governor Robertson declared:

> Business loans expanded at about the same rapid pace as in the latter part of 1968. If we adjust the statistics to take account of sales of business loans under repurchase of agreements, the rate of increase of business loans made by weekly reporting banks actually rose in 1969. Monetary policy succeeded only in curbing business lending by the smaller banks. The big banks found ways to step up their lending. . . .
>
> We tried to plug up some of the loopholes. One big one was the banks' use of Euro-dollars. The big banks doubled their Euro-dollar liabilities in the first seven months of 1969. . . ."

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Federal Reserve restraint was not imposed on these operations until the late summer of 1969.

Governor Robertson went on: "Some banks also made heavy use of commercial paper, mainly that of newly created one-bank holding companies. . . . The loophole still exists, and commercial paper liabilities of the banks rose nearly 50 percent in the first quarter of 1970."

So, the banks evaded the squeeze and increased their lending. While available funds dried up for residential construction, state and local governments, and smaller business, increased bank loans were extended to the big corporations and the rich—for continuation of the unsustainable capital-goods boom, business mergers, and conglomerate takeovers, gambling casinos, land speculation, investments in foreign subsidiaries, and unnecessary inventory accumulation.

By early 1970, the economic squeeze began to affect some of the major corporations. In their almost frenzied efforts to build huge conglomerate empires and to expand plant and equipment at a very fast pace, some corporations had borrowed heavily from the banks—partly through high-interest commercial paper loans. Some corporations—Penn Central, for example—found themselves in a very tight liquidity squeeze, loaded with loans that the bankers were calling up. Their credit rating began to shake, in an economic environment of declining sales and production.

In February 1970, the Federal Reserve modestly eased its monetary policy. The postal workers' strike forced the Administration to grant a wage increase for federal employees. In the private sector of the economy, most unions gained substantial wage increases. Other developments added to some easing of the squeeze on the economy—including the beginning of small tax cuts and the ending of the 7 percent tax-credit subsidy, under the terms of the Revenue Act of 1969.

But a major factor in this modest easing of the restrictions on the economy during the course of 1970 was the impact of the recession itself. Business loans declined somewhat and interest rates moved down from their heights, as industrial production declined. And with industry's operating rate falling to about 76 percent of productive capacity by the end of the year—after much of a decade of a capital-goods boom—business outlays for plant and equipment leveled off.

Although the modest easing of monetary restraint after February 1970 halted the stock-market decline and the threatened collapse of several overextended corporations, the recession continued. Housing starts and state and local government activities picked up. But sales and production in other parts of the economy weakened. Unemployment rose, accompanied by rapidly rising living costs. By the end of 1970, the number of jobless was 5 million—or 6 percent of the labor force—up 2.3 million from January 1969, when the economic squeeze got underway.

The average nonsupervisory worker in private employment who was lucky enough to hold his job saw the buying power of his after-tax weekly earnings decline. In November 1970, for example, the weekly after-tax earnings of such a worker with three dependents were $105.88—and after accounting for the rapid rise of living costs, the buying power of his take-home pay was almost 2 percent below the previous year and even less than in 1965.

The inflation of the 1960s started with a profit inflation and one-sector capital-goods boom—plus a three-year rise of military spending, beginning in late 1965, that was not offset by an equitable tax increase to ease the actual pressures in the private economy. In the latter part of the decade, particularly in 1969–70, a credit inflation was added and cost-price pressures were aggravated further by skyrocketing interest rates and suppressed productivity increases.

Corporate profits shot up sharply in the 1960s, much faster than wages and salaries.

In the first half of 1969, before the onset of the recession, the after-tax cash flow to corporations was up approximately 91 percent from 1960. But the after-tax personal income of all Americans was up only about 76 percent—about one-fifth less than the corporate cash flow. And that includes the effects of a large increase in employment as well as the income gains of individuals.

The after-tax weekly earnings of the average non-supervisory worker were up only about 34 percent—three-fifths less than the corporate cash-flow. In terms of buying power, the gain was only approximately 10 percent.

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The profit inflation of 1960–65 continued through much of the second half of the decade, until the economic slump—with the rise of interest rates, lag in productivity, and weakness in sales and production—brought a decline in profits of nonfinancial corporations between mid-1969 and mid-1970.

However, in the late 1960s and particularly in 1969–70, interest rates rose—increasing costs and prices and producing sharply rising bank profits. So, while the cash flow of nonfinancial corporations rose more slowly in the late 1960s and declined somewhat between mid-1969 and mid-1970, bank profits soared.

Over the entire period since 1960—and in almost every year of the decade—the shares of economic progress have been shifted away from employees and have gone to the added gains of other groups in the economy. The 1970 Handbook of Labor Statistics, published by the Labor Department, reports that in the 12-year-period of 1957–69, real output per man-hour in the private economy rose at a yearly rate of 3.3 percent. But real compensation per man-hour of employees (wages plus fringe benefits) increased at an average annual pace of only 2.6 percent. AFL–CIO estimates indicate an even slower rise in real hourly compensation of nonsupervisory workers in private employment. This considerable lag indicates a continuing shift in income distribution during recent years.

Thus income gains shifted away from employees—and particularly from nonsupervisory workers. This income shift has gone, in large part, to the benefit of business and bank profits and depreciation allowances, and another part has probably been to the benefit of such self-employed groups as doctors and lawyers.

In the early 1960s, America needed balanced, expansionary economic policies to boost production and employment after the near-stagnation of most of the 1950s—with an emphasis on meeting social requirements and on improved income distribution. The policies that were adopted, however, emphasized expansionary tax-reduction measures, combined with regressive trends in the distribution of the gains of economic progress and a one-sector business-investment boom. In the later part of the decade, America needed selective economic policies to curb specific pressures and to create a better balance among economic groups in the society, as well as emphasis on attempting to meet socially vital needs. Instead, we got an aggregate squeeze on the economy, with its socially discriminatory and inequitable impacts and recessionary decline.

IV

THE U.S. CAN NO LONGER AFFORD to depend solely on aggregate fiscal and monetary analysis and measures that were originally developed in an earlier and simpler time, before rapid and radical changes in technology, urban growth, and race relations. Nor can the nation's economic policy-makers continue the hypocrisy, emanating from academic spokesmen, that proclaims such aggregate analysis and measures to be socially neutral.

America cannot afford to continue to victimize home-building and aggravate the urban crisis, or to maintain policies that result in continuing layoffs and rising unemployment. Neither can the government ignore changes in income distribution and the structure of the economy.

Selective approaches and measures are needed to get at specific problems—along with general measures. If the government had pursued selective measures to curtail the specific pressures in the private economy in 1968–70, the severe squeeze, with resultant recession, could have been avoided. Had the government adopted selective, pinpointed measures in 1966, much of the inflation problem of 1966–68 would not have occurred. Indeed, had the government engaged in balanced, expansionary measures in the early 1960s, the foundation for some of the later inflationary problems would not have been laid.

One of the many difficulties in economic-policy decision-making stems from the simplistic emphasis on gross mathematical aggregates that dominates the textbooks and thinking of most university and government economists. On this score, the differences between most of the conservative and liberal economists is not very great; they both concentrate on gross aggregates, but on different ones, the liberals on fiscal (federal tax and expenditure) policy and the conservatives on monetary (money supply) policy.

Most of the liberal economists probably

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would have been more cautious in applying an aggregate tight squeeze on the economy; income is more important in the operation of the economy than monetary aggregates. But neither group pays much attention to social consequences of their recommendations and to the need for pinpointed selective measures to meet such social requirements as housing and urban development, community facilities, education, and health care. During 1969 and the first half of 1970, most of the "New Economics" group was relatively uncritical of the Administration's tight economic squeeze. Their major point of difference was their call for a revived, voluntary guidepost policy—to press down on workers' wage increases, despite the accelerating rise of living costs.

The AFL–CIO repeatedly urged the government to adopt selective measures to curb the specific causes of inflation, without creating a recession and rising unemployment. It also repeatedly urged the government to plan for a swift and socially useful conversion from military production. If the government had followed such policies, it would have curbed the amount of credit going to the blue-chip corporations and wealthy people for mergers, conglomerate takeovers, land speculation, gambling casinos, and investments in foreign subsidiaries. It would have provided the means for the needed flow of money into housing and community facilities, and would also have provided offsets to declining defense production. There would have been no severe tight-money, high-interest-rate squeeze on the economy.

But the Administration chose to choke off economic expansion in early 1969. Instead of selective measures to aid the economy, the Federal Reserve and the Administration chose severe economic restraint. Yet the Federal Reserve did use selective measures to reduce margin requirements for purchase of stock to encourage stock-market speculation and to remove the interest-rate ceiling on 30- to 90-day bank deposits of at least $100,000—which aided banks, blue chips, and the wealthy.

In December 1969, Congress granted the President broad authority to curb the specific causes of credit inflation, to set up selective credit controls, to impose interest-rate ceilings and to expand credit for needed housing, public facilities, and regular business operations. This represented congressional recognition of the need for selective, pinpointed measures.

Confronted by the President's failure to use this authority, the AFL–CIO urged the Congress to direct the Federal Reserve System to establish selective credit controls, maximum interest rates on specific types of loans, and the allocation of credit to where it will do the most good for America—to direct the flow of available credit, at reasonable interest rates, into housing, public facilities, and the regular operations of business while curtailing the flow of credit for low-priority purposes. Organized labor also urged Congress to adopt legislation to require that a portion of such tax-exempt funds as pension, college endowment, and foundation funds—as well as bank reserves—be invested in government-guaranteed mortgages to help meet the goal of 26 million housing units in ten years.

V

GOVERNMENT ACTION IS NEEDED to curb the price-raising ability of the dominant corporations and to curtail the greatly increasing concentration of economic power in a narrowing group of huge corporations and banks. In pursuit of this objective, a thorough investigation by the Congress of the structure of the American economy, along the lines of the TNEC studies of 30 years ago, is long overdue.

The specific causes of soaring pressures on living costs, such as physicians' fees, hospital charges, housing costs, and auto insurance, should be examined, and practical, sensible measures to dampen these pressures should be developed. And a land-use policy is needed, particularly in and near metropolitan areas, to curb land speculation and provide the basis for the rational, planned development of urban areas and recreational facilities.

If the President determines that the situation requires overall stabilization measures—after the establishment of selective credit controls—the AFL–CIO has repeated its offer to cooperate. Such mandatory controls are equitably placed on all costs and incomes—including all prices, profits, dividends, rents, and executive compensation, as well as employees' wages and salaries.

Above all, policies are needed to revitalize the economy—to get America on the road to

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full employment as rapidly as possible. America needs an expanding supply of money and credit —and government efforts to drive down interest rates, so as to stimulate the required expansion of economic activity and reduce price pressures.

The full funding of federal appropriations for such socially vital requirements as housing, education, health care, community facilities, and hospitals is obviously and urgently required in order to create employment opportunities in meeting social needs.

The federal government must also establish a public-service employment program in order to create jobs for the long-term unemployed and seriously underemployed—and to provide badly needed public services—as an integral part of a national manpower policy aimed at upgrading the skills of the labor force and assisting the unemployed to find jobs.

Increases in real incomes of workers are needed to provide the basis for some improvements of living conditions. In an economy where about two-thirds of output is composed of consumer goods and services, the end of economic stagnation and the rapid reduction of unemployment cannot be achieved without increases in the purchasing power of workers' earnings.

Restoration of economic growth and rising employment are essential, to step up the pace of increasing productivity that would ease the pressures on unit costs and move rapidly to full employment which, in itself, is not the end-all and be-all. But without it, the nation can hardly begin to solve most of the social and economic problems that plague us, including the urgent need to bring the Negro population into the mainstream of the society.

The Fair Labor Standards Act needs to be updated to provide federal government protection to the millions of workers who are still not covered by this statute and to raise the federal minimum wage above the woefully inadequate $1.60 level. These measures to aid the working poor, coupled with an adequate federal family assistance program for those poverty-stricken people who cannot work, would go a long way toward eliminating the blight of poverty from America. In addition, social security payments to the aged should be raised to realistic levels, to improve the generally low living standards of those who are too old to work. Such measures would also lift most of the growing burden of welfare payments—frequently inadequate, especially in the southern states—from state and local governments.

A planned national effort under federal leadership is required to apply as much of the nation's resources as possible to meet vital public needs within a reasonable period of years. Such effort should be based on a national inventory of needs in the various categories. The federal government should develop, coordinate, and maintain a national inventory of public needs, based on present backlogs and future population growth. Each state and metropolitan area should be encouraged to develop an inventory of needs within its geographical jurisdiction, in addition to the development of a coordinated national inventory, prepared by the federal government.

Such a comprehensive inventory of needs should provide the foundation for nationwide programs in each category—based on federal financial and technical assistance to the state and local governments, including federal grants-in-aid and guaranteed loans, as well as direct federal efforts. To facilitate such an effort, a federal urban bank may be required to provide long-term, low-interest loans for moderate and low-income housing construction and community facilities. Target dates should be established for achieving specified objectives and the pace should be speeded up or slowed down, depending on changes in the availability of manpower and productive capacity. The federal government, the states, and metropolitan government authorities should develop such inventories of needs in housing, community facilities, and public services as soon as possible and move ahead rapidly, with sufficient funds and resources, to meet the requirements of a rapidly growing urban population.

In addition, the long overdue national health-insurance system should be established as rapidly as feasible—including improvements in the delivery of health-care services.

The mistakes and inequities in economic policy of the 1960s can and should be corrected. The political system offers the means for achieving the needed improvements.

These are complex social and economic issues. Slogans are no solution. The search for

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a single issue that encompasses all problems or for a utopian one-shot panacea leads merely to frustration and a cop-out. In the real world, social and economic progress can be achieved only by tough-minded analysis—and, in a democratic political system, by the necessary daily chores to convince a majority of the electorate and legislators. In the United States, such effort requires the effective coalition of economic liberals and the civil rights movement with the AFL–CIO, which is the only major organized force in American society that works day-in and day-out on a broad range of progressive, national, social and economic issues.

Pran Chopra

The Inevitability of Mrs. Gandhi

February 27, 1971

I WANT TO PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE the great split in the Congress party of India in the middle of 1969, its leftward swing since then, and the hesitation in that swing during the fall of 1970, soon after the party's ruling body, the All-India Congress Committee, met in the capital city of Bihar, politically the most unstable state in India.

The split came in part as the climax to a tussle between the party and the government, something that often occurs in a parliamentary system. An influential caucus in the Congress, imbued with a strong king-making complex, had engineered Mrs. Gandhi's choice as Prime Minister in 1966; she was then, or so they thought, a political fledgling, likely to be a useful vote-catcher because she is the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru. But a clash began to build up as soon as she showed she would not be the mere puppet of the Congress machine. And behind this struggle of cliques and personalities, rival values were struggling for ascendancy. Age, orthodoxy and conservatism on one side, and on the other youth, a strong desire for economic and social change, and a willingness to risk some dynamic instability in Indian life.

The lines were not, of course, as clearly drawn as I here suggest. Old leaders were on both sides; so were those few in the Congress who used to be thought of as progressives and socialists. The radicalism spouted by Mrs. Gandhi had its content of moderation, and her opponents whatever their private opinions, were quite willing to mix a little socialistic rhetoric in their public pronouncements. But the difference was as clear as between twilight and dawn, and so it was seen by the people—which in politics is as important as the objective reality. The imprecations hurled by each side at the other—selling the country to "the Communists" was the favorite charge against Mrs. Gandhi, selling it to "vested interests" and "capitalism" against the others—only showed the public where each side stood in the other's eyes. Since the split there has been far greater ideological differentiation than at any time before.

During the struggle for freedom, the Congress party had been a monolithic yet all-inclusive movement, with one overriding objective to which all shades of interest in India could subscribe. And this it tried to remain even after independence, so as to retain a monopoly of power by pleasing all interests (while satisfying none). The momentum of its heroic phase helped it to do so; the inertia of India helped a bit more; Nehru's umbrellalike leadership helped most of all. But, beneath the surface, group interests were taking shape under the powerful incentive of general elections which, held on adult franchise, are the world's most massive.

Some old groups were getting eroded, as of caste for example; but new ones were coming up, as of language, region, and economic class. Since power followed numbers, as it must in elections, it moved out of the town into the country, out of the upper-middle-class intelligentsia into a broader lower-middle class; and each phase of this movement gave rise to new groups. The increase in industrialization, for Indian conditions quite rapid, added a labor-based politics. Rural poverty was slower in

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carving out its politics but has been given a spurt, paradoxically, by the first economic breakthrough seen in Indian agriculture, which has brought some prosperity to the village but also more disparity in economic conditions and has lowered even the dumbest Indian peasant's threshold of toleration.

Under these pressures, the power of the Congress had to crack one day, and it began to crack just before our fourth general election in 1967. Opposition pressures mounted; parties that had singly been ineffective now formed all-inclusive anti-Congress fronts, and in 1967 took over half the states of the Indian Union, while reducing the Congress majority in the federal Parliament to a thin margin.

Rightist parties gained as much ground in some of the heartland states as leftists in the rim states. But the myth of the Congress party's invincibility was broken. This enormously weakened Mrs. Gandhi's position within the Congress itself. She proved a flop as a vote-catcher; the time had therefore come, the party bosses thought, to insist that she must either get out or govern according to their *Dictat.*

But she saw the signs otherwise, and saw them right. She realized that the voters' disillusionment was neither with her nor the Congress, but only with the staleness of the status quo that the party had come to represent after 20 years in power. Therefore she would be stronger than the party bosses, the very symbol of the status quo, if she went over their heads to show them who had the wider appeal in the country.

The establishment tried to pull the noose of the party's power around her neck. But Mrs. Gandhi fought back spectacularly, rushed economic reform measures through the government machine, and forced the party to a split—a risk from which her father had always shrunk back, choosing to compromise instead. When the dust settled it was discovered that she had taken the bulk of the party with her; not only the rank and file and the cadres, but also many of the leaders who preferred to stay with the winning side. Since then, with the credit for more reform measures piling up on her side, she has proved in a series of local elections that her wing is almost the sole inheritor of the Congress party and the opposition wing, the Congress (0), only a splinter. She has acquired for herself a reputation for radicalism while remaining within the constitutional system.

The real test, however, lies not in proving that she is the true inheritor of the Congress party but in saving the system. Even if she acquired the entire base of the former party intact, she would only be the leader of a minority; even at its height under Nehru, the Congress had always polled less than half the vote, which itself rarely exceeded 60 percent of the electorate. Most of the rest is nowadays under a rising pressure from extraparliamentary forces —alienated sections of religious and ethnic minorities, the rebellious young, industrial and farm workers who no longer accept their poverty as God-given—all of them grist for parties of insurrection.

MRS. GANDHI'S PROBLEM therefore is how to reconstruct the party system so as to widen the base support for the parliamentary frame. By herself she cannot accomplish this, because she does not even have a simple majority, and because some of the system has been captured by parties which, although wedded to constitutionalism, are also wedded to economic conservatism, social orthodoxy, and total opposition. Therefore she has been trying to draw to herself all the democratic forces of the Left as well as the minorities. Whenever the political terrain justifies it—or makes not doing so electorally expensive—she has also joined hands with India's biggest party of minority communalism, the Muslim League, and with the Communist party, the more moderate (Moscow) wing of Indian Communism which seems closer to constitutional ways than the much bigger Maoist section, the CPI (Marxists) and, of course, the all-out insurrectionary CPI (Marxists-Leninists), known as the Naxalities.*

This eclecticism has paid off handsomely in Kerala, the tiny state in South India which became in 1957 the first place in the world to elect a Communist government in a free and fair ballot-box elections. Since then Kerala has been dominated by the "left Marxists." But in elections held in Kerala last September, Mrs. Gandhi routed them with the help of the CPI and the Muslim League, and at the same time reduced the Congress (0) and other conserva-

* See DISSENT, September–October 1970, for my report on the Naxalites.

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tive parties to an electoral joke. Only this kind of a broad left-of-center alliance might contain the pressure of discontent within the parliamentary frame. It is, I think, the only hope in India for economic change through legitimate politics. A constellation of chance, luck, daring, and political cunning has put Mrs. Gandhi in charge of this hope. But if not she, someone else would have been sooner or later; the surprise is only that the moment has been a quarter-century in the coming.

The reason for this delay is also the reason for the appearance of a swingback to the Right at the All-India Congress Committee meeting during the fall. A party as large as the Congress, even after the split, pretty much reflects the country. And a country like India has tremendous forces of economic and social conservatism, powerful within the Congress and still more so outside it. Ill-defined and amorphous, this elephantine party has a tremendous instinct for survival; it is the largest democratic political party in the world and the only one in the former colonies of the West that has continued to lead the country for more than ten years after winning independence.

It has survived largely because of the fluid balance within it. Whenever it sees any opposition building up, it innundates the opposition by simply moving to the Right or Left. Its innate conservatism used to act as a break upon Jawaharlal Nehru, snuffing out many of his progressive initiatives and exploiting his almost sentimental aversion to a split. It has made Mrs. Gandhi hesitate by playing up the danger—not entirely unreal—of a Hindu backlash in the north against the alliance with the Muslim League in the south, and to some extent a socialist backlash against the alliance with the Communists.

But her hesitation can only mean a pause, not a halt. She does not want to halt nor can she, and she certainly should not if the Indian experiment in parliamentary democracy is to prove more than a 25-year miracle. Despite steady economic improvement, tensions of discontent are growing, if only because mass elections have politicized the masses as nothing else could have done; *they have converted what was a relatively staid parliamentary system into a powerful drive for their demands.* These it must satisfy if it is not to collapse, and it cannot do so if the party in power is largely conservative. This is the rationale for the realignment Mrs. Gandhi is bringing about. That she may seek an alliance with the Communists or may herself capture their base support is a matter of detail.

Her opponents have accused her of programmatic gimmickry, and certainly there is much of that in her. The reforms on which she has concentrated so far have little economic significance; they have been put through because they have a tremendous political appeal. But in a tradition-bound country like India, which is full of well-established interests, real economic reform takes a lot of time and patience; gradualism and moderation are built-in restraints for anyone who does not wish to break up the country. In the meantime, the people have to be persuaded that a change has occurred. Mrs. Gandhi has been convinced of this for a long time. She told an audience in Washington in 1966, within weeks of being elected Prime Minister, that India could best be governed from a centrist position but with a leftist thrust.

Now that she is firmly in the saddle, this is the kind of thrust she is trying to develop. The tactics may vary from time to time, but the strategy will not. In one phase she may opt for alliances with other parties of the democratic Left, as she did in Kerala. In another, she may move over and occupy more of the democratic Left area herself. But the political balance of our party system will be the same.

In the last week of December, she announced dissolution of Parliament, the first time any Prime Minister has done so in India, and advanced the date of the next general elections from February 1972, to the first week of March this year. When she made the announcement, it was generally expected that she would invite the more democratic parties into electoral partnerships and share constituencies with them in which mutual contests would be avoided. Certainly these parties themselves expected it. But, encouraged by the current wave of popularity in her favor, her colleagues are pressing her not to be generous in handing over constituencies that she can capture herself. Therefore she is attempting the other tactics of crowding in on the democratic socialists. But this only represents a shift in the level of ambition and not either a change in her own political direction or that of the party system as a whole.

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Michael Walzer

VIOLENCE

The Police, the Militants, and the Rest of Us

POLITICS IS FIRST OF ALL the art of minimizing and controlling violence. It is a taxing and morally dangerous art because violence itself and the threat of violence are two of its instruments. These can be put to use with almost equal ease by the public authorities and by private men and women, but almost always more massively and more effectively by the authorities. So it is best to begin by worrying about them.

War, riot control, law enforcement, "maintenance of order," punishment: all these can involve violence. The word itself calls to mind (to my mind, at least) a charging phalanx of helmeted police, an image fixed, I suppose, as much by the media as by recent events. It is by no means an accurate picture of what it is sometimes said to represent: the state stripped naked. But it does make it impossible to pretend that "the use of physical force to inflict injury" (the dictionary definition of violent behavior) is something other than violent whenever the users are uniformed officials, and it is equally impossible to argue that official violence is somehow presumptively legitimate. Even the justification of punishment, the most ordinary form of official violence, is uncertain and much disputed among philosophers. The intermittent violence of everyday law enforcement is more commonly questioned, especially since historians began to compile the record of police and militia brutality against labor organizers, radical agitators, ethnic and racial minorities. And just as the state's use of violence is often cruel, needless, and illegitimate, so the state possesses no monopoly on legitimate use. We deny its monopoly every time we assert the right of self-defense or of collective resistance to tyranny.

What the state does have and should have is control—in this country it has exclusive control—of the means of massive violence, both human and material: the army and police, planes, tanks, artillery, and so on. Only the ownership of guns is legally the right of individuals in the U.S., and this is a right increasingly questioned—for very good reasons. The case for state control of the means of massive violence is so widely accepted that I need not review it here. I have to stress instead that the existence of such control, however justified, also establishes the state as a threat to us all. The threat is simply that violence will be used, as it has been so often in the past, not to protect everyone's rights or to enforce policies democratically agreed upon, but to defend the privileges of some few of us or to interfere with or repress democratic liberties. Obviously, no guarantees are possible here. Official violence is like unofficial violence, at least in this regard: it too inflicts injury, and it needs (in every case) to be justified. From the time of Thomas Hobbes on, the most successful efforts to justify the use of violence have undoubtedly been undertaken on behalf of the state. But these efforts do not free us from the burden of asking ourselves, over and over again, what are the prospects for the use of military and police power? Insofar as we defend state control, we have an obligation to watch over it.

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Recently, however, many of us have focused, except when talking about the Vietnam war, on unofficial violence. Urban riots, street confrontations, terrorism: these claimed our attention, even if only our critical attention. Confrontation and terror suggested a *politics* of unofficial violence toward which every leftist and liberal had to adopt a position. That was not hard to do, and no one deserves any special credit for setting himself against it, though there is some discredit to be distributed among those who patronized unofficial violence or apologized for it. "Nothing has ever been accomplished without violence"—this was the peculiarly debased slogan of the apologists, suggesting that it was not *only* in order to make omelets that one had to break eggs. It was necessary also in order to show contempt for the art of cooking, to leave the kitchen as messy as possible, to revenge oneself against bourgeois omelet-lovers, and so on. The only trouble is that all this can be accomplished and no one satisfied. And that is true as well of confrontation and terror: they represent a dead end of meaningless militancy. Nor has it taken very long to explore their farthest reaches.

But something happened in the last years of the 1960s that the militants and the rest of us ought to be concerned about. Police power was significantly strengthened and government surveillance over political activity widely extended. That is the usual outcome of unofficial violence, but just what it means for our immediate future is not easy to figure out.

It doesn't mean what we are sometimes told by both radical ideologists and their critics: that the country has been dangerously polarized or that we are in the midst of or on the verge of fascist repression. Instead of polarizing the country, the militants and terrorists have succeeded only in isolating themselves; they are cut off from any hope of a political base or of large-scale (even small-scale) popular support. The country as a whole seems less divided than it was in 1968—I'm not sure how one ought to feel about that. And the repression of the far Left since that time has been less organized and thorough (and the repression of terrorists considerably less efficient) than most of us expected, given the character of the national administration and all the opportunities it has had. There is, nevertheless, a great deal to worry about: above all, the apparent readiness of the police themselves to engage in confrontation politics; also the nighttime police raids; the shooting down of student demonstrators; the large number of men and women under indictment, often for offenses whose precise character is very unclear; the general and apparently not unrealistic sense of being watched and spied upon. Yet all this does not add up to a countrywide war against the Left. Most of the incidents that outrage us seem rather to be examples of local zealotry, reflecting the continuing and not the new weakness of liberal (and, needless to say, of far Left) politics in many parts of the country.

Nationally, however, things are not the same. Despite the Left's flirtation with localist ideologies, it is protected largely by national forces and would be better protected were this country's politics still more "nationalized." It seems certain that no one would have died at either Kent State or Jackson State had the Ohio National Guard or the Mississippi State Police been under effective federal control. It is significant also that the least bloody of our ghetto riots occurred in Washington, D.C., and, again, that federal courts often overturn the convictions won by local prosecutors. At the present time, and for the foreseeable future, massive repression simply does not have the support of national elites, nor can it be worked through national institutions. The reports of one presidential commission after another—they must reflect *someone's* opinion—point as clearly as one could wish to the absence of any ideology of repression at the national level. Nor does the political campaign for law and order seem likely to change any of

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this. The 1970 elections suggest instead that far Left violence has not been exploited so as to enlarge the base of conservative support. Given all this, talk of an American fascism seems only a particularly gruesome (and for some people, I suppose, entertaining) escape from the need to face honestly the extent of far Left failure—and the real, if more limited, dangers that failure always brings.

But there is escapism also on what might be called the "near Left"—a term I take to include not only democratic socialists like the editors and readers of DISSENT, but also many liberals, even those who apologize for far Left violence, since they are apologists at such a distance.

WE HAVE BEEN TERRIBLY RELUCTANT to face the unpleasant but critically important question: *just what sort of law enforcement do we want?* For example:

—*Are we in favor of a national police force or have we opted definitively for local control? A national force would surely be more liberal (and better disciplined) than many local forces; at least it would be more liberal right now; but it would also give to the central government a kind of power that liberals and conservatives alike have always warned against.*

—*Do we want the National Guard abolished, or its members more widely recruited and better trained? Many of the most disgraceful incidents in the long history of official violence are the work of the National Guard; yet at the same time it is the closest thing we have to a citizens' militia. (But after reading the polls on the work of the Guard at Kent State, we may be soured on citizens.)*

—*How do we feel about the many local budgetary decisions that are providing more and more money for the police? Like other municipal employees, they have been badly underpaid, but have they also been underequipped? The Kerner Commission said so, but warned at the same time against supplying policemen with automatic rifles and machine guns. And what about mace and helicopters and other devices tested in Vietnam?*

—*What do we think of the infiltration of police spies into far Left organizations? into terrorist groups? Is there some line to be drawn between people who can be spied upon and people (like us) who cannot be?*

—*At what point do we want police called onto a university campus or sent into battle against political demonstrators or rioters? And then, do we want them to enforce the law (and collect people for punishment) or simply to keep the peace as best they can?*

—*Do any of us really think that policemen are "pigs"? And if anyone does believe that, will he refrain from calling on them when faced with a riot or a bombing?*

I don't want to suggest by any of these questions that we should be prepared to accept the erosion of civil liberties. The libertarian struggles of the past decade, however, have been largely concerned with the establishment of judicial restraints on police action. These will certainly need to be defended; they are already under attack. I mean to call attention now to the problem of political control. For it is clear that important political decisions have been and will continue to be made by police officials in areas where the courts cannot or will not interfere. They exercise discretion as to what laws they will enforce, with what degree of violence, in what parts of the city, and so on. In some cities, the extent of political control over such decisions is as unclear as is the extent of federal control over national defense. The reasons for the confusion are the same too: larger budgets, advanced weaponry, the freedom that necessarily exists under crisis conditions, and the emergence under these same conditions of the police and the military as political forces in their own right. All this leaves us ignorant of the responsibility (or lack of it) of elected officials. Thus, the war against the Black Panthers looks sometimes like a political campaign

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(national or, more likely, local) and sometimes like a police crusade. The second would be more understandable, but also more frightening.

The standard Left response is to attack police brutality while insisting that the proper focus of political energy is on those social problems which force public officials to rely on the police. The same response is standard in international affairs, where leftists generally see in this or that instance of military sadism only the necessary result of a failure to solve the problem of imperialism, capitalism, or war itself. But the police, like the army, are likely to be with us for a long time. It is simply not the case that police powers will cease to be necessary and dangerous once a beginning is made toward solving whatever social problems lie at the roots of our present discontents; nor is it certain that all our discontent has roots that governmental problem-solving can reach. The near Left must face up to the implications of its attack on police brutality: we want the police to act differently, but not to go away. I suppose what we need is a domestic version of the theory of just war—a theory of "civil law enforcement," the appropriate parallel for civil disobedience, but necessary even when disobedience is uncivil.

What kind of a police force do we (of the near Left) want? Surely a force that is, first, carefully selected, well-trained, and highly disciplined; these features alone would considerably reduce the quantity of official violence. They would reduce it, that is, to the precise quantity intended by whoever commanded the police and thereby make their responsibility a great deal clearer. Second, a police force that is well-paid: for the increasingly narrow social base from which police are recruited plays havoc with law enforcement. Part of what happens when police come onto a campus is simply class war—to be sure of a curious sort, with radical students pretending to represent and the police more nearly representing the working class. It is not a formula for minimal violence. Third, we want or should want a force committed to a fairly rigid professional and legal code (a code, obviously, that requires police to minimize violence). And fourth, a force answerable, within the limits set by that code, to elected officials. These last two requirements are not necessarily consistent or not easily maintained together: there is a tension (in the public school system too) between professional commitment and political control. But that is a tension best left unresolved. It's one of the more peculiar notions of the far Left and of many of their liberal apologists that a community police would be better than what we have now. In fact, we have our greatest difficulties precisely with policemen who are little more than ordinary folks with guns. Since it is utopian to hope for an American police force without guns, we must insist that armed men be carefully trained. And the idea of training implies the existence of standards.

I am inclined to think, perhaps naively, that a police force better trained and controlled would be less available as an instrument of political repression. Clearly, it would be a purer instrument, its use less violent and more efficient at whatever task it was set, and so its effects more strictly limited to its legally appointed task. The worst effects of police power as we have recently known it (historically too, so far as I can discover) are those that stem from what might be called its "incidental" uses. The police are most repressive not when they are used to prevent or control illegal political activities, but when allowed or encouraged to *punish* those activities—most often by beating up (or killing) the activists. That is not what they are officially told to do, nor is it what they need to do to accomplish their legal purpose. Police violence obviously serves other purposes, but it also expresses ethnic, social, and political feelings—private feelings that ought to be repressed by professionals doing a job. That's a good kind of repression, and it would make the police less repressive.

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At the same time, "incidental" violence is exactly the sort of police behavior that activists sometimes seek to provoke, knowing that insofar as it comes into view, it will be publicly condemned. A great deal of it never does come into view: that, at least, is what we suspect, and it is what makes the police so fearsome. Mere law enforcement is not fearsome, and though revolutionaries may well object to it, they are unlikely to win much sympathy. The far Left lives symbiotically with the "pigs," counting on each outburst of their brutality and then of our indignation.

But if official violence often generates spasms of national anger and self-reproach and "radicalizes" (a word that grossly exaggerates what actually happens) hundreds or even thousands of people, there is no doubt that over time it has a deterrent effect. Unless the political base of the Left (near or far) is very strong, police brutality will erode it, for ordinary men and women, part-time activists and camp followers, will withdraw and seek shelter. The aftermath of Chicago 1968 was not mass movement, but silence, disillusion, collapse. And it would be foolishly optimistic to imagine that large-scale student demonstrations are going to be easy to organize in Ohio after Kent State 1970. The story may be different in colonial situations, where the mass of the population is already alienated from the authorities and where a particularly brutal incident may trigger a desperate resistance. There, people are not shocked but mobilized. By contrast, the failure of mobilization in this country suggests how far we are (even in the ghettos) from a colonial situation. Confrontation politics, *especially when the police join in,* makes every sort of Left politics more difficult. That is a very important reason for demanding a police force that won't join in.

II

IT IS ALSO A REASON for condemning leftist provocations—like the recent mad campaign to "bring the war home." That effort seems already to have collapsed, though it may continue to have an aftermath of casualties. The career of domestic warfare has been brief and its various moments were so quick that they can hardly be said to constitute strategic choices in need of careful criticism. Yet it's worth setting out the record of those moments, even as it appears to an outside observer. I don't doubt that there is an inside story, too, more interesting than any I can tell. But it is important here to establish a certain category of militant acts: *those that one wants the police to deal with.* They must deal with them, as I have already argued, without "incidental" violence, without punishing the militants before they are brought to trial, without using far Left madness as a way of attacking other sorts of dissident politics; but deal they must, and, I am afraid, with our support.

The first moment was that of street confrontations, direct attacks (though not with lethal weapons) on massed police. These were intended, if that's not too strong a word, to open the way to full-scale white rioting, comparable to that of the blacks in the ghetto. Working-class youths were supposed to join in, drawn by the *machismo* of the militants and their manifest readiness to break away from the fears and inhibitions of their own past. None did join, so far as I know, during the first dramatic incidents. Indeed, nothing at all happened, except that the police, probably quite happily and certainly rightfully, fought back, and considerable numbers of young militants from the middle and upper classes were injured and arrested.

The second moment was that of collegiate "trashing." Now the ghetto imagery was acted out, not in any of our major cities, but in university towns like Cambridge and Madison. And now young people from the local high schools, some of whom must have been working-class, joined the militants, without any discernible political (there may have been social) motives, in breaking the windows and looting the stores of petty-

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bourgeois merchants. Another example of class war, and again unrelated to any political struggle.

The third moment brought urban terrorism, a surrender of any hope of mass participation, a search for efficacy in the Act rather than the Movement. Or perhaps it is not a search for efficacy at all, but only an expression of hysteria, fury, and failure. Thus far, the attacks have been aimed at buildings rather than at people. I'm not sure if that reflects some murky residue of moral principle or a peculiar sociological sophistication. American society, it may be thought, is built of steel and concrete rather than of men and women. That's wrong, but it's not an error we should seek to correct.

Now toward activities of these sorts, it's obviously not possible to engage in comradely criticism. Terrorists end without comrades. But before that, confrontation and trashing already revealed the collapse of any sort of collective discipline on the Left. I don't mean only (though this is important enough) that there is no mass party from which we can expel idiots, adventurers, and plain criminals. There is also no common forum within which strategic options can be debated, no "public opinion" that can exercise any restraint over individual enthusiasts, no stable body of leaders who can be held responsible for whatever happens. In the last years of the sixties, *laissez-faire* triumphed on the Left. And just as in the economy, so in the political arena, and even among radical entrepreneurs, the triumph of *laissez-faire* rapidly creates conditions which require state intervention. It also creates conditions in which the state, in this case, the police, can be sure of widespread popular support when they do intervene and may have such support even if they intervene inefficiently and brutally.

What happens to the militants then? With the beginning of terrorist activities, they went underground, and there, wherever it is, they lead a life that I can only speculate about. I find it hard to credit reports that there is an underground *movement*. There clearly are a surprising number of young Americans *hiding*, and there is undoubtedly a network of hiding places and a communications system of some rough sort for sharing information about how to do it. But the existence of a movement implies what is not at all apparent today, a planned and coordinated pattern of activities. Probably no such pattern can be developed without considerable above-ground support, and that the terrorists don't have.

They have, however, found a certain amount of sympathy within that curious American phenomenon, the above-ground underground, the highly publicized, perfectly visible subterranean world of the cultural revolution. Despite all the talk about repression, this largely legal "underground" life, typified by the "underground" press sold freely on Cambridge street corners and, I expect, in other cities, has been expanding rapidly. In a more accurate metaphor: the margins of American society are wider than ever before; it has never been easier (though a prolonged recession would change this quickly) to pursue a marginal career. A certain sort of occasional politics is one such career, and terrorism in its turn is marginal to that and might readily be assimilated or reassimilated to it were the terrorists ever to

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decide that bombing is not the true and only way. Some of them seem already to have made that decision. It is hard to see any other future for them: the cultural revolution is the only revolution they can hope to join.

III

THE FAR LEFT HAS SPLIT so often, the tale of its internal wars is so tangled and so sad, that the rest of us can be forgiven if we allow ourselves to lose track of its various tendencies and their various ideological excuses. But one division seems to me important. Over and over again the line has been drawn (not always with the same people on the same sides) between those who are willing and those who are not willing to tolerate or encourage cultural marginality. The confrontationists, trashers, and terrorists have been among the tolerant, as well they might be. On the other side are all those groups that have tended toward one or another sort of Marxist (Trotskyist, Maoist) sectarianism, a tendency never free from puritanical impulses, but commited also to relate somehow to the "masses"—even to middle Americans. The sectaries have their own view of violence, which involves theoretical approval of it at some revolutionary moment sure to come but relatively far off and, at the same time, a refusal (mostly) to act violently here and now. The refusal, at least, brings them nearer to the near Left, and it calls to mind a political position on violence that I will try to restate briefly below. The position is worth restating not, I think, because of the Weathermen or the Panthers, whose future is dim, but because of the cultural radicalism with which we are likely to live for some time.

The new culture may indeed turn out to be as nonviolent as some of its friends and publicists suggest. But it is not now and never has been even remotely supportive of a nonviolent politics, or indeed of any politics that requires organization and long-term planning. The radicalism of "Do it!" has no room for prohibitions on trashing or terrorism or anything else. It is, instead, the mirror image of political (and why not of economic?) *laissez-faire*. Against the background of extravagance and fantasy that it provides, there is something attractive about the young sectaries, unlovely as they may be in other respects, who recognize that there are some things that ought not to be done—today, anyway.

Judging from the rhetoric (and the tone, style, voice level, etc.) of their spokesmen, their press and movies, the fantasies of many of the cultural radicals are rich in violence. Though they themselves most often appear as victims, part of the fascination is with the possibility of striking back. Not, I think, with the possibility of winning some specific struggle against oppression—the radicals may or may not be victims, but they are not oppressed—nor with the possibility of joining the ranks of the oppressors, temporarily, as has been done so often, for a "good cause." There was a kind of stolid commitment to brutality among Stalinists in the 1930s, but nothing like that exists in the varied ranks of the cultural revolution. Theirs is not the politics of

> the necessary murder . . . the flat ephemeral pamphlet, the boring meeting . . .

so much as it is the cult of experience, with violence, for some of them, as the penultimate experience. *Penultimate,* because attacks on the police, for example, are often said to have the happy effect of liberating the attackers, and there must be some further reason for doing that.

But perhaps freedom from moral inhibition is an end in itself: one acts violently in order to free oneself to act violently. It may even be thought that revolutionaries are created through such a process, but I know of no evidence for that claim. The end-state is some special sort of grace (or spiritual pride) rather than political effectiveness. Religious zealots have often in the past set themselves such a goal, and I expect it is even possible to reach it, though there ap-

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pears to have been some escalation in the necessary means. In the seventeenth century, it was enough, according to certain antinomian sects, to fornicate, or at most to fornicate repeatedly, and so liberation was conceivably available to the millions. Freedom through violence is not so egalitarian a doctrine. It is, however, easily cheapened: violence is an experience that can be enjoyed and is most often enjoyed by its advocates at a distance and vicariously. Nor do I know many people ready to pay the price of a more serious commitment. The greatest violence of the cultural radicals is expressive, not practical. And with *that* the rest of us can live. The problem with the revived and already corrupted cult of experience is not that it is likely by itself to produce more violence than we can endure or the police can handle, but rather that it provides no support for everyday politics. Instead, it sets the stage for once-a-month or once-a-year explosions, bursts of excitement shared through the media, with effects that no one even pretends to think about.

As putative victims, the cultural radicals are more appealing but no more helpful. They have produced a counterimage to the violence of our time, not pacifist but pastoral: the picture of a "green America," themselves the rightful inhabitants, beset by technologically advanced barbarians. As an art form the pastoral has hitherto been a specifically upper-class diversion, and it remains to be seen whether they can make it into anything else. Here I want only to note how innocent their picture of the future is—vaguely anarchist, sternly ecological, sexually bountiful, depopulated—and how incredibly far those who hold it have to go before they can even think of acting it out. Every practical decision lies ahead of them; every political temptation is yet to be encountered; every risk yet to be taken. Now the cultural radicals simply turn away from the violence of the American state and its enemies. If they have to, will they be able to criticize, organize, resist, and still maintain their peculiarly peaceful vision?

IV

POLITICS, ONCE AGAIN, is the art of minimizing violence; a man begins to be a politician as soon as he tries to get what he wants without hitting somebody. But social change, we are told, requires that somebody be hit; nothing has ever been achieved . . . etc. There is some truth here, but questions need to be asked in each case—just as questions need to be asked of the police. At what point, in what (precise) circumstances was violence used? who used it first? how many people were injured? with what (concrete) results?

A disciplined mass movement is much like a strong and legitimate state: it uses violence artfully and economically; often the mere threat is enough; "incidental" brutality is barred or punished. The classic vision of the near Left is of such a movement, growing steadily over time, winning massive support by means almost entirely peaceful, but then *because of its strength* being challenged by the authorities and forced into strikes, demonstrations, perhaps even street fighting, and so on. It was never thought that this challenge could be successfully met, however, unless substantial sympathy had already been won among the police and within the ranks of the army. Even "radicalized" citizens do not conquer policemen and soldiers; they win them over (or they don't). Hence violence is but one instrument of politics, and by no means so ready a choice for the Left as for the authorities.

But the movement grows slowly, and so the shortcut is the first and the perennial political temptation. Violence always looks like the easiest shortcut. Sometimes this or that group of militants hopes to seize power all by themselves without waiting for anyone else, or to terrorize the country and win major concessions on behalf of the others; or they hope to provoke police repression and so goad their potential but passive followers into revolutionary action. The last of these is the strategy most often attributed to contemporary militants. They intend to ex-

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pose the "true character" of American society, it is said, to drive the authorities into an openly fascist posture, and so force the rest of us to resist. What is there to say? I doubt, again, that this is a serious intention, though it is a strategy that might conceivably work if (1) the true character of the U.S. government were fascist, and (2) the mass of the American people were already profoundly alienated from it. Neither of these conditions holds. Nor do strong and legitimate conservative regimes turn fascist in response to leftist provocation; I know of no historical cases. And if they did, that would surely be a disaster and not a success for the Left. No fascist regime has yet been overthrown by rapid revolutionary mobilization; nor is there time for long-term political organizing; in the short run the militants would be dead. It is, all in all, a policy of insanity compounded.

I have already described the actual results of this "strategy" in the U.S. today. But there is more to say about it, a classic leftist position to reiterate against it. However easy it may be to throw a brick, use a gun, plant a bomb, and however much the cultural atmosphere encourages—and publicists, editors, screenwriters, etc., applaud or "understand" —such activities, they are not likely to be engaged in by large numbers of people. They don't build a movement, because they don't commit men and women to daily work for the cause. Terrorism is not and cannot be a collective effort. It enhances the self-regard of a militant elite, and then the members of this elite celebrate their psychic or moral liberation. But the rest of us have no reason to expect that if they were ever to seize power, they would be any different than the people they call "pigs." The one group is as unlikely as the other to liberate *us*. That we can only do for ourselves, through organizations in which we are actively involved and whose policies we share in making. "The liberation of the workers can come only through the workers themselves."

The liberation of the militants is a waste of violence, just as the beating up of the militants by the police is a waste of violence. Neither is a victory for the rest of us. The only difference between the two is that in the second case there are review boards and presidential commissions to condemn the waste, and in the first there are none. The "movement"—for the moment—offers us no recourse. The democratic state does. So *laissez-faire* on the Left makes statists of us all, and our most immediate duty is to be honest about where we are. Inevitably, the police will impose the discipline we have failed to build: the problem of law enforcement—not a problem we are at home with—has been moved onto the political agenda of the seventies. Significant social and political change may well await its working out—may well await, that is, the restoration of a framework of civility within which the police, the militants, and the rest of us can live, more or less, together.

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Robert Lekachman

Between Apostles and Technicians

Mind-Blowing and Problem-Solving

In the 1970s two ways of examining society, neither of them very satisfactory, will probably continue to vie for intellectual favor. One is the New Left rebellion against the organizational rationalism of a complex technological polity. The second is the style comfortable to the social scientists and bureaucrats who administer such societies, a style ostentatiously prosaic, empirical, and nonideological, lineal descendant to Benthamite felicific calculation and the Fabianism of the Webbs. In extreme versions it manifests itself in essay like Edward Banfield's *The Unheavenly City,* said to be widely admired in the White House. A home for more moderate expression of the problem-solving nonideology is *The Public Interest,* a journal about which more will be said later.

The younger radicals cherish one-to-one relationships, diffusion of power, and immediacy of sensual gratification. They suspect technology and organizational hierarchies.[1] Until they took to criticizing their acolytes' excesses, Herbert Marcuse and Paul Goodman were popular New Left gurus. Their successor appears to be Charles Reich whose *The Greening of America,* an impassioned celebration of youthful virtue, amounts to a prophecy of revolution through a transformation of consciousness. For good or ill, Reich's Third Consciousness bids fair to match the celebrity of such catchwords as repressive tolerance, identity crisis, The Medium is the Message, and David Riesman's tripartite construction—inner-directed, other-directed, and autonomous individuals—to which Reich's three consciousnesses display considerable affinity.

Reich is worth consideration as a brand-new cultural phenomenon, or, as Harry Golden might say, Only in America! Reich's transformation is almost as startling as the greening of America that he preaches. He is a 42-year-old law professor at Yale, esteemed until only yesterday at his university as an extraordinarily gifted teacher and beyond New Haven's borders as the author of exceptionally provocative law-review articles.[2] These essays on property, government regulation, and 20th-century feudalism contain the roots of the assault upon organizational power, which is the most satisfactory portion of *The Greening of America.*

"The New Property," the best of the articles, focuses upon governmental "largesse" as a dynamic of alteration in property relationships. This is the rubric under which Reich enumerates the many benefits government confers upon its constituents, extending over additions to income in the shape of welfare, social security, and veterans' pensions; government jobs; occupational licenses; bus, trucking, airline, and taxicab franchises; subsidies to farmers, shipbuilders, and a long list of other clients; access on indulgent terms to grazing, mining, and lumbering on public lands; subsidized commercial mail delivery, cut-rate savings-bank and home-construc-

[1] I refer only to the libertarian and anarchist branches of the New Left, not to its much less agreeable authoritarian division. The latter is a familiar offshoot of rationalist Marxism, and its organizational expression on college campuses is Progressive Labor.

[2] See, as examples, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare," *Yale Law Journal,* 74:1245 (1965); "Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act," *Yale Law Journal,* 72:1347 (1963); "The Law of the Planned Society," *Yale Law Journal,* 75: 1227 (1967); and, most famous of the group, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal,* 73:733 (1964).

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tion insurance; and free technical information for farmers and corporations.

Public functionaries see this largesse as acts of grace; beneficiaries esteem it as similar to older varieties of property. For his part, Reich emphasizes a distinction between largesse and other kinds of property, which simultaneously identifies a danger. Private property in general originates in economic activity performed in private markets, while largesse both reflects and reinforces the existing distributions of political power. *Time–Life* or the *New York Times* secure radio stations and television channels far more readily than Black Panthers. Public largesse enriches the wealthy and adds power to the powerful. Large commercial farmers get most of the agricultural subsidies. FHA loan guarantees facilitated middle-class flight to the suburbs, and in the deserted cities' urban renewal has diminished the inventory of low-cost apartments, which have been traded for convention halls and luxury flats. California's tax and fee structure combine to generate subsidies for middle-class youngsters financed mostly by repressive taxes levied upon their financial inferiors. It is a law of public largesse that great social need accompanies small political power. From the law flows a corollary: the powerful, not the needy, get a disproportionate share of the cash.

Worse is yet to come. It is typical of largesse that it can be capriciously granted and removed at the pleasure of administrators endowed with alarming discretionary power either by congressional intention or by their own statutory interpretations. Communications policy illustrates the point. The courts have ruled that the communications act, which created the Federal Communications Commission awarded no property right. Licenses are mere privileges, initially granted for three-year terms and, thereafter, renewed or revoked by FCC decision. Congress originally may have intended license limitation as a pressure upon broadcasters to meet minimum criteria of public service. But in the Agnew era, this precariousness of tenure impresses timid television executives as sufficient reason to tone down news comment. Reich's point is sharp: the networks retain enormously valuable property on the condition that they barter away at least part of their First Amendment rights to free speech. As in the Middle Ages, property is converted into a grant conditioned upon loyalty to the sovereign.

These coercive powers of government over individual access to largesse are extensive and growing, With few signs of popular dissent, Congress has decreed that,

> Any person shown by evidence satisfactory to the Administrator to be guilty of mutiny, treason, sabotage, or rendering assistance to any enemy of the United States or of its allies shall forfeit all accrued or future benefits under law administered by the Veterans' Administration.

As a society, we do not take money away from disloyal millionaires. What warrant justifies shearing a veteran of benefits earned by past service because of poor behavior at some later date? Once more the practice of public largesse involves a threat by sovereign power to personal freedoms.

Although recent judicial interpretations have somewhat improved the situation, welfare recipients are most exposed of all to demands for barter of their rights and reprisals when they resist such demands. The Bill of Rights protects ordinary citizens against unreasonable searches conducted without proper warrants issued upon the demonstration of probable cause. Bill of Rights or not, welfare investigators have specialized in midnight searches of their clients' homes, in the attempt to establish male presence and thus terminate benefits. The Supreme Court has recently determined that welfare beneficiaries must trade for public largesse the citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights to the undisturbed enjoyment of his home.

Reich summarizes these phenomena as the

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recrudescence of an exceedingly dangerous version of feudalism. Increasingly, property and benefits are linked to status and status is conferred either by the state or, even more dangerously, by a small number of very large private organizations which act as loosely regulated agents of the state, among them corporations, foundations, and universities.

THIS ANALYSIS is persuasive. Unfortunately Reich's powers falter on the threshold of remedy, and rhetoric is made to substitute for programs. Reich leaves his readers with a fair prospect:

> The highly organized, scientifically planned society of the future, governed for the good of its inhabitants, promises the best life that men have ever known.

But there is a roaring lion in the path to Utopia:

> If the individual is to survive in a collective society, he must have protection against its ruthless pressures. There must be sanctuaries or enclaves where no majority can reach. To shelter the solitary human spirit does not merely make possible the fulfillment of individuals; it also gives society the power to change, to grow, and to regenerate, and hence to endure. These were the objects which property sought to achieve and can no longer achieve. The challenge of the future will be to construct, for the society that is coming, institutions and law to carry on this work. Just as the Homestead Act was a deliberate effort to foster individual values at an earlier time, so we must try to build an economic basis for liberty today—a Homestead Act for rootless twentieth-century man. We must create a new property.

Here, upon a dying fall, the witness curiously ends. The vital sanctions and enclaves are never identified. In a curious way the failure of analysis is repeated in Reich's book.

The Greening of America has turned its author into an immediate celebrity. In carrying forward the themes of his law-review essays, Reich has recorded his own rebirth as a child of the new consciousness.

He begins with a conventional checklist of New Left charges: American society is fatally corrupted by "disorder, corruption, hypocrisy, war"; "poverty, distorted priorities, and law-making by private power"; "decline of democracy and liberty, powerlessness"; "the artificiality of work and culture"; "absence of community"; and "loss of self."

Although such a society is overripe for change, successful revolutions require revolutionists. Enter the young as vessels of new truth and heightened conciousness. Their elders are mired either in Consciousness I, the atavistic remnants of frontier individualism, or Consciousness II, the grey spirit of the organizational mentality, bureaucracy incarnate. In entrancing contrast, Consciousness III's converts dismiss with contempt both the alleged inevitabilities and the rewards of hierarchical organization. For them they substitute joy, love, friendship, openness to experience and sensation, immediate communication, and warm community, As Reich would say, oh, wow!

Rejecting hierarchy, competition, and routine, how will the children of the new age inherit the earth, as Reich is certain that they will? Peaceful persuasion and demography will make this revolution. Externally imposing, the Establishment is really little more than a hollow shell. The generals, executives, and college presidents who pretend to run institutions lack conviction and purpose. They are increasingly easy targets of infiltration. The number of the infiltrators steadily rises. As the fifty-year-olds die, decline into their dotage, or, more unusually, join the revolution, their juniors will succeed them in power. At the moment of liberation, Consciousness III will transform the institutions that now oppress us all and liberate even the bureaucrats. In the world struggling to be born, organization and technology, today's enemies, will be made to enlarge the individual and enhance his experience. The universe of work and the private cosmos of sensation will be rejoined and the ancient pangs of alienation at last be relieved. As-

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tonishingly meek in Reich's idealization of them, the young will truly inherit the earth.

The emotional appeal of this sort of thing needs no explanation. Reich will be a hero on the campuses for some time to come. How well does the argument withstand scrutiny? To begin with, *is* there a new consciousness, even as a powerful metaphor for altered cultural and social outlook? Like other academics, I deal with many young men and women who approximate Consciouness III insofar as it is defined by aversion to routine and sustained intellectual effort, and affection for rock music, drugs (on which Reich is fuzzy), and informal human relationships. Reich, not so incidentally, says little about the dark side of Consciousness III, the minority freaked out on drugs, the few attracted by violence, and the many who, according to the campus psychiatrists, are unhappy and neurotic in spite of (or because of?) the new culture of joy.

A Reichian, I suppose, would dismiss this pathology as cultural growing pains. Reich's argument, however, certainly overgeneralizes. An unknown but substantial percentage of the young harbor secret, subversive sympathies for individualism and organizational efficiency. West and south of New Haven, there are campuses where President Nixon is applauded and hecklers must at some expense be imported. A recent poll reported the alarming news that a fifth of the young admire the Vice-President.

Are we dealing with anything more than another leisure class? Ours is larger because we are richer and we make a practice of collecting large numbers of young adults in compounds called universities where their keepers fail to find sufficient diversions for them. The "straight" students are the offspring of poorer families, usually first-generation college attenders, and quite as determined as older predecessors to acquire the marketable skills which will make them eligible for material benefits. Though less noisy, the straight students are more numerous.

I may be quite wrong. Reich may be quite correct in his identification of one of those creative minorities which set the tone for sluggish contemporaries and ultimately convert them to new truths. But even on this hypothesis, it is hard to believe that when Consciousness II and Consciousness III slug it out in large organizations, victory is foreordained for the latter. Hatred of bureaucratic styles is one thing, successful definition of alternative ways of doing the world's work quite another.

At this juncture, Reich offers nothing but more rhetoric. Could Consciousness III run the world? Without organizational routines and hierachical administration, can there be survival of such life-supporting mechanisms as transportation, power, heat, light, and food distribution? Reich is as vague as he is cheerful about "humane" technology and unrepressive organization, just as in his earlier work he was similarly unhelpful in the identification of the enclaves required to shelter individuals against the enroachments of public power.

Nothing works better than a good Republican recession to remind Americans that the United States is not a land of free goods. Somehow choices must be made about what is to be produced and who is to get it. New capital depends upon past saving. Alas, if men and women save they defer gratification and backslide into the older worlds of sensation. Modern factories turn out work clothes and jeans, not to mention motorcycles, hi-fi equipment, and jet aircraft. Inevitably factories are financed by somebody's savings. Who disagrees with the proposition that there are ways to improve the human environment of work and otherwise to civilize large organizations? On the evidence, I should have no confidence in Consciousness III's capacity to reform factories and offices.

As an intellectual construction Reich's argument amounts to rather little. As a cultural phenomenon Reich is significant—though one should be clear just how. I should not be astonished if on the campuses Reich, a generous but infirm thinker, will en-

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joy a vogue like that of Hermann Hesse, a sentimental and second-rate novelist. It cannot really be a good thing that intelligent students prefer Reich to Marx and Hesse to Tolstoy.

II

AFTER RHETORIC SO WARM and spirits so high, it is something of a relief to visit the problem-solver's workshop, a place of comfort for technocrats, economists, cost-benefit analysts, and assorted corporate technicians. As an anonymous reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement* said of C. P. Snow's *Last Things,* "Many of the characters in his books are scientific civil servants, administrators of one sort or another. These people run the world and it is right that they do so." The engineers, accountants, lawyers, scientists, and administrators who populate Galbraith's technostructure are the real masters of their organizations because they alone can solve the endless stream of technical conundrums presented by science and technology. In principle one cannot distinguish their labors from those of the RAND alumni who at McNamara's behest refined the tools of cost-effectiveness and applied them to Vietnam. In the heyday of the Great Society, Lyndon Johnson's presidential fiat applied Pentagon program-budgeting to the civilian agencies.

The problem-solvers' favorite forum is the *Public Interest,* the quarterly founded by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in the wake of the copious arguments over "the future of ideology" stimulated by Bell's famous essay on "the end of ideology." The new journal, said the editors in their opening statement, aspired "to help all of us, when we discuss issues of public policy to know a little better what we are talking about—and preferably in time to make such knowledge effective." In the pursuit of these objectives, ideology was said to be an obstacle:

> It is not, however, merely a matter of knowledge or the lack thereof. "Knowing what one is talking about" is a deceptively simple phrase that is pregnant with larger implications. We do not wish to avoid these implications, or pretend to be blind to them. Thus we must admit—or, if you wish, assert—that such an emphasis is not easily reconcilable with a prior commitment to an ideology, whether it be liberal, conservative, or radical.

Why not?

> . . . [it] is the nature of ideology to *preconceive* reality; and it is exactly such preconceptions that are the worst hindrances to knowing-what-one-is-talking about. It goes without saying that human thought and action is impossible without *some kinds* of preconceptions—philosophical, religious, moral, or whatever—since it is these that establish the purposes of all thoughts and action. But it is the essential peculiarity of ideologies that they do not simply prescribe ends, but also insistently propose prefabricated interpretations of existing social realities—interpretations that bitterly resist all sensible revision. The *Public Interest* will be animated by a bias against all such prefabrications.

The *Public Interest* has kept this faith. Its contributors have ranged from Robert Heilbroner's rational radicalism to Daniel Moynihan's emotionally tinged romantic conservatism. Particularly noticeable has been a large delegation from the Harvard-MIT social-science and urban-planning axis. Here are such familiar names as James Q. Wilson, Nathan Glazer, Robert Solow, James Tobin (transplanted to Yale), Carl Kaysen (ditto to Princeton), and David Riesman.

The magazine has been steadily devoted to the evaluation of alternative public policies. Technical comparisons of negative income taxes and family allowances, discussions of cost-benefit measurement, and inquiries into market mechanisms for the control of pollution exemplify the urge to judge existing social mechanisms and design better ones. The editors have naturally been hospitable to the floating establishment of academics and bureaucrats who move in and out of universities, public agencies, founda-

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tions, and governments in exile like the Brookings Institution and the Kennedy Institute of Politics. In short, the *Public Interest* has sympathized with an ethic of rational social management by the people who "run the world" as "it is right that they should do." Bell and Kristol possess a Fabian respect for experts and an equally Fabian hope that experts can educate politicians.

In the United States the practitioners of social management are most comfortable during liberal Democratic administrations when there is money to be spent. They flourished on the New Frontier as planners and flourished as spenders in the Great Society, until Vietnam swallowed up the social programs they had formulated, nudged through Congress, and stayed to administer. However, any sensible establishment finds space for flexible souls like Moynihan who are temperamentally equipped to adjust to various holders of office, as well as genuine conservatives of the Edward Banfield stripe.

No need for one's tone to become acid, for there is much to be said in behalf of the problem-solvers. Wouldn't any rational soul join the economist Robert Levine in his preference for "the problem-solving style" over the "politics of provocation"? (Of course there might be other alternatives.) Militants seek excitement and Revolution. They (and the rest of us) get instead police repressions, conservative yearning for law and order, plausible justification for new restrictions on civil liberty, and the menace of nativist fascism.

The problem-solver is a dull fellow and it is easy to ridicule his slide rules, office machines, and computers. Yet how sensible he is! *He* wastes no energy railing self-indulgently against the system. *His* enemies are more tangible: ghetto youngsters' poor reading scores, deficient manpower training techniques, gaps in neighborhood legal services, urban housing shortages, congested roads and subways, dirty air and water, and so on.

As he ponders the treatment of these specific ailments, the problem-solver typically is handicapped by neither institutional nor ideological hangups. Since as a practical man he neither loves nor hates major corporations, he is free to convert corporate strengths into the service of effective, curative social action. If major corporations are more efficiently managed than major (or minor) universities, anyone but an ideologue will select Litton, Philco, or Western Electric as a Jobs Corps contractor rather than a university qualified only by a debatable altruism of motive. It is much harder to document the university's altruism than the corporation's efficiency.

In so saying, the problem-solver intends neither to praise corporate officials nor criticize university presidents. The explanation is structural, not personal. Businessmen can rely upon a well-understood and exceedingly powerful set of incentives and penalties. Net income measures corporate performance. Cash and promotion reward individuals who increase net income. Persistent losses result in bankruptcy and the men responsible are thrust into the cold world. No tenure protection and no AAUP shield incompetent corporate executives from the consequences of their inadequacies. As the Penn Central recently demonstrated, even the mightiest may fall. The moral is plain to see. The thing to do is tie the corporate contractor's fees to his success in generating the skill improvements and the behavioral alterations which social programs are designed to achieve.

ALTRUISM, LIKE IDEOLOGY, is a poor guide to problem solution. Head Start illustrates why this is so. Liberals endorsed the program, as egalitarians and conservatives approved it, out of fiscal anxieties over rising welfare and police expenditures. Both shared a feeling for children. Such sentiments turned Head Start into the most popular of the poverty program's experiments, approximately as safe from attack as motherhood itself. The problem-solver begins rather than stops here. He asks whether the children actually read better, how long the effects last, and which teaching techniques worked best.

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Only after such technical queries have received satisfactory answers is it reasonable to expand, transform, or replace Head Start. Only ideologues (and congressmen) pour money into programs which careful evaluation reveals to be failing.[3]

Problem-solvers and ideologues have a particularly good war on overeducation: liberal, integrationist doctrine continues to support public education even though liberal parents often enroll their own youngsters in private schools. The familiar public school myth claims that full citizenship is accelerated by common schooling and other common experiences. Hence the integration of Italians, Irish, and Jews, hence the impending integration of blacks. Moreover, what the public school does not do is very nearly as socially virtuous as what it does. Above all public schools are constitutionally debarred from messing about with religion like the infamous parochial schools. They also avoid the snobbishness of elite eastern imitations of English public schools and the militarism of the West Point copies.

The problem-solver is prone to identify the realities which ideology masks. In the North residential segregation by color, income, and religion turn the public schoolmen's integrative ideal into farce. And Supreme Court prayer decisions or not, Southern public schools especially have often been conducted as Protestant parochial academies. In the more affluent suburbs everywhere, public schools flourish that consciously model themselves on elite English institutions.

Since real-life public schools differ enormously in intellectual quality, class stratification, ideology, and racial mixture, sensible men will replace their nostalgia for a sentimentalized past with open-minded experiment. Everything then becomes possible. Perhaps a better way than perpetual litigation to cope with Catholic schools might be to consider them as functioning entities, endowed with assorted virtues and flaws. Some Catholic schools have done better at integration than their public rivals. Others do creditable jobs of college preparation. A little public money might remedy many of the parochial system's weaknesses.

Once ideological preconception is dispelled, real experiment becomes easy. Performance contracting and educational vouchers are only two of the possibilities. Performance contractors, usually corporations that make teaching machines or other hardware, promise to improve verbal and mathematical skill as measured by standard achievement tests. If the kids do well, the contractors get full payment or even bonuses. Poor performance costs the contractors financial penalties. If greed stimulates teaching ingenuity and the children learn more rapidly and more thoroughly, then educational contracting deserves to flower.

Presumably it will flower most lushly in the gardens of competition. The freer the market, the better. Voucher schemes are one means of devising a free educational market. Milton Friedman was among the first to advocate turning over to parents an allowance in lieu of presently collected school taxes. But in the ongoing OEO voucher experiment, the notion has attracted such liberal sponsors as Harvard's Christopher Jencks. Vouchers start with the critical social observation that the public education coalition has fragmented. On compelling evidence, black parents believe that public-school teachers dislike, undervalue, and humiliate their children. Blue-collar parents rail at racial mixing, sex education, and excessive permissiveness. Middle-class parents are apprehensive about educational quality. Parents of all varieties seem convinced that the schools have done less than they might have to control drug abuse.

These powerful disaffections readily ally themselves with the community power sentiments that now agitate groups as diverse as

[3] Robert Levine's history of the poverty program, *The Poor Ye Need Not Have with Ye* (MIT Press, 1970) presents the evidence of Head Start's failure to effect lasting improvement in reading skills.

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White Citizens' Councils, campus radicals, homosexuals, black militants, tax avoiders, and white ethnic minorities. If this is social reality, wise men design programs that come to terms with social possibility. Why shouldn't *all* groups of like-minded parents control their schools, as some groups already do? In cities like New York massive educational establishments notoriously smother experiment and deprive parents of effective influence. Reform is all but hopeless. The free market may be a way out, and there doesn't seem to be much to be lost by trying.

Few schools now exist that match the tastes of their prospective customers. As economists know, effective demand soon evokes supply of appropriate quality and quantity. Presented with the new commercial opportunity, educational entrepreneurs will open the sort of schools their customers seek. Should the clients dislike what their children receive, the market will inform the school proprietors that they should either redesign the product or make way for more alert operators. Such a result is considerably more than most people expect from criticizing public-school officials.

This design gives the educational theorists complete freedom to subsidize their favorite nostrums. Altruists can store up treasure in heaven by charging fees below cost. Among them, entrepreneurs, theorists, and altruists will almost certainly hawk a variety of merchandise considerably more diversified than is now available to the ordinary parent.

But all of this is persuasive only for those prepared to jettison the public schools as unsalvageable. If the public schools are valued ideologically, their disrepair is an impetus to programs of rescue. In short, the siren song of the problem-solver lures only those who have made up their minds that the public schools no longer serve or can be made to serve values that they esteem highly. That of course is an ideological decision, and one of considerably more importance than the selection of problem-solving technique.

There is a second controlling ideological element. The problem-solver implicitly declares that organizations differ primarily in their reward structures and relative efficiencies of operation. This is just as ideological a judgment as that of the self-confessed ideologue who frankly prefers altruistic impulse to profit maximization and locates his preferred motive in universities rather than in major corporations. As usual, the problem-solving approach works splendidly if one allows the problem-solver to define the problem.

One more example of the problem-solving technique should suffice. This is public welfare. In the autumn of 1970 even comparatively liberal political candidates were heavily suggesting that many of the poor were lazy, dissolute, and prone to the breeding of large numbers of children for the sake of more generous welfare allowances. The bastard Calvinism implicit in this vein of prejudice enjoins the smallest possible welfare payment, surrounded by the most humiliating conditions ingenuity can arrange. Liberals and most social scientists perceive welfare differently. For them the overwhelming majority of the poor are too young, too old, too disabled, too little trained, too illiterate, or too engrossed by child care, to support themselves. Most would gladly work and earn if only someone would employ them and care for the youngsters. These are the casualties of personal limitation, heedless nurture, racial and sexual discrimination, and neglectful public policy.

According to his custom, the problem-solver defines the issues technically and empirically. He supports an experiment that OEO Administrator Donald Rumsfeld has characterized as "possibly the most significant social science experiment ever to take place." [4] This is an income maintenance study involving 575 working poor families in New Jersey, 150 more in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and a further 635 in scattered loca-

[4] See *Preliminary Results of the New Jersey Graduate Work Incentive Experiment,* OEO Release, February 18, 1970.

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tions. The study's key question is, will income guarantees damage work incentives? Given the chance, will poor people simply down tools and coast along on their subsidies? As far as they reach, preliminary results have been encouraging. The chosen families were offered income guarantees ranging from 50 to 125 percent of the then poverty line of $3,300 for families of four. Those who chose to supplement the guarantee by their own efforts were asked to surrender as little as 30 and as much as 70 percent of their earnings from paid labor. Although some families could have drifted along on higher than poverty incomes without lifting a finger, most chose to work. In fact 53 percent of the families earned more from their own efforts *after* guarantees were supplied than before they became available, and only 29 percent earned less. Possibly because they alleviated disabling anxiety, cash gifts appeared to encourage individual initiative.

Caution is advisable. The study excluded unemployed female heads of families. Participation in an experiment of itself often generates untypical conduct. Moreover, the time span is too short to allow safe conclusions about the lasting impact upon behavior of no-strings cash guarantees. There is a feature of the New Jersey experiment particularly encouraging to problem-solvers: when the conditions are propitious, scientific research has political effects. The preliminary research findings just summarized apparently sufficed to persuade the House Ways and Means Committee, no haunt of Consciousness III, to report the Nixon extension of income maintenance for the working poor to the full House of Representatives which unexpectedly passed the measure. Wilbur Mills, cautious and conservative (but Harvard Law-trained), was described as particularly taken by the experiment.

All these years apprehensive welfare administrators and humane politicians have been torn between the wish to alleviate hardship and the fear that generosity would damage the incentives of the poor, infuriate the taxpayers, and result in electoral defeat. Are the social scientists really on the verge of the cheerful discovery that the best way to stimulate individual effort even for the poor is to increase the hope of reward? Is social science "truth" a really effective solvent of ideological prejudice?

The story would end better if the Senate were less determined (after receiving the same social science evidence as the House of Representatives) to slaughter the Administration's Family Assistance Plan.

III

PROBLEM-SOLVING HAS HELD my attention so long because its prestige remains high and also because even in this constricted form, rationality has more appeal to me every day. Nevertheless, the heavily quantitative techniques of the problem-solvers suffer from glaring defects. Some are technical. Cost-benefit analysis, the heart of the analytical mode, struggles unsuccessfully against a very serious bias in favor of the readily quantifiable. In selecting highway routes, it is much easier to compute construction costs per mile than the relative esthetic and scenic penalties attachable to several possible choices. Consolidated Edison's financial savings at Storm King are easier to quantify than the damage to scenery, marine life, and the Hudson River. Conscientious analysts *mention* what they cannot measure. They advise their political masters to *evaluate* the unmeasured and the unmeasurable. Since they don't tell their masters how to turn the trick, the steady political temptation will be to assign low or zero weights to what the computers aren't programmed to evaluate.

Even when amenity and esthetics are not directly at issue, the problem-solving technique is dangerously subjective, and open to the convert influence of individual ideology. I can do no better than cite the testimony of a friendly witness. William Gorham, in better days an assistant secretary of HEW, has

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spoken in the following terms of the technique which he himself supervised: [5]

> The problems of benefits measurement, however, are not just technical; they are conceptual. It is far from obvious how the benefit of most health, education, and welfare programs should be defined. For example, Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provides special funds to local school districts for the education of deprived children. What is it that we want to measure? Should we test the children to see whether their reading comprehension, or their arithmetic achievement, has improved faster than would have been expected? Should we ask them whether they liked school any better or felt more confident of their abilities? Shall we wait and see whether they drop out of school less frequently, commit fewer crimes as teenagers, or go in greater proportions to college? Or shall we wait a decade or two and see how much they earn as adults, and whether, in fact, the cycle of poverty has been broken?

This formidable array just begins the difficulties:

> Even if we could conceptualize and measure the benefits of particular programs, there is the fact that benefits of different programs go to different people. Shall equal benefits to different individuals in the population be weighted equally? Is it equally important to raise the educational attainment of a suburban child and a slum child? Should an additional hundred dollars in welfare payments going to a mother with six children in Mississippi be weighted the same as an additional hundred dollars in Social Security payments going to an old man in Chicago? If the weights should not be equal, what should they be? Finally, even if benefits of different programs can be identified and measured and weighted, they cannot always be measured in the same units. Educational benefits may be measurable in terms of achievement test scores, and health benefits in terms of lives saved or days of sickness averted, and welfare benefits in terms of families rescued from poverty. When these benefits are forced into monetary terms, a great deal of violence is inevitably done to their heterogeneity, and useful information is suppressed.

Good questions all. After harkening to Gorham, it is hard not to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is as inescapably imprecise as the openly unscientific program choices made by untutored congressmen and overweening presidents. Though Gorham's own final word is naturally more optimistic about his technique's prospects, he sees a narrowly limited role for this mode of problem-solving:

> While the big choices may not be greatly illuminated by cost-benefit analysis, the narrower ones can be. It is possible to group programs and potential programs which have the same objective and to examine the effectiveness (relative to cost) of each in reaching the objective. If the objective is to save lives through control of disease, it is clearly helpful to examine various disease control programs and try to estimate how many lives would be saved per dollar expended on each type of program. If we want to raise the earning power of unemployed or under-employed individuals, it makes sense to examine various kinds of training and employment programs in order to compare the effectiveness of these programs in raising the earnings of people being retrained. If we seek to cut infant mortality, rational decision-making will be facilitated if analysts assess the relative efficiency of different health programs.

This modest definition of the expert's writ is difficult to quarrel with or, for that matter, to take very seriously as an innovation either in politics or social science. Of course sensible people will estimate program costs by whatever social accounting techniques are plausible. If cost-benefit analysis "forces people to think about the objectives of government programs and how they can be measured," splendid.

Unfortunately, problem-solving techniques leave the difficult issues of social choice just

[5] The following quotations are drawn from "Notes of a Practitioner," *Public Interest*, Summer 1967, pp. 6–7.

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as they were—intractable. At the risk of inflammatory utterance, one must describe these issues in the language of ideology, as any of Gorham's queries serves to illustrate. Gorham asks, "Shall equal benefits to different individuals in the population be weighted equally?" Evidently, Congress thought so when it wrote Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. By channeling funds to low-income school districts, the Act explicitly registers a preference for more rapid improvement in the education of the poor than of the rich. The Act implemented a brief American inclination to redeem long neglected promises of racial equality. Extra funds for the poor were Congress's way of compensating for decades of inadequate funding of ghetto schools and decades of preference for the interests of the middle class.

Once Congress states a principle and appropriates the funds to implement it, the money should be rationally administered and its effects reviewed. What else is new?

Little that occurred during the Kennedy–Johnson regime was any freer from ideological overtones, despite the professed attachment by New Frontiersmen and Great Societarians to "nonideological" problem-solving techniques. Thus from its noisy beginnings to its present glum decline, the Office of Economic Opportunity has been a battlefield contested by hostile social theorists. That inflammatory phrase, "maximum feasible participation of the poor," expressed a conception of democracy sharply contrasted to the tacit elitism of most social scientists. Within OEO,[6] maximum feasible participation warred with an ethic of opportunity that stressed mobility through existing channels, and job creation instead of community organization.

IN THE END, the problem-solving style's disabling limitation is its tacit assumption of general agreement upon basic goals and values. Problem-solving is a formula for periods like the 1950s when the natives are calm, politics are placid, and ordinary people leave government and administration to the professionals. In the reign of Eisenhower the Good, Americans agreed on autos and roads. The result was a massive highway construction program that continues inexorably to pave the country long after the consensus upon which it was based has dissolved.

Sputnik legitimized the moon race. Americans, a few sour dissenters excepted, briefly joined hands in a national refusal to lose the Big Game with the Red Machine. In the mid-1960s a somewhat weaker consensus favored more rapid economic growth and accepted tax reduction as the way to get it. The upshot was the Revenue Act of 1964. Moral: where there is general agreement, problem-solving works, especially if a healthy dose of anti-Communist ideology is available as a stimulant.

The problem-solvers have a contribution to make in the handling of small, technical issues. They lack magic as the solvers of major dilemmas of power, income distribution, and racial equity. National consensus on any topic is nowhere in sight. "Problems"

[6] The accounts by OEO veterans, though inevitably biased, are revealing. See the volume by Levine already cited and Daniel P. Moynihan's *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.*

There Are Some Matters On Which a Marxist Just HAS to Draw the Line

Millett's book, as an experienced reader can detect, was written too rapidly, or not rewritten or edited enough, and it has faults as well as virtues. Howe denies the existence of the latter and makes the most of the former. Some of the faults are serious, such as Millett's attempt to avoid a position on what preceded the patriarchal family while at the same time making concessions to the idea that society has always been patriarchal.
—From an article in The Militant,
"Irving Howe: a Reformist Rankled by Kate Millett," by George Breitman

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are defined from the start by contending ideologies and they are "solved" or, more accurately, handled in accordance with the political interests of the strongest contenders. Catchwords like crime in the streets, permissiveness, law and order, pornography and drugs resonate with Consciousness I. For adherents to Consciousness III, permissiveness is personal freedom, pornography is openness to esthetic revelation, and drugs are the well-marked pathway to the expansion of the consciousness. Such clashes of perception, such opposed structures of reality, are at issue every time Congress writes a crime statute and a state legislature considers a university appropriation bill.

On both sides the definitions are ideological. They recall Bell and Kristol's analysis of ideological error: "it is the nature of ideology to *preconceive* reality." I "know," because my students have told me so, that marijuana is a harmless euphoric drug which I am foolish to deny myself. I "know," because narcotics-enforcement administrators have told me so, that marijuana at best is psychologically addictive and at worst leads its consumers toward much more dangerous drugs. I conclude that no quantity of scientific inquiry will modify opinions deeply tied on the one side to a structure of sentiment deeply hostile to the life-style of the young and on the other to deep rebelliousness against existing authority and the idea of America cherished by many older Americans.

Crime legislation emanates from a definition of party and generational interest. It is couched in the tongues of ideology, and perceived on all sides as an engagement between old and young, Establishment and radicals, middle Americans and effete Eastern snobs. Hence the Nixon administration's success or failure in enforcing the laws it has sought from Congress is light years away from mundane social-science computation of the relative cost-effectiveness of punitive and rehabilitative approaches to the treatment of criminals. For the Administration the political point of the exercise is preservation of the enemy for ritual annihilation during forthcoming electoral hunting seasons. In his successive campaigns, Ronald Reagan has run against student violence, drugs, and high taxes just as though all three had not increased during his term of office.

There is a related point. The techniques of problem solution are themselves judged by all parties ideologically. Among its partisans, community control is much more than an alternative administrative technique comparable to state, regional, or metropolitan modes of organization. An acceptable political solution must emphasize local control because local control is the shared value that precedes and validates policy choice. Implied are confidence in the wisdom of local residents and distrust of experts, mandarins, and professional politicians. The experts share an ideology of their own, a confidence in technique which equips them to generalize beyond specific localities, deploy tools of analysis and choice inexplicable to the laity, and achieve conclusions that are better for ordinary people, but not fully comprehensible to them. The experts can't help themselves. Their mystery converts them into wire-pullers, manipulators, and secret rulers.

Understandably, expert solutions are frequently experienced as the acts of interested parties and the expressions of hostile ideology. Indeed, experts employed by public agencies do represent clients other than the community to which their findings apply. City planning experts implement the policy preferences of the mayors who appoint them. John Mitchell's civil-rights experts interpret the relevant statutes quite differently from the experts who served Ramsay Clark. Experts protect their own positions, opportunities, and reputations, and often they do so most effectively by serving the ideological interests of their employers.

The problem-solvers can at most resolve tiny problems. For everybody's sake one can hope for a time when community agreement upon values and objectives presents the

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problem-solvers with the agenda of small issues that they are equipped to cope with.

IV

IN THEIR DIFFERENT WAYS, the Reichians and the problem-solvers have taken flight from real politics. The Third Consciousness may be grappling with a substantial vein of youthful romanticism. As far as the young are concerned, their new way of examining experience is nonpolitical or even antipolitical, although it has already been a cause of political response by others. The problem-solvers assume agreement where there is none and thus have nothing to say about the fissures that widen beneath the surface of American life.

For this libertarian radical, contemporary politics is about equality, which is both a value and an ideology. In the long run, the goal remains the good socialist dream of redistribution of privilege, power, property, and income. There is no way to get there except by the patient construction of alliances of intellectuals with unions, blacks, and the poor. Ours is a society blighted by inequality. Our regressive tax structure sufficiently distorts reality so that many people are convinced that we cannot afford Scandinavian standards of public health and communal amenity. Inflation is a disease of distorted expectations, an attempt upon the part of the many to reach for standards of life thrust upon them by the mass media.

I need scarcely say that the immediate prospects for radical economic reconstruction are bad. Accordingly, in the short run I attach myself to a criterion of judgment and a political tactic. I shall support any proposal which, however slightly, diminishes inequality and strengthens potential radical alliances. As for the political tactic, in the absence of a radical party I plan to give what help I can to the more progressive among conventional politicians. It is a good thing to lighten the weight of the Pentagon, diminish tax inequities, agitate for redistributive negative income taxation and universal health care, preserve the environment, and tighten public controls over large corporations. None of this yet constitutes a sufficient or inclusive radical program, but it is an essential immediate perspective for radicals.

Meanwhile, there are other immediate tasks. Ralph Nader is an example of an honorable type, the muckraker. Yet what he has discovered and the opposition he has aroused are educational to the community and grist to the radical's mill. Radicals need to play conventional politics with the McGoverns and Hugheses and slightly less conventional politics with the Naders and Banzhafs. During the 1970s, conventional politics are unlikely to be uplifting. The alternative to them is far more likely to be universal repression than the sort of radical renewal of our society that socialist egalitarians yearn for.

There may yet come a time when useful employment will be found for the problem-solvers. Perhaps one day the more rational aspirations of Consciousness III will also be approximated. Until then there is no escape from politics and ideology.

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Marcin Wyziemblo

Was Lenin's Mother Jewish?

The full importance of Wyziemblo's report on Marietta Shaginian's discovery of Lenin's geneology can be grasped only by one who has lived in the Soviet Union.

Deified after his death, Lenin became for Soviet youth a "knight without fear and beyond reproach," the greatest genius of world history who, coming from the depth of "the Russian soul," had created a new state and a new ideology.

After Stalin's death, the Lenin myth became further magnified. Lenin remained the sole, absolute authority upon whom Soviet leaders could rely. Now that Soviet anti-Semitism officially termed anti-Zionism is increasing, the image of Lenin cannot be besmirched with such "shameful" details as having had a Jewish mother.

Shaginian's discovery seems convincing and authentic, but in all likelihood no longer verifiable through original documents. Wyziemblo's reference to a high Soviet official's disparaging remark about the disorder in the Soviet archives indicates that in all probability the archives have by now been completely purged of any documents that might reflect on the memory of the Soviet leader.—TRANSLATOR

IN THE LATE AUTUMN OF 1964, Moscow was alive with political debate. It was just after Khrushchev's fall. The government had been taken over by Brezhnev and Kosygin, both still unknown quantities. Hope was intertwined with forebodings, yet all conjectures were based on frail, subjective calculations.

Although the intentions of the new government were subject to endless speculations, the problem of Marietta Shaginian's unusual discovery was discussed everywhere and seemed to obscure more fundamental issues. I heard about this discovery from many sources. Depending upon the knowledgeability, age, and intelligence of my informants, the problem was presented in lesser or greater detail, in depth or superficially. But its essentials were similar in all versions.

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Marietta Shaginian is a Russian of Armenian descent, a journalist who had been writing for the central Soviet press for decades. Lacking neither in vigor nor aggressiveness, this "twice-decorated and thrice mad woman," as people had called her for many years, had somehow avoided destruction in the thirties (such things did happen), and had been pensioned off at the beginning of the sixties.

It was probably Isaac Babel who had once observed that retired Russian colonels embark on new careers as historians. Shaginian, in this tradition, also became involved in historical research upon her retirement. She began to investigate the origins of the legendary All-Russian Industry-Trade Fairs of Nizhni Novgorod which go back to the first half of the nineteenth century.

Availing herself of the rich yet inadequately studied materials in the Leningrad

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State Historical Archives, she examined thoroughly the materials and scrupulously compared even those that seemed of slight importance. Therefore, when compiling the register of the organizing committee of the first Fair, she noticed that at a certain point a member of that committee with the surname of Blank and the first name of Sender had disappeared. In his place emerged one Alexander Blank. One does not require much intelligence to realize that this person was a Jewish merchant who had changed his first name. At that particular time in history such an event probably coincided with a conversion to Christianity.

Marietta Shaginian undertook a closer examination of the metamorphosis of Mr. Blank. It showed that he was a merchant and physician living in the heart of Russia, in the provincial capital of Simbirsk. At this point, however, the associations took on an astonishing and even political character. Prerevolutionary Simbirsk, now called Ulyanovsk, happens to be the Soviet Mecca because it is the birthplace of Lenin. The merchant Blank might have something in common with the "leader of the international revolutionary proletariat" because Lenin's mother's maiden name was Blank, and her father's name, Alexander. As every Soviet child knows, she was called Maria Alexandrovna.

The investigation proceeded, and this initial suspicion acquired the cloak of fact: Lenin's mother, Maria Alexandrovna Blank, had been born in Simbirsk in 1835, a Jew. At a relatively mature age, shortly before marrying the teacher Ilya Nikolaevich Ulyanov, she became a convert to the Greek Orthodox faith.

With only the best of intentions, and presuming that she might help in the destruction of anti-Semitism in the Soviet administration, Shaginian prepared to publish the documents she had discovered in the summer of 1964. The editors of the monthly magazine *Voprosy Istorii* shared her views, apparently unanimously. However, the final decision regarding the content of a Russian magazine lies with the censor. When he had finished reading the documents, submitted along with Shaginian's foreword, he immediately realized that the problem exceeded the limits of his authority. He turned to his superiors. They did the same, and the problem soon reached the agenda of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at this time still chaired by Khrushchev. It was considered there on a par with international and agricultural problems.

ONE CAN WELL IMAGINE how the members of this all-powerful body secretly regretted, neither for the first nor last time, that the "good old days" were over. If such a situation had arisen in Stalin's time, Shaginian, along with the editorial board of *Voprosy Istorii,* the employees in charge of the archives, and the censor, would have been shot. Then the executioners would have been shot in turn, and the whole problem would have had a relatively simple solution.

Such a solution, however, was no longer possible. This does not mean that the Political Bureau agreed to the author's wish to publish the documents. One may presume that whether or not the decision-makers were Russian chauvinists, they made the only possible decision, given their position in the system. In the mind of the average Russian, Communist or not, the Revolution is still something ambiguous. It seems the strongest reason for national pride, yet everyone realizes what material and moral devastation, what bloodshed and savagery it has brought. True, the Revolution created a basis for the Russian "Empire" to play an international role, but this was accomplished by "aliens": Jews, Poles, Latvians, who first overthrew the Russian Czar and then the Provisional Government. To be sure, the names of Trotsky, Kamenev, Chkheidze, etc. are anathema,

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but the images of Commissar Kogan,[1] or Commissar Levinson,[2] who introduced order into an anarchic Russian military detachment, are strongly commemorated in Soviet literature. The non-Russian makeup of the first Soviet of People's Commissars must reverberate in the hearts of true Russians as discordantly as the creation of the original Russian state by the Scandinavian Viking-Varengians in the early history of Russia.

And now there was proof that even Lenin's origins were flawed. Was the adjective, *genialnii* (of genius), used each time his name is mentioned the heritage of the proverbial "Jewish brain"? Of course, the name, Blank, is not Russian. It was suggested in literature about Lenin that it was German in origin—which, after all, is uplifting. (In 1970, at the anniversary exhibit in Stockholm, Swedish relationships by marriage were devised for Lenin.) But for Lenin's mother to be simply a Jew. . . .

The Central Committee did not believe the State Archives and demanded explanations of the Greek Orthodox Curia. A set of documents was swiftly obtained, confirming the baptism of Sender Blank, a former follower of the Mosaic religion. As a piquant supplement, a letter was found, written in the name of a contemporary local priest, stating that after his baptism, Blank was so happy that he would no longer be an object of discrimination that he invited guests to a huge drinking bout. Only by luck did half of the city not burn down!

But let us return to the events on the Soviet Olympus. The decision of the Central Committee was negative. The rationale behind this was the work of Ilyichev, then secretary in charge of ideological problems. It was more or less formulated as follows: Lenin never wrote about his Jewish origins. Since he did not, he must have considered it improper to do so. And Lenin's wish has always been sacred to us. And the director of Soviet Archives, a former general in the Security Forces, was told by an authoritative person, "There is a kind of disorder in your archives, Comrade Belov." This infuriated that dignitary and resulted in his "increased alertness." A committee was immediately dispatched to the Leningrad Archives with the mission of putting things in proper order. The staff at the Archives tried in vain to prove that they were not the ones who had made the regulations permitting 100-year-old documents to be readily accessible to researchers. Who could have foreseen that current state secrets lurked in provincial papers from the last century? The committee stated that an intolerable liberalism existed in the State Historical Archives in Leningrad and, to quash this liberalism, a decision was made to fire the head of the Department of Public facilities, Comrade Melamed. To avoid accusations of anti-Semitism, it was also decided to fire Comrade Pavlova.

News of these events spread throughout Moscow at approximately the time of Khrushchev's fall. In their comments, people connected this event with the policies of the new government. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team at first felt obligated to take measures to at least disarm the distrust in intellectual circles, if not to arouse their sympathies. Khrushchev was disliked in these circles, though it was realized that under his regime prisoners had been released. People were also aware of his role at the Twentieth Party Congress.

To gain some popularity, the new government sacrificed two people. Frol Kozlov, who died shortly afterwards, was dropped from the Political Bureau. Under Stalin he had succeeded Zhdanov as the Party's first secretary in Leningrad. He had left behind him numerous blood stains and general public hatred. And Ilyichev was dropped from the Secretariat. People in Moscow remembered quite

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[1] The character of Commissar Kogan was created by the Soviet poet, Eduard Bagritsky (1895–1934) in his long poem, *Duma pro Opanasa.*

[2] The character of Commissar Levinson appears in the novel *Razgrom* (*The Rout*), by Alexander Fadeev (1901–56), a leading Soviet writer and long-time chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers.

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well the articles he had written as editor of *Pravda* under Stalin.[3]

Within the framework of clandestine political life, gossip plays a much stronger role —informative as well as distorting—than in democratic states. The rumor about Lenin was widespread, but this did not mean it was well-founded. I wanted to check it. Among the many people I could turn to, I chose Comrade X, a Member of the Academy, now deceased. Ostensibly backward in ideology, poorly educated, he had for a long time been the laughing-stock of his young assistants. On the other hand, he was personally honest (this had been shown in 1937), and secretly critical.

We talked often and frankly, although it was difficult for me to adjust to the views and beliefs of my fellow conversationalist. Once I suddenly asked him, "Gennady Vasilyevich, how much is true and how much is false in the rumors in Moscow about Shaginian and her discovery?"

Gennady Vasilyevich probably felt like the Jewish accountant who was asked by an American rabbi touring Russia if a cow in the Soviet Union really costs only twenty rubles. Not wanting to lie and afraid to tell the truth, the accountant found a way out: "Rabbi, why do you need a whole cow? You'd be better off to spend ten rubles more and buy yourself a good goose!"

Anyway, I received a similarly impeccable reply. "What kind of discovery did Shaginian make? Many of us knew about it a long time ago!"

—*Translated by* MARK LIWSZYC

[3] This action was not intended to harm him seriously. Since he was the bearer of the title of Member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (a title bestowed by Stalin upon all editors-in-chief of *Pravda*), Ilyichev was named director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences. Despite appearances, this position offers significant possibilities in influencing political life by releasing various ideological pressures. However, the staff of the Institute demonstrated much firmness. At a strategic moment, it refused to submit to the decision. The Central Committee was forced to revoke its decision and Ilyichev became a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Shaginian was also invited to the Central Committee. It was explained to her that although the decision to prevent publication was a correct one, this decision applied only to the controversial documents. The ban was not intended to prevent publication of her findings in a monograph. The delighted author, as late as 1965, in an interview with the *Literaturnaya Gazetta,* stated that despite recent difficulties her sensational monograph would soon appear. It has not.

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Gus Tyler

Generation Gap or Gap Within a Generation?

CAN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, which does fairly well at accommodating political or economic conflicts, handle a *cultural* battle, which begins to shape up more and more like the pointlessly violent strife of hostile religions sects?" So asked the *Wall Street Journal* in May 1970. The *Kulturkampf* to which it referred was an "argument over the way people think of themselves and how they should live . . . a cultural conflict [that] is potentially every bit as volatile as conflict over more substantial issues."

To those who think in terms of issues, such a cultural conflict may appear implausible. A confrontation between guardsmen and students at Kent State or hard hats and demonstrators in New York they see as a clash of hawks and doves, or old and young: as ideological or generational struggles. What does culture have to do with it?

Mao Tse-tung's experience with his explosive students may suggest an answer. When the Chinese campuses began to heat up in the mid-sixties, Chairman Mao—in good Leninist tradition—tried to harness the energy. By unleashing the Red Guards on Liu Chao-chi, his favorite scapegoat, Mao took the generational drive and turned it into ideological channels. And he dignified the bloodletting by naming it a "cultural revolution."

However, once the student crusade began to get out of hand, the Chairman ordered the kids back to their classrooms. No more free bed, board, and travel: return to the parietals. This didn't work, either: the Red Guards continued to tear things up, this time on the campus. There was something about the life-style of these zealots that did not yield to Maoist manipulation.

It was now that Mao's Marxism came forward—as an inevitable search for the class origins of collective human behavior. The Chairman's conclusion was that the universities were overloaded with children of the privileged, who for too long had been exposed to the temptations and trauma of purposeless leisure and were caught up in unrealistic discourse over abstractions rather than in a serious involvement with matters that mattered. So he simply changed the college curriculum and its constituency. Crap courses were eliminated. Some perennial students were "volunteered" to distant farms, to pitch hay, and replaced in the classrooms by cadres from the unions and armed forces, whose term on the campus was limited to two years lest they also be corrupted by too much comfort. In short, Mao moved to change the life-style on campus by changing its class content.

Mao was aware of the generational impulse: he harnessed its energies for his purge against Liu. But Mao also recognized class-styles within the young: which he used to purge the purgers.

WHAT MAO KNEW by heart—life-styles derive from class (as well as generational) differences—CBS has recently discovered through the research of a 1969 report prepared by Dr. Daniel Yankelovich. Although the study is entitled "Generations Apart" and described as "a study of the generation gap," it might better have been called

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"Classes Apart—a study, etc." For what the report reveals is that while there is a generation gap, it is not as great as the class gap within generations.

Consider the very first and perhaps most important proposition stated in the Yankelovich questionnaire: "Hard Work Will Always Pay Off." Of college youth (here seen as a class), only 56 percent agreed, of noncollege youth 79 percent agreed. Their parents agreed, respectively, 76 percent and 85 percent. Here the difference among the young is far greater than between noncollege youth and all adults.

The percentage of "revolutionary" youth who says "yes" to this proposition is a low of 12 percent, but the parents of these same "revolutionaries" answer "yes" by a high of 91 percent. Which suggests that for the latter "hard work" did "pay off." It turns out that 44 percent of the "revolutionary" youth have parents making more than $15,000 a year, whereas only 22 percent of the young as a whole have parents in this upper bracket. If black revolutionaries were excluded from the count, the percentage of white "revolutionary" youth from affluent families would even be higher than 44 percent. One may therefore assume that if a youth is both white and "revolutionary," the chances are better than even that he comes from a well-to-do family and doesn't believe in "hard work."

Among conservative youth, 83 percent believe "hard work" pays—as do 86 percent of their parents. These young conservatives come from families with a disproportionately heavy percentage from the middle-income bracket ($10,000–$15,000 a year). While 29 percent of all youth come from this sector, 43 percent of conservative youth do. Relatively few conservative youth (only 11 percent) come from homes making more than $15,000, whereas 22 percent of all youth come from such homes. The percentage of conservatives in the *lower* bracket (up to $10,000) is 48 percent—almost exactly what it is for all youth. In sum, the conservative youth comes mainly from America's bulge in the middle.

Consider a second proposition posed by the survey: "Belonging to some Organized Religion is Important in a Person's Life." Among the college young 42 percent said "yes"; among noncollege youth, 71 percent. The adults, respectively: 81 percent and 91 percent. These figures clearly show the young are less religious than their parents. But they show even more clearly that noncollege youth are far more like adults than their contemporaries in college.

Among "revolutionary" youth, only 8 percent are religious, while 73 percent of their parents are—a very big generational gap. Among "conservative" youth, 84 percent are religious, while 91 percent of their parents are—nearly no difference.

In their attitudes toward money, sex, law-and-order, and authority, college and noncollege kids differ widely. The latter are far more traditional. Noncollege youths find it easier to accept restraints, whether it be police, "boss," or conventional clothing and grooming. Half the noncollege kids, for instance, assume that for the first couple of years on a job they will have little decision-making power. College youth, by two to one, reject this waiting period. In short, college youth are more reluctant to take orders and more impatient to give them—a not uncommon upper-class trait.

Young people disagree about the nature of the generation gap. While 54 percent of "revolutionary" youth note "very great" differences with their parents, only 11 percent of "middle-roaders" and 12 percent of "conservatives" feel that way. By two to one, the "revolutionaries" believe there is a "large generational gap," while middle-roaders and conservatives believe (72 percent and 70 percent) that the gap "exists" but is "exaggerated."

Above all, the "revolutionaries" think of their parents as immoral. Only 34 percent believe their parents "have strong moral principles and live by them" while 71 per-

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cent of "middle-roaders" believe this about their parents. Thirty-six percent of the "revolutionaries" believe their parents "act out of expediency rather than out of any moral principles" while only 10 percent of the "middle-roaders" and only 7 percent of the "conservatives" have this tacky view of their parents. The "revolutionary" youth often sees his parent as a money grubber. Thirty-nine percent believe that what their parents' "way of life brought them" was "material comfort," while only 8 percent of the "middle-road" and 7 percent of the "conservative" youth have this image of their parents.

Parents also differ about the character of youth. The parents of "revolutionaries" have less faith in kids than do conservative folk. Thus, 36 percent of the revolutionaries' parents believe that parents are "more interested in other people" than youths are, while only 14 percent of the conservatives' parents think so. As a corollary, only 9 percent of the revolutionaries' parents think the young "more interested in other people" while 33 percent of the "conservatives' " parents think so.

These cultural differences appear to have an economic origin. The parents of 41 percent of the college youth earn more than $15,000 and only 24 percent of them under $10,000; fifty percent of the parents of noncollege youth make under $10,000 and only 18 percent make more than $15,000.

FROM THIS SCATTERED DATA a pattern begins to emerge. There are differences of significance within the youth generation as between college and noncollege, upper-middle and lower-middle income, white-collar and blue-collar, "revolutionary" and "conservative." The noncollege, lower-income, blue-collar, middle-of-the-road or "conservative" youth is far more like his parent than like his rich intellectual counterpart on the campus. The *Kulturkampf* is less one of age against age than class against class.

Nor is the difference solely ideological—although that dimension is certainly there. The conflict is truly *cultural:* over life-styles, authority, boss, cops, drugs, education, fags, flags, family, girls, hard hats, intellectuals, jobs, kids, love, muscles, neighbors, etc. The contrast is most apparent as between rich "revolutionary" students and hard-working "conservative" workers. And in-between are most of the youth—about 70 percent—with a spectrum of in-between activity. At the center is a big chunk of kids—college and noncollege, affluent and not, Left and Right and Center—whose cultural attitudes are pretty much the same as, or at least not vastly different from, those of the adult generation. The highly dramatized clash of cultures is a conflict among contemporaries fired by atypical extremes who, in a period of high tension, come to appear as spokesmen for the typical.

What are these types? Oversimplified and overdrawn, they are those who come from the polis of work and those who come from the cosmopolis of leisure. Though of the same age and same nation, they are ages apart, locked in combat like warring "nations" arising out of hostile subcultures.

In the work polis, discipline is part of the job. The worker assumes this whether he is "on the belt" or on high steel. In mass production, he must move with the ruthless rhythm of the machine; in construction he must swing with the crew—as much as if he were on a PT boat or a bomber crew. Manual labor, except when artsy-craftsy, is a collective effort with built-in congregational compulsions.

This discipline is not as irksome to the worker as it appears (or would be) to the child of leisure, because the blue-collar boy is accustomed to authority before he gets to the job. He is reared with it in his family where parents traditionally teach their children to "honor your father and mother." This continues into maturity. For blue-collar folk, notes the sociologist Mirra Komarovsky, "the parental family . . . remains their major reference group after marriage." The

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traditional family structure is further perpetuated among blue-collar workers by the disproportionate presence of Catholics, rural elements (about one-fifth of the blue-collar force is off the farm), and immigrants.

When work discipline comes to seem too oppressive, the worker changes the rules through the structured rebellion of his union. More leisure, greater voice, less pressure. But the rebellion is careful to preserve the work place physically, to seek a settlement, and to run its course in a disciplined way.

In the blue-collar world, two gods preside: Ananke and Eros. The former—the god of necessity, before whom all others must bow—drives the man to work, to hard work, even when it doesn't pay very well. The latter—the god of love—is the maker of his family. No matter how irksome the sacrifices to both these deities, the blue-collar worker continues to pay homage at their shrines. Although probably unaware that Dr. Freud looked upon Ananke ("the compulsion to work") and Eros ("the power of love" with its resultant family) as "the parents of human culture," the plebeians of all ages—including the present—sense the importance of these institutions in the making of a viable society. In the blue-collar family, notes Arthur B. Shostak in *Blue-Collar Life,*

> child-rearing is a total activity, possibly the most important in the maintenance of the entire marriage relationship. Together the couple struggles to combine the concern of the wife with the child's self-actualization and the husband's more traditional interest in making men out of boys. . . . In the entire system of rationalizations that blue-collar men derive for life as it is lived (or better yet, tolerated), the working-class family remains the key factor, the beginning and end of all things.

To the worker, the family—like the job—is accepted for better or worse. If he likes his family, so much the better; if he likes his job, he is doubly blessed. But, like it or not, family and job are his cross to be carried to his own calvary for personal salvation and social survival. As a result, the worker is not generally anti-institutional. He may be critical, even cynical, about his institutions—company, family, church, union, political party, or country—but he remains loyal.

THIS SENSE OF LOYALTY that starts with family and fellow-workers and extends to neighborhood and nation results in such a complex mixture of behavior patterns as class solidarity, family devotion, gang unity, patriotism, parochialism, and prejudice. This set of traditional loyalties is constantly reinforced by the fact that the worker is turf-bound—both at home and on the job. He lives in a fairly homogeneous neighborhood where he mingles with his own kind most of the time. His household is part of an ethnic and economic unity. He worries about safety and stability in his urban village and is prepared to protect its borders. He and his kids may spend all their lives in that enclave, traveling only short distances and at rare intervals. If the family moves, it is likely to do so as part of a tribal migration.

These neighborhoods, points out Shostak, are "social class enclaves relatively untouched by time and emphatically personal in character." Here, adds Scott Greer in *The Emerging City,* we see "not the 'faceless world of megalopolis,' but men in shirt sleeves playing softball, groups of women gossiping on the porches, children swarming in the streets." However slumlike this urban village may look or smell to the visitor, the natives feel at home on this piece of turf that has "an old-shoe comfort and reliability." They are also proud of what Edward Ryan calls their *commonness,* "the strong theme that the good man is the plain man . . . that there is virtue in being of the common clay."

The job, like the neighborhood, is another piece of turf to which workers are attached: by choice, necessity, and habit. Many will not leave a job even for better pay because

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the workplace is a *social center*—a locale of a subculture—with strong emotional ties and loyalties.

One of the propositions in the CBS report that separated college and noncollege youth related to this matter of loyalty. The proposition: "No sane, normal, decent person could even think of hurting a close friend or relative." Of the noncollege youth 43 percent strongly agreed, as against a mere 18 percent of the college youth. This faith in group loyalty on the part of the blue-collar boy was not mere naivete: they believed in greater number than the college youth that "anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble." But in the herdish blue-collar world it is natural to believe that a "sane, normal, decent" man will stand *by his own*—will remain loyal.

Traditionalism is reinforced by the fact that the polis of work, shunning change qua change, is basically neophobic. Blue-collar processes tend to be imitative rather than inventive; repetitive rather than innovative. In the case of a man in mass production, this is obvious. In the case of the craftsman—like the electrician—the locale may change but not the chore: installing a switch is, with few variations, installing a switch.

Change may, indeed, be downright threatening. An old dog must learn new tricks. Sometime he may be rendered obsolete by a new process. In any event, comfortable habits and rhythms are disrupted. Since the worker is expected to turn out as much as possible in as short a time as possible, he is not encouraged to experiment. He is paid to produce—not to probe. He is put on an incentive system rewarding a mastery of routine that speeds output.

At home and at work, he seeks stability —regular employment and regular meals, discipline and authority, predictable production, safety on the job and the street. In this ordered universe, he believes that there are traditional roles to be played by boss and union, by priest and congregation, by friends and neighbors, by "them" and "us," parents and children, men and women.

Men are expected to be men: masculine and muscular. Homosexuals are "queer." In the eyes of the blue-collar beholder, they can't lift big weights or raise big families. When asked about "relations between consenting homosexuals," 72 percent of the noncollege youth thought it was "morally wrong." Less than half the college youth thought so. (Here again the noncollege youth were far closer to the adult generation as a whole than they were to the college kids.) When the same question was put to the "revolutionaries," only 7 percent found it "wrong" as against 83 percent of the "conservatives."

Immersed in a masculine mystique, the blue-collar man accepts combat—at the bar, on the picket line, in the convention hall, at home, overseas—as an inevitable aspect of life. In part, this is a prolongation of boyhood with its street brawls—a commonplace of blue-collar life. In part, it is the result of constant living with physical danger: in the last half-dozen years more lives were lost in industrial accidents than in Vietnam. But basically it is an unstated acceptance that a man cannot go through life without being physically bruised or bruising.

This acceptance of bellicosity, plus a sense of loyalty and patriotism, makes it easier for the blue-collar man to go along with a national war. For instance, in questioning college and noncollege youth on "fighting a war," twice as many noncollege as college respondents felt it worth fighting to "keep a commitment," or to maintain "our position of power in the world," or to protect "our honor." (Again, the noncollege youth are more like adults in general than like their college contemporaries.)

Above all else, the blue-collar worker is reality-bound. No doubt, he has his fantasies; but he quickly separates out the real from the unreal in the crucible of daily demands and deeds. At work and at home he is

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put to the hard test of personal and familial survival.

II

IN THE COSMOPOLIS OF LEISURE, however, a contrary culture is aborning—with play substituted for work, innovation for imitation, style for content, universalism for tribalism, conscience for loyalty, individuality for collectivism, neophilia for neophobia, theater for reality. The carriers of this counter culture are a cadre of youths raised in an elysium whose propagation as a universal life-style they envision as a social utopia.

In his *Work and Its Discontents* Daniel Bell concludes with a thought that might well have served as the introduction to a sequel on "Leisure and Its Discontents." In Western civilization, notes Bell, work has stood at the center of moral consciousness and moral unconsciousness: consciously, work was the compelling virtue of *Genesis,* the Protestant ethic, the Carlylean *homo-faber;* unconsciously, work was man's answer to death in an era when the traditional hope of immortality—religion—was in decline. "The significance of work was that it could still mobilize emotional energies into creative challenges. . . . One could eliminate death from consciousness by minimizing it through work." Then comes a closing query: if work (as Freud believed) was "the chief means of binding an individual to reality, what will happen then, when not only the worker but work itself is displaced by the machine?"

This closing query in a section entitled "Ananke and Thanatos" poses the problem of man's ability to relate to reality in a workless world. Whether or not the worker on-the-belt is part of this nonwork unreality because his toil is unvaried and unchallenging is open to debate. But there is little doubt that a sizable body of affluent youths in America, because of the death of that old-fashioned god, Ananke, have been liberated from humdrum toil by the very technocracy that many of them yearn to destroy. In *The Making of the Counter Culture,* Theodore Roszak writes:

> A high consumption, leisure-wealthy society simply doesn't need contingents of rigidly trained "responsible" young workers. It cannot employ more than a fraction of untrained youngsters fresh out of high school. The middle class can therefore afford to prolong the ease and drift of childhood, and so it does. . . . The result has been to make of adolescence, not the beginning of adulthood, but a status in its own right: a limbo that is nothing so much as the prolongation of an already permissive infancy.

The notions about the American economy just noted are open to serious doubt; but as prevalent myths they suffice to motivate or justify the extension of infancy through college and beyond.

The prolongation of infancy sustains the notion of life as play rather than work. From the cosmopolis of leisure arises a life style where play's the thing: an attitude nurtured from cradle to college.

> As babies [records Roszak], the middle-class young got picked up when they bawled. As children, they got their kindergarten finger paintings thumbtacked on the living room walls by mothers who knew better than to discourage incipient activity. As adolescents, they perhaps even got a car of their own with all of the sexual privileges attending. . . . [The commercial world joined the schools] to elaborate a total culture of adolescence based on nothing but fun and games.

In this life curriculum, discipline appears as an unnecessary evil. Tough problems are resolved through theater. The way to handle the problem of tasteless Pablum, for instance, is to serve it in a variety of containers of varying colors and shapes decorated with characters out of the comics. If that doesn't work, sing a song, play a tape, dance a jig, do anything, even beat a drum—but not the kid. If that doesn't work, offer another food and another and another—change the world, not the child. The well-to-do parent, especially the mother, has time to in-

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dulge the whims of the infant. There is also a moral justification, for, as Roszak insists, the young are thus "influenced to believe that being human has something to do with pleasure and freedom."

As in theater, novelty is an essential part of the action. The child is exposed to new decor, dwellings, visitors, places—even new fathers and mothers. Life flickers by like a movie montage with new faces and scenes to excite the senses. The child grows up a neophiliac—yearning for change *per se*. New means good, old means bad, just as youth is virtue and age vice.

Life, like theater, is expected to be instantaneous: to transport the onlooker, to resolve problems, and to render pleasure or catharsis—in a matter of minutes. From high chair to higher education, these youths are reared in a hurrying hothouse. They get instant attention and authority, money and credit. They are surrounded by instant coffee, tea, heat, and refrigeration. They are encouraged to buy instant teeth, nose, hair, and beauty. They sample instant bosoms and a novel bustle touted as "instant fanny." The media make instant heroes, idols, ideas, ideals, and widely imitated idiosyncracies. A turn of the TV dial turns off one fantasy and turns on another. A pill, a sniff, or a needle makes fantasy instantaneously real. Sex is instant: mate now, meet later.

THE YEARNING FOR NEWNESS and Nowness is, of course, stimulated by a highly technical society with its magical inventions. Yet, ironically, it is precisely against this technical tyranny with its rigid disciplines that "technocracy's children" are in rebellion. And doubly ironical is the use of modern mechanisms (physical and psychological) by the "revolutionaries" against the technocratic order: cameras, electronic devices, media manipulation, chemistry, image-making, miniaturized high-speed explosives.

Out of this counter culture arises a sophisticated dramaturgy whose real-life enactment is intended to be an instrument of profound social change. Life is expected to imitate art —including the theater of the absurd. Daily dress is costuming, intended far less for comfort or esthetics than for role-playing. Today I'm Sitting Bull or Pocahontas, Fidel or Che, Bill Haywood or Joe Hill, Gandhi or Lumumba: clothes make the man or woman. The revolution itself is theater, inspiring drama critic Robert Brustein to insist that it was within his professional jurisdiction to review the current crop of "revolutionaries" as he would any other batch of plays.

A high percentage of the rich "revolutionary" youth are the children of men who made their wealth recently in the manufacture and sale of images: teachers, preachers, PR men, ad men, artists, writers, foundation executives, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers. From such parents, the children learn the power of the word, the repeated cliché, the dramatic act, the surprise move, the subliminal suggestion, the amorphous abstraction with its catch-penny appeal. They learn the superiority of package over content, style over substance. They learn the artifacts of imagery projected in colorful conflict or sweeping symbolism. They become master dramatists, directors, actors, and publicists at an early age, certain—as are their parents —that they know how to merchant dreams.

In some major respects, however, they are unlike their parents. The old man learned his craft to earn a living while the son, taking economic security for granted, feels free —as Roszak puts it—to "build a new uncompromised personality, flawed perhaps by irresponsible ease, but also touched with some outspoken spirit." While the old man must "kowtow to the organization," the son "can talk back at home with little fear of being tossed out into the cold." While the old man made a living out of peddling detergents, cigarettes, or a political candidate, the son makes a religion out of denouncing the parental products as poison.

In such families, the generation gap is great. Fathers appear as hypocrites who, preaching high ideals to their children, prac-

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tice the mean trade of peddling mischievous myths. The old man, under the lash of Ananke, serves Mammon while the son, believing Ananke is dead, enshrines Thespis. In the fantasy of the son, the father appears as a deceitful, money-mad dictator. When asked whether the adults "considered" their "opinion" or granted them "a full vote in family matters," only 27 percent of the "revolutionaries" said "yes" while 43 percent of the "conservatives" said "yes"—although the latter come from more authoritarian homes.

The rich young "revolutionary" feels no strong tie to work or family. Without such attachment to institutions that are the twin pillars of blue-collar life, the child of leisure lacks a personal model for accepting almost any institution. Loyalty to company, union, family, or nation consequently becomes difficult if not downright craven. The ultimate symbol of loyalty—the flag—is an abomination. The only real loyalty is to the counter-cultural sect with its own flag, shibboleths, and heroes.

Without strong ties to immediate family, the cosmopolitan child feels no strong attachments to the expanded family—the "tribe"—whether ethnic, geographic, or political. Many of these young have traveled widely during their teens, soaking up the cultures of many peoples. The resulting cosmopolitanism, conditioned by a nonfamilial and antiparental bias, slips easily into a practicing xenophilia and autophobia.

Nor does college change this cultural fix. For the counter-culturist, higher education is not intended to have practical consequences. Only 6 percent of the "revolutionaries" thought of college as preparation to "earn more money, have a more interesting career, and enjoy a better position in society." (Seventy-three percent of the "conservatives" saw school in just these practical terms.) Ninety-two percent of the "revolutionaries" found college to be "something more intangible; perhaps the opportunity to change things rather than make out well within the existing system."

For the "revolutionary," college is where you learn how to change the system—not fit into it. The university is not a place to discover reality through work, to accept discipline, to develop institutional loyalty. Quite the opposite. College years are intended to shake institutions, challenge authority, create a workless world. The campus—at this crucial moment of self-assertion—becomes a stage where the "revolution" as theater conducts its rehearsals for the real "revolution" to come.*

III

THE CHILDREN of the work polis and those of the leisure cosmopolis have contrary images of self and of the other. Each thinks he is the true fount of creation: the blue-collar man sees himself as builder of cities, maker of things, defender of the nation; the revolutionary intellectual sees himself as planner of societies, setter of style, maker of eternal peace. The blue-collar man thinks of the rich "revolutionary" as a self-inflated, useless snob; the latter views the "hard hat" as an ignorant, useless slob. Both think of the other as dirty, though in different ways: the blue-collar man works in dirt; the "hippie" lives in it. The blue-collar man looks upon disloyalty as treason; the "revolutionary" sees disloyalty as loyalty to a higher reason. The blue-collar man thinks of this

* The rich, white revolutionary is not the only group conditioned by the unreality of the workless world. There is a "lower class" that is also liberated from the compulsions of labor. Its life-style is strikingly like that of affluent counterparts. Here, for instance, is Edward Banfield's description: "The *lower* (as opposed to working) class person never sacrifices any present satisfaction for the sake of a larger future one. He lives from moment to moment. This is to say, he does not discipline himself to acquire an occupational or other skill, to hold down a regular job, to maintain stable family ties, or to stay out of trouble with the law. His bodily needs (especially for sex) and his taste for 'action' take precedence over everything else. . . . He likes the feeling that something violent is about to happen. . . ." The similarity of life-style with this traditional "lower class" has not gone unnoticed by a sector of the counter-culturists who have tried to copy habits and make activist alliances with their impoverished twins.

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society as his and sees the "hippie" as an alien to be tolerated up to a point and, beyond that, to be chained. The "revolutionary" feels he is alienated from this society and that—to find a home—it is not he but the social order and its hordes that must be changed. The worker favors social change that is tangible and measurable—job, wage, pension, home, health care, house, vacation—and uses proven methods of collective action, like bargaining and balloting, to make progress through cumulative reform. The rich "revolutionary" favors social changes that are conceptual and abstract—freedom, justice, equality, participation—and turns to novel methods of *individual* action, like booing, burlesquing, or bombing, to make progress through sudden revolution. The worker looks on these "revolutionary" methods as a threat to his existence and to his social order: the "revolutionary" sees the worker as an obstacle to his personal liberation and the freedom of man.

My CONTRAST between the children of "labor" and those of "leisure" is exaggerated. My descriptions are less characterizations than caricatures. Very few individuals totally fit any of these stereotypes, and even within the defined categories there are variations. Moreover, the labels of revolutionary, conservative, etc. are—like most modern packaging—somewhat misleading. Revolutionary style does not necessarily signify revolutionary content. And there are the puritan rebels, the Jacobin squares. A perfect example of a recurrent incongruity between style and substance is the class that the CBS Report calls the "radical reformer."

In discussing the "revolutionaries," Yankelovich notes that "this group is so small (only 1 percent of the youth) that it should be looked at in combination with the radical reformers," making up 10 percent of the youth. On closer examination, it appears that these "radical reformers," no matter how dissident, are traditionalists in life-style: 68 percent of them want more emphasis on law and order; 58 percent believe religion is important; 70 percent believe private property is sacred; 82 percent believe society needs some legally based authority to prevent chaos; 82 percent believe compromise is essential for progress; 70 percent favor more respect for authority; 84 percent think education is very important. "While holding radical views on most ideological questions," comments Yankelovich, "these radicals appear more like middle-of-the roaders on traditional values like patriotism, sex, and religion."

Why? Because a large percentage of them come from working-class families (55 percent from families making less than $10,000 a year), and because nonwhites are disproportionately represented (26 percent). These "black militants," notes Yankelovich, "are radical on domestic issues but highly disciplined in terms of upholding certain standards of personal morality."

If one adds this "radical" group to the "revolutionaries," then the total at the left end of the spectrum is 11 percent. At the right end are the conservatives with 19 percent. In between is 70 percent of the generation. This in-between group covers a wide spectrum, including the "New Left," the "Old Left," people who like to join civil rights protests, or favor a "fundamental reform" of the military, big business, political parties, etc. Some share opinions with the far Left; others share opinions with the conservatives; still others hold a mixed set of views. In life-style, this sector is also in-betweenish: a bit obedient and a bit rebellious, liking old shoes but trying new boots, respecting the folks but battling the old man, tied to home and job but on a long elastic tether, remembering that all work and no play makes Jack a jerk. And like any middle child, it is least likely to be put on public display.

Although composing the bulk of youth in America, the influence (and eventually the size) of this sector could dwindle rapidly. It has little internal cohesion, and is united neither by an easy outlook nor by a recognizable style. (The right wing is swiftly developing a style for public confrontation, a

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kind of war paint, like the flag decal on the hard hat.) It is underexposed by the media that prefers the pyrotechnics of confrontation. In a period of polarization its ranks are thinned to Left and Right.

Yet this is a sector of youth that can moderate the cultural clash within its generation and turn politics from theater to reality. Its mood is left-of-center. Its composition is cross-sectional in terms of blue- and white-collar mix, family income, percentage in and out of college, religion. It has natural ties to the nation across economics, education, and ethnicity. It could be the core of a progressive coalition that reaches into both the leftist (especially the radical-reform) and the conservative (especially the trade-union) wings of the nation.

How and whether this can come to pass is an item for another discussion. But the starting point must be a realization that the struggle between generations is far less significant for the politics of our times than the struggle within the generation of the young.

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Herbert L. Packer

What Should We Do About the Police?

THE RELATIONSHIP between the police and the community has become an urgent problem in this nation's domestic life, as we vainly strive to control the law's legitimate monopoly on the use of force without deepening the division between Middle America and our various minorities (blacks, youth, the intellectuals, etc.). Let us assume for a moment what may be unlikely: that the police could be brought into an ideal relationship with the community. What would that relationship be? And what are the chances of coming anywhere near it during the 1970s? The first question I find a good deal easier to deal with than the second.

The desirable relationship between police and community in today's America requires, in my view, the following developments: (*a*) decriminalization; (*b*) elimination of the paramilitary character of the police force; (*c*) "professionalization" and "centralization" of those police functions which require a high degree of "institutional management"; (*d*) decentralization and community control, particularly within urban areas, of the "cop-on-the-beat" aspects of police work. Let me offer a few remarks on each of these.

Decriminalization The criminal law, and hence to a large extent the work of the police, should be purged of those crimes, like narcotics and marijuana possession, gambling, abortion, homosexuality, drunkenness, obscenity, etc., that are beyond the capacity of the criminal law.[1] These offenses create legal lawlessness and give law enforcement a bad name. Just as in our foreign policy, we must here reduce commitments to match capacities. The criminal law, and hence the police, must be relieved of the burden of enforcing morals and the consequent costs of illegal police practices, such as searches and seizures, entrapment, electronic surveillance, etc.[2] Such a policy would have the effect of freeing the institutions of criminal justice to devote their major efforts to the first job that law enforcement must do: protecting us against gross and immediate harm to person and property. If, as James Q. Wilson argues, the police must inevitably exhibit a middle-class bias, the racist overtones of that bias can at least be reduced.[3] Decriminalization

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[1] Arguments for this view are fully developed in Packer, *The Limits of The Criminal Sanction* (1968). See also Morris and Hawkins, *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control,* Chapter 1 and Chapter 8 (1970).

[2] Police illegality arises almost entirely in relation to "victimless" crimes, by which I mean primarily crimes involving consensual transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers. I exclude from the category of morals offenses such apparently "victimless" crimes as bribery, perjury, and other offenses against the government. While these crimes do not have any immediate victim, we are all their victims. To the extent that their detection involves such police illegality as wiretapping and bugging, it is presently unconstitutional to condone that illegality. If such sanctions as compensation for "innocent" victims of these devices could be developed, there would be much to say for modifying our present exclusionary rules in the investigation of certain narrowly stated crimes, since exclusion of evidence is the only sanction for police illegality presently available.

[3] See Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (1968), p. 297.

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would substantially alleviate the feelings of discrimination that most blacks have in relation to law enforcement, if only because offenses like drunkenness, narcotics possession, and gambling are committed by blacks quite out of proportion to their numbers in the population. Ghetto inhabitants are like the rest of the population in their wish that law enforcement concentrate on protecting lives and property, for they are the principal victims of such crimes as murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. The police can be prepared by decriminalization to cease, or at best diminish, their present vendetta against blacks and the young—to mention only two of the most deplorable aspects of police work today.

Elimination of the Paramilitary Character of the Police By "paramilitary" I mean the tendency of the police to resemble the institutions and structure of an army: the sense of mission, pride in identifying oneself as being part of a unit, and antidemocratic spirit. This tendency is an evil in police work because it accentuates the "we/they" feeling, even though the police, unlike an army, are an immediate part of the community. As a part of the community that enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the police must not be allowed to develop a "fascist streak" that enables them to exploit the notion of a "war on crime." It isn't just their self-image but their image in the community at large that represents a danger to democratic institutions. The principal "paramilitary" aspects of the police include: (1) their closed-endedness, which inhibits contacts with the rest of the community; (2) the fact that discipline is maintained solely from within; (3) the tendency for a policeman's sense of identification and loyalty to be almost exclusively to his profession.

We need to blast apart this "paramilitary" structure by a number of related measures. For example, police recruitment and training ought to be greatly diversified. Why should every policeman be required to start at the bottom as a "rookie" patrolman? The analogy to "basic training" must not be allowed to control police recruitment and training. Since the police do a number of very different jobs, there should be a number of different avenues into police work: detective work, community-relations work, clerical work, management work—none of these logically needs an initial period of training or indoctrination as a patrolman.

Correspondingly, avenues need to be opened outside the police system for further training and retooling. College graduates should be sought out and encouraged to go into police work at advanced levels.[4] The principle of "lateral entry" needs to be extended far beyond the modest notion of transfer between police forces encouraged by the President's Crime Commission. Blacks can be recruited right from the ghetto and given on-the-job training as policemen; their avenues of advancement through additional schooling also require development. I dissent strongly from the canon of "professionalization" which insists that entry into the police should require higher formal education than it now does. On the contrary, initial qualifications should be greatly broadened and relaxed. Of course, as a man's career develops, formal education becomes a necessity. But that is very different from imposing initial exclusionary requirements that may often have a racist effect. Nor is education the sole restrictive requirement. Chinese in San Francisco are protesting the height requirement of the local police, which tends to keep Chinese off the police force. The response of the Chief of Police to this suggestion was rather cool,

[4] See the story of the New York Police Department's effort to encourage recruitment of college graduates, *New York Times,* February 13, 1970, p. 1; see also the accompanying "Man in the News" piece on David Burton Durk, *id.,* p. 42. Even *Time* has now joined the chorus of praise for these efforts; see *Time,* July 13, 1970, pp. 34–43, and especially the profile of Sergeant Durk, pp. 42–43. The *Time* article contains the first plug that I have ever seen in the mass media for decriminalization. *Id.,* p. 42.

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as one might expect from the head of a paramilitary institution.[5]

While minimum requirements require relaxation, the members of the force should be encouraged to broaden their experience by taking leaves to work as teachers and at other "civilian" occupations, without being penalized by the loss of their accrued leave and similar fringe benefits. Thus, the police can move outside the police structure, and so gradually the distinction between the police and the rest of us may be lessened.

Police discipline, as the police become less paramilitary, will have to include at least a minimum of "outside" participation. Whether this participation comes through civilian review boards or through easing the process of civil litigation against the police doesn't really matter. What matters is that the present paramilitary distinction between the police and the rest of us be blurred. The "racist" provisions of the recently passed D.C. Crime Act, requiring the government to pay the policeman's legal fees when he is sued for false arrest regardless of who wins the suit, is a fine example of how people like the bill's principal author, Representative McMillan (D., S.C.) can impede progress. This provision tends to increase the paramilitary character of the police. If, on the other hand, the paramilitary structure begins to break down, the possibilities of what I hope will cease to be referred to as "civilian" participation in police disciplinary processes will probably increase.

"Professionalization" and "Centralization"

It is the unanimous opinion of experts that police work needs to be professionalized and the structure of local government units that control the police centralized. Our present fragmented structure of local government impedes police efforts to control crime. "Professionalization" means of course more money for salaries; more money for research and training programs; more money for developing specialized services; more money for research and development of substitutes for deadly weapons like tranquilizing "bullets" and wooden ammunition for missiles. Centralization goes hand-in-hand with professionalization, since only through providing larger governmental units is it financially feasible to enable the police to develop what professionalization requires. The President's Crime Commission, dominated by professionals, gave heavy priority to this aspect of police work, though without even recognizing the conflict between this and the "community" aspects of police work. No doubt the trend toward professionalizing and centralizing police work *up to a point* needs to be accentuated. Professionalization is necessary for those aspects of police work that require specialization. Detective work, police management, and such supporting services as computerization are good examples. In these "elitist" aspects, police work calls imperatively for centralization, the creation of broader and larger governmental units. Perhaps metropolitan units should be substituted for our present crazy-quilt pattern of city, township, and county units. Indeed, the advent of the computer may make metropolitan or even state units technologically irrelevant, for by now even riot control has become an interstate matter. The centrifugal pressure of things-as-they-are may suffice to curb the movement toward a national police force that most of us would deplore as a major threat to civil liberties. Nonetheless, we do need centralization and institutionalization of the elite aspects of police work.

Decentralization and Community Control

While it has become fashionable to call for greater "community control" of the police, there have been, so far as I am aware, no attempts to prescribe in detail how this is to be achieved. It is easy to applaud efforts to get community "input" into police work, but very difficult to reconcile these efforts with the legitimate demand for increased professionalization and technological efficiency.

[5] *San Francisco Chronicle,* July 16, 1970, p. 4.

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The work of the "cop on the beat" certainly does call for some easing of the tension between the police and the community. However "professional" a police force may be, even with decriminalization and a decrease in the paramilitary character of the police, there will still be difficulty in bridging the gap between police and, to cite an extreme example, Bedford-Stuyvesant. What measures can we take at least to modify the tension?

Assuming that the institutional structure of the police remains committed to specialization, professionalization, and centralization, as I believe it must, what modifications are possible? What does it really take to be a good "cop on the beat"? A good cop must be honest, not psychotic, of normal intelligence, and be able to get along with people. For cops on the beat, extensive recruitment should be undertaken among the inhabitants of urban ghettos. These recruits can be full-fledged police trainees, working the beat in their own communities. At the same time, they can be educated in local community colleges to recognize those aspects of middle-class values that we expect our police to share. I say "recognize" because it is only through the responsibility of their on-the-job training that they can be expected to arrive at a sharing of those values. Respect for the value of human life and of property—these are the essential middle-class values that the police must share.

To Our Contributors

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It would, at the same time, be a great help in training these ghetto recruits if we could step up the recruitment of middle-class, college-educated policemen. Their wish to serve the community can be encouraged by employing their talents as teachers for the ghetto recruits, both as police instructors in community colleges and as on-the-job companions. I find this kind of alliance less implausible than I do the "integration" of lower-middle-class white ethnic police with young ghetto people. If we can recruit enough "elite" men from the colleges, as we now seem to be trying to do in some cities,[6] and if decriminalization and reduction of the paramilitary aspects of police work succeed, we should be on our way to easing the present tension, which results in large part from the lower-middle-class "white ethnic" orientation of the police.

We then must consider the effects of introducing large numbers of young uneducated blacks into the police force. They obviously can't be limited in their careers to patrolling their own neighborhoods. Some, I assume, will display an aptitude for police specialization that will enable them to qualify for professionalization. Why shouldn't police work become one model among others for the advancement of blacks? In short, police work probably typifies the kind of service occupation that ought to lead to black assimilation into the middle class. Of course, "middle-class values" are themselves undergoing a process of change, and the injection via the police of large numbers of blacks into the middle class would hasten that change.

But even if large numbers of black police were to remain uneducated, why would the situation be any worse than it is now? If most of the "cops on the beat" in the ghettos were black ignoramuses and bullies, that would not be as bad as having white ignoramuses and bullies patrolling the ghettos. A minimal sharing of middle-class values will

[6] See Note 4, *supra*.

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surely take place. In the struggle of the white ethnics to maintain their dominance in ghetto police, they will have to yield to the demands of justice.

IS IT POSSIBLE to disprove the assertion that "there's no way to get there from here"? At the least, there are a few hopeful signs. The four elements that I have been elaborating are, with the exception of professionalization and centralization, interrelated. Decriminalization is essentially the job of state legislatures, but it may in the end turn out to be the result of a constitutional *coup de main*. Consider the case of abortion. While legislatures have been gradually liberalizing the abortion laws, some courts have declared abortion laws to be unconstitutional. It is my thesis that all criminal laws declaring that consensual conduct is criminal ought to be viewed by the courts as *prima facie* unconstitutional on the general ground that they are irrational.[7] Whether the Supreme Court will so decide during this decade, or whether legislatures will repeal such laws during this next decade, is uncertain. Yet if our society does not become completely repressive under Nixon and Agnew, I believe the chances are quite good that in the long run we will by a combination of legislative and judicial action decriminalize ourselves.

A similar caveat blocks reduction in the paramilitary character of the police. Our divided nation is still committed to the current paramilitary image of our police. Middle America, if I understand that term, rests largely on the entrenched force of lower-middle-class and blue-collar white ethnicism. These people are, so far as the police are concerned, very much in the saddle. White ethnicism is being simultaneously assailed by the blacks, the middle-class young, and the tired remnants of the liberal coalition forged by F.D.R. Now it may be that the paramilitary character of the police will turn out to be the most vulnerable point in the armor of the white ethnics. If the nonwhite ethnics and the young can come to political maturity, perhaps we "tired remnants" will be able to create a new coalition against the police as they now are. (That is, if our allies don't knock us off in the process.) One needn't be Jeremiah to see in a certain kind of ethnicism a source of the corruption of the police, as was brilliantly portrayed in *"Z,"* the recent movie about the Greek situation. Single-minded patriotism plus power plus fear plus indifference about methods equals something that could approach fascism. If the predominantly youthful and enthusiastic audience in whose company I saw *"Z"* really took in the lesson it had to teach, the paramilitarism of the police might well be on the way out. One could only wish that the intellectual Establishment,[8] schooled as it is in the "talk tough" tradition of the Kennedys, and inhibited by its devotion to the "scientism" of behavioral science, showed more concern over the possibility that "order" and "growth" can be the seeds of a corruption that might blossom into a native kind of fascism. We can rant against the destructive radicals all we want, but we still must protect ourselves on our right flank, too.

The first real opportunity to make a breakthrough in the paramilitary structure of our police will come when the durable J. Edgar Hoover retires or dies. We don't need a younger J. Edgar. I should favor someone like Ramsey Clark as the next director of the FBI, for the exemplary power of that position is tremendous. Count it, if

[7] By "irrational" I mean the absence of a reasonable means/end relationship, what the Supreme Court used to call the absence of Substantive Due Process. I am not interested on what peg the Court hangs the doctrine; there are plenty of possible pegs, including the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments," the Ninth Amendment's developing role as the safeguard of "privacy," the religion clauses of the First Amendment, etc.

[8] For example, the *Public Interest* group.

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you will, as one of John F. Kennedy's prime mistakes (along with Vietnam, the space program, the SST, and the ABM) that he missed the tremendous opportunity offered him in 1961 to take the one symbolic step that could have changed forever the image of the American police.[9]

Professionalization and centralization, unlike decriminalization and elimination of the paramilitary character of the police, are with minor exceptions completely in our present mainstream. The main impediment is congressional reluctance to spend the large sums required for training and research programs for the police rather than for hardware. This reluctance is aggravated by Congress's disposition to give the money directly to the states, to the obvious detriment of urban areas. Until administrative arrangements are worked out either to give money directly to the cities or to impose federal requirements on how the money is to be spent, we will continue to experience misallocations of existing resources that we spend on the police.[10] This same congressional reluctance will presumably militate against the needs of our cities if my prescription for decentralization is to be followed. Money is the key to solving police personnel problems, whether they be centralization ("elite" specialists) or decentralization (recruitment and training for "the cop on the beat").

We can't rely on the present leadership of the police to change their nature or even their image; only through presidential leadership can we divert the necessary funding into improving the police; and only through presidential leadership can we hope to reach a national consensus about the police. Presidential leadership alone can perform the delicate task of simultaneously centralizing and decentralizing the police that is necessary if the police are to be responsive to the needs of a democratic, pluralistic society. In the reform of the police, I see writ small the kind of renewal that our society needs.

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[9] Richard Nixon, at least, dismissed that other great symbol of the past, General Hershey.

[10] The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which allocates federal funds, has been attacked by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark for its policy of making block grants to the states. The National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors are currently pleading with Congress for a larger voice for cities in planning the federal allocation. They have pointed out that Toledo has so far received only 1.5 percent of Ohio's grant; Philadelphia, with more than 2 million people, less than 15 percent of the Pennsylvania grant; Denver, which has over 30 percent of the population and 70 percent of the crime in Colorado, less than 20 percent of its state's allocation. In these and many other cases, the top priority needs of the cities have not been met.

The Ford Foundation has announced the creation of a grant-making agency to promote police reform (*New York Times,* July 22, 1970, p. 1). While Ford's $30 million is a mere drop in the bucket and while the Ford Foundation is not the Congress, this is a very hopeful development.

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David K. Cohen

Public Schools: The Next Decade

TWO IDEAS have dominated American thought about education during the last half-century. One is that schooling is the key to mobility and social justice; the other that it might be a major instrument of social and cultural integration. Education has long been seen as both the chief antidote to poverty and the principal means for assimilating ethnic and racial minorities. While there always has been evidence to belie these notions, it went virtually unnoticed until the late 1960s. Since then, however, events have cast serious doubt on these two venerable articles of faith. It no longer seems so clear that education is the high road to equality or social integration.

THE MOST PERPLEXING ISSUE is the relation between schooling and social justice. By 1965 the federal government had launched several major initiatives in education—principally Headstart and Title I of the 1965 ESEA—whose main thrust was to improve the life chances of poor people, especially blacks, by improving the quality of their education. A year later, in the federally sponsored *Equality of Educational Opportunity* report, James Coleman announced that differences in the quality of the nation's schools bore only a trivial relationship to differences in the educational achievement of the nation's students. The issue seems clear: *can education be the key to social justice if schools have no effect on children's achievement?*

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the American Jewish Committee's Task Force on Group Life.

Early results from the new education programs offered one answer. By 1968, newspaper accounts of the failure of local Headstart and Title I programs had become commonplace. By 1969 several national studies of these programs had found no discernible impact on children's performance in school. And early in 1970 the White House released a special presidential message on education, which argued that federal education spending should be held down until new research could turn up some answers about the schools' effects on students.

All of this is puzzling. If the schools "make no difference," as Coleman's research seems to show, why spend more on them? Several early critics turned up an impressive list of technical problems with which to undermine the report's credibility, but reanalysis of the data (with many of the difficulties corrected) corroborated the original findings. Still, the results boggle the mind. Do they indicate as some hold, that government will not effect social change by improving social services? Should it then stick to direct income transfers? Others leaped to different conclusions. Arthur Jensen interpreted the reported failure of compensatory programs as evidence of underlying racial differences in the inheritance of intelligence. Many liberals and radicals think the results prove that liberal social welfare programs cannot work as long as they are controlled by centralized bureaucracies. Spending more money on social programs will be futile, they argue, until the programs are made accountable to those they are supposed to serve.

One result of all this has been a sense of

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trouble within the democratic Left, which has experienced spectacular political fragmentation during the last few years. This fragmentation has been paralleled by growing evidence of disillusion with liberal programs. Just as the political cement of the liberal coalition seems to be dissolving, the intellectual legitimacy of its program has been seriously weakened.

The challenge has come not only from research or program evaluation. Changes in the politics of race during the past five years have created uncertainty about school reform. Until late in the 1960s there was little confusion on the liberal Left about school segregation. Despite much controversy and some reluctance to press ahead, there was never any doubt that racial desegregation in schools and housing was a structural prerequisite for the full social integration of black Americans. Now all that is changing. The debate is no longer over the pace of desegregation, but whether it should occur at all. Outside the South, the most articulate opponents of school integration are blacks who argue that desegregation amounts to little more than brutal assimilation; that black children need education responsive to their special backgrounds; that the only way to attain this is by setting up black community-controlled schools within the public system.

Though many of the arguments for community control or decentralization are historical—stressing the slowness of Southern school desegregration and its virtual absence in the North—these really distract from the main point: the path to social integration for American minority groups is now seen to lie in group solidarity—cultural unity, community economic development, and political control of community institutions. In this view, the public schools should help develop managerial and political competence in the adult community, serve to create and transmit an authentic black culture, and instill a sense of group identity and pride in black students.

NOW, WHATEVER one may think about the merit of these ideas, several facts are accepted by all. First, almost no one thinks that this is the way the public schools worked in the past for immigrant children, when blatant assimilation was the rule. Second, the demand for community control violates a cardinal rule of ethnic politics in America: it overtly proclaims ethnicity as the basis for organizing public institutions, rather than leaving the principle undeclared. Third, one of our most fondly held ideas is now bluntly challenged—that in the public schools children of all creeds, colors, and nationalities come together helter-skelter to learn from one another about life in America.

No suprise, then, that the movement for community control has profoundly shaken liberal thought about education and social reform. For it carries the unmistakable suggestion that racial and ethnic integration may not be a good thing; and whatever the *facts* of group life in America may be, the structure of our politics and folklore rests on the notion that this is a nation of individuals, not groups. While we may be able to tolerate the fact of group distinctiveness, it is less easy to tolerate its recognition as the explicit organizing principle of cultural and political life. To say that the schools should create and transmit a distinct ethnic or racial culture, rather than transmit the common culture, is simply heresy when viewed in the light of received doctrine.

The shock these ideas convey has been magnified by the research revelations I discussed above. One obvious rejoinder to pleas for community control has been that political and administrative separation will disadvantage the black community in the competition for scarce educational resources. Yet how can one maintain this argument in the face of evidence that variations in the quality of schools—whether measured in dollars or staff qualifications—relate not at all to student achievement? As Christopher Jencks argued more than a year ago, if

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schools have little or no effect on students' achievement, it would seem perverse to resist community control. The only remaining argument against organizing schools along ethnic and racial lines is that it would contribute to divisiveness; but that, after all, is just what the proponents of community control proclaim to be the underlying principle of intergroup relations in America. No wonder they find the objection unconvincing.

If these developments have undermined the legitimacy of accepted ideas about schooling and social reform, they also have encouraged such proposals for diversifying public education as tuition vouchers, performance contracts, subcontracting curricula, and direct public subsidies to private schools. Of course, support for these ideas does not arise solely from the recent crisis of confidence in schooling. It derives in part from a long-standing desire more fully to reflect religious and ethnic differences in publically supported education, and in part from a more recent upsurge of interest in free schools, alternative forms of schooling, etc. Let us pause at these two phenomena for a moment, since they promise to be of increasing political importance in the 1970s.

Several religious groups, especially Catholics, have a strong interest in supporting parochial education, and their legislative activity toward this end has increased markedly during the past few years. Several states have passed parochial aid statutes, and others seem almost sure to do so in the near future. There is, of course, nothing new here, save the greater pressure for public aid. But tuition vouchers, aid to alternative or free schools, and diversification of existing curricula are more of a novelty. The main support for these notions lies outside the established religious and ethnic groups; it is found in certain segments of the urban middle and upper-middle class. Such demands express not a desire to reflect more fully traditional intergroup differences in the school system, but to allow more freedom for individual expression in the quality, style, and character of schools. They parallel the growing class conflict that has begun to emerge over the character of university education.

What is the source of these demands?

Perhaps the most important development of the last half-century has been the "massification" of social welfare and culture, two sectors of the economy which have experienced enormous growth. The emergence of education, social welfare, communications, and culture as mass industries has begun to create new lines of class and cultural division in American society. This growth can be viewed as an institutionalization of bohemia involving the expansion of values and styles of life radically different from, if not explicitly hostile to, the ethos of industrial capitalism. Workers in the welfare and culture industries are trained to value humanity, openness, and creativity; as professionals, they often deal with the unhappy consequences of market values.

This group has exhibited more and more political discontent over the past several decades. The roots of its discontent are not essentially material: the problem is not increasing misery, or even growing relative deprivation. Its discontent arises from the creation in the bosom of modern society—in the family, child-rearing, and educational institutions—of an ethos and mode of life that is unusually open and democratic. Children from this class have been raised in an atmosphere where individual differences and self-expression are highly valued; parents, consciously seeking to comport themselves in nonrepressive ways, teach their children to make their own rules and develop their own discipline. The most highly valued educational institutions are those that stress spontaneity and creativity. Education is esteemed, but there is ambivalence or outright hostility toward the work-oriented and mechanical constraints of urban public schools. As a result, the most typical artifacts of this group have been their schools, expressing for children the values their par-

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ents want most to realize for themselves. The institutional history of these schools begins with the turn-of-the-century kindergartens, and moves from there through the Progressive movement to the present fascination with free schools, the Leicestershire movement, and community schools. Through it all, the main themes are similar: children should learn at their own pace, from things that interest them; learning should occur from the inside out, not the other way round —and the only legitimate discipline arises out of the learning situation; school should not prepare for the mechanical routines of the workday world but should develop individuals toward the outer reaches of their own capacity. Schooling, in short, is justifiable only when playful, not conditioned by the mechanical rhythm of the workplace but by the unpredictable rhythm of individual discovery.

All the tables have been turned: the only acceptable work is that which is play, and the only really desirable play is that which is instructive or otherwise useful. In tone as well as character this is reminiscent of the new world Karl Marx described when he ventured a few ideas about communist society. More than a little, these schools are efforts to create utopian enclaves in the midst of capitalist society. There is, of course, a problem: these schools are only for children, and thus in the ordinary sense of the word partly playful; but the utopia never has been fully realized, either in the free schools or the family—how could it be, in the midst of the existing order? Both unreality and tension mark this new educational world.

Still, the contrasts are clear when the standard of comparison is what already exists. It does not require a superrefined sensibility to discover that on one side the ordering principle is freedom, and on the other the market; for those reared in an atmosphere of freedom, it is not hard to decide which is preferable. And it is hardly surprising that workers in the social-welfare and culture industries—and especially their children—have come into open conflict with the established educational authorities. Whatever position one takes on the politics and ideology marking this clash, it would be a mistake to write it off as an unhappy accident. It is a manifestation of the strains accompanying the development of advanced industrial societies away from the factory system, unregulated capitalism (or, in the "socialist" countries, emphasis on heavy industry), and elite possession of education and culture—toward technological industrialism, greater regulation of the economy in the interest of social welfare and consumer goods, and more democracy in the possession of education and culture. As these changes continue, the strains are likely to increase.

There is no assurance that the outcome will be progressive. For one thing, bohemia always has had a pronounced tendency toward romanticism, the worship of feudal forms and cultural exotica, and religious or quasireligious withdrawal from the world. This was true for the first tiny coteries of early nineteenth-century European bohemians, and there are signs that it is just as true for the mass bohemians of contemporary America. Indeed, the entire history of bohemian and middle-class left-wing culture, since its inception nearly two centuries ago, can be framed in terms of a tension between political and social engagement on one hand, and the urge toward the pastoral life, religious contemplation, or obscure and elitist art forms on the other.

The new culture I have described evokes hostile reactions in the society. We already have a slight foretaste of this in the response of "middle America" to the university-media-liberal-snob axis. Almost everything presently emanating from this "New Left" threatens the working and lower-middle classes: the proclamation of social and cultural freedom is unsettling to those attached to more traditional notions of authority; the advocacy of radical social change is unsettling to those with a minimal stake in eco-

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nomic security; and arguments for massive compensatory treatment for blacks exacerbate both the cultural antagonism and the economic anxiety. Combine all this with the tendencies toward nativism still present in rural and small-town America, and there is the potential for a powerful rightward shift in American politics.

The chief developments of the late 1960s have, then, a remarkable political coherence. Both the "failure" of major domestic programs and the findings that educational institutions have little effect on students reinforce the idea that the traditional liberal approach to social reform is bankrupt. These developments provide grist for radical and conservative elements who—for a wide variety of reasons—believe that liberal reform must or should fail. And just as the evidence of programmatic and institutional "failure" exacerbates the sensibilities of black activists, so does it make way for ever more radical forms of racial separatism. Finally, changes in the class structure have begun to generate fundamental changes in the demand for education among the urban middle and upper-middle class, all tending toward greater freedom for individual expression, more diversity in the character and quality of educational offerings, and increased individual control over the substance and timing of schooling. In the short run, at least, this tendency is hostile to familiar liberal ideas and institutions; its partisans even welcome evidence of failure.

THE LEGACY OF THE 1960s can be reframed as questions for the 1970s:

- *Should choice in public education continue to be constrained by famliy budgets and school jurisdiction boundaries?*
- *Should expenditure on education continue to play a major role in government efforts to combat the effects of poverty and discrimination?*

One way or another, the main problems in education will turn around these issues. It is worth speculating about what the answers ought to be.

Spending This issue is so vexing that there can be no quick answers. The pressure to continue the upward trend of educational expenditures will increase, but will greater spending on schools for poor children improve their chances later in life? The evidence on this point is mixed, and likely to remain so far some time. We know, for example, that highly structured preschool child-and-parent-training programs markedly improve the children's cognitive ability; we also know that when the programs are discontinued the children's test ability slumps. But at the moment we don't know how long such efforts would have to be extended to avoid this slump. We also know that the number of years of schooling people complete is strongly related to their later occupational status. We do not know, however, whether less educated people of the same initial ability and motivation as those who complete college wind up at the same place on the occupational ladder.

There is some evidence that students with better test scores and grades complete more years of school, but it is easy to imagine that those with the higher scores were socialized at home to the sorts of behavior that make for success in school. Whether it is test scores or primary socialization that cause the relationship is presently unknown. But let us suppose we knew that higher test scores caused more years of school to be completed, and that completing more years of school caused higher occupational status; still, very little is known about raising test scores, except at the preschool level. All the experience with elementary-grade compensatory programs suggests that simply spending large sums of money on such gross changes as reducing pupil-teacher ratios has little or no noticeable effect on students' test scores. Some researchers have speculated that more refined approaches—changing teachers' behavior and attitudes—will help, but there is next to no evidence for this, and

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there are no clues how it might be done. Research on these issues will be difficult and time-consuming. It demands large-scale study and experimentation, which is both expensive and politically burdensome. The federal government has shown only limited enthusiasm for this, and has not yet developed the capacity for carrying out even the present limited efforts in a satisfactory fashion. In this situation, several courses of action are available. One is to hold all spending at current levels until research provides the "answers." But to do research well requires a political commitment to improving federal social-action experiments, and as the present administration reveals, those politicians who are enthusiastic about reducing costs are ambivalent about experimenting with social-action programs. Help will not soon be forthcoming from this quarter.

A second option is to shift social expenditures to more direct income transfers, such as income maintenance and job-creation programs. This is a sensible approach, not because research shows it to be better, but simply for commonsense reasons. One purpose of the Kennedy–Johnson education programs, after all, was to eliminate poverty. The notion that education is the best and most efficient way to accomplish this is an old one—our faith in its transforming power has been the basis of compensatory and social-welfare programs since the late nineteenth century. Schooling has traditionally been conceived as a mechanism of reform whereby the rewards of adult life would be distributed on the basis of talent rather than inheritance. It is a notion peculiarly suited to liberalism, for the redistribution of social and economic status promised through education does not threaten to reduce the magnitude or importance of class differences. Far from it, schooling-as-reform promised only that inequalities would be more consistent with qualification than with birth. This approach to social reform rests on a desire to promote fairness in the distribution of privilege, but without attacking the distribution or ownership of property. Its appeal is that all problems of the direct redistribution of wealth are deferred, and translated into a matter of individual ability and effort in schools and the market.

Has this ever been the way the schools have really worked?

All the evidence suggests that the school system has "worked" principally for groups well-situated to make the most of the academic meritocracy that has evolved over the last six decades. The main prerequisites seem to be competence in the schools' language (formal English), an ability to maneuver in fairly complex urban social systems, and a cosmopolitan cultural orientation. Children from those immigrant groups which consisted mainly of non-English-speaking peasants, oriented toward village societies (southern Italians, for example, or Poles), fared abysmally in the public schools; peasant immigrants from English-speaking countries (the Irish), fared a good deal better; the Jews, who were on the average a good deal more urbanized and cosmopolitan, performed remarkably. What is more, evidence on the relation between schooling and later adult social status suggests that the role of education in promoting upward mobility varies enormously among ethnic groups, and in just the ways we would expect; those groups whose children did well in school show the strongest effect of schooling on social status.

The schools, then, have been most effective in redistributing privilege for already urbanized groups in other ways well-prepared to cope with the academic merit system. It is quite a leap from this, however, to the idea that schools can be primary engines of reform for less urbanized groups. Not only is the notion contradicted by the schools' past performance, it seems unlikely on its face. The elimination of poverty seems much more likely to be accomplished by a direct attack on the structural differences in occupation and income, as well as the other barriers to the possibility of a humane life.

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This course, however, is much more costly, and inconsistent with established ideas about schools and social reform. In my view, therefore, the "failure" of recent social action programs in education simply manifests the results of misdirected efforts. It does not prove that decentralized government is required to make social programs work, any more than it proves that social programs do not work. *If it proves anything at all, it is that greater equality cannot be purchased cheaply.* The new education programs allocate relatively little money to poor children, and almost all of it is used to pay the salaries of school professionals. Although no one knows what all the effects of income transfers would be, any money spent directly on increasing the income of poor people would be much more effective than money spent on the school programs. In any case, since both have the same purpose—eliminating poverty—it is hard to see how income transfers could be less effective.

The fact is, however, that few government programs are ever reduced, let alone halted. The growing power of the education establishment's national lobby (evident in the 1970 session of Congress), makes it doubly unlikely that federal antipoverty funds will be shifted from education to other categories. Thus the new education programs—which were supposed to benefit poor children—will continue to support the educational professions with little visible benefit for the children. Under these circumstances, it is not enough to argue for future expenditures to provide direct income transfers to families—that may be some time off. Other ways must be found by which these programs can directly benefit the people they are supposed to help. In the present circumstances, this can only be accomplished through increased community influence over the allocation of resources. At a minimum, this would increase the likelihood that the programs would be used to support more direct assistance to the poor, in the form of food, clothing, health care, etc.

Thus, the answer to my second question is that expenditures on education probably ought not to play a major role in any serious effort to combat the effects of poverty and discrimination. But as existing programs are not going to disappear, the community that is involved should have a major voice in the allocation of these resources. I do not regard this as a pessimistic reflection on the efficacy of liberal social programs, but rather a reflection on the limitations of the liberal notion that schooling is always a suitable instrument for redistributing wealth and status. *We may be learning that equality cannot be gotten in the bargain basement, by trying to teach the children of the poor to behave differently, while all the other conditions of their lives remain unchanged.*

Diversity Pressures to widen the framework of educational choice come from two sources: those who want to abandon district lines altogether in favor of individual decisions, and those who simply want to redraw jurisdictional boundaries around smaller and more homogeneous school communities. Both notions rest on what appear to be similar assumptions:

(a)Smaller units of educational choice would provide greater efficiency—there would be a better match between the schools' taste in pupils and the parents' taste in pedagogy. Because parents would have more leverage on schools, students would perform better;

(b)Smaller units of educational choice would provide the material with which those blacks and whites now disaffected from public institutions could regain a legitimate polity, since smaller units of choice would establish a new social contract around the schools;

(c)Smaller units of choice would allow more educational variety than is possible within the present overregulated and standardized school system.

Despite such similarities in assumption, the two sorts of proposals are by no means iden-

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tical. They rest, for example, on fundamentally different ideas about the role of government. The individual choice schemes suit the taste of those who have an antipathy to government and bureaucracy; by now these sentiments are no less strange on the political Left than on the Right. By way of contrast, proposals for decentralization and community control appeal to those who regard government as an agency for social change. The notion is that government at the community level should have more impact on educational decisions; this assumes that political communities, not individuals, are the proper units for making decisions about the allocation of public goods. Once we strip away the rhetoric about bureaucracy, it becomes clear that *one likely implication of community control is that education would be governed more rather than less*. The other group of proposals, by contrast, rests on the notion that decisions about education should be based on individual choice, and that government should have a much smaller role in making them than it now does. This assumes, of course, that the public interest in education is relatively small compared to private interests, and it implies that school reform is mainly a matter of reducing government control over schools.

Diversification of some sort is desirable. School government in the cities has grown in ways that weaken accountability without improving efficiency: transportation and other support systems require metropolitan or regional government (because they would be either economically more efficient, or administratively and politically less clumsy). There is, however, no evidence that this is needed for schools. In addition, city schools do not reflect as well as they might the large underlying diversity of taste in education: in fact, for most of their history the public schools have sought to avoid or deny these differences, especially if they were related to class or ethnicity.

The question is whether diversification could be arranged without becoming politically retrograde. The two leading schemes are decentralization and tuition vouchers, but both could increase segregation by race and class, and they might produce greater disparities in the distribution of educational resources than exist now.

DECENTRALIZATION would be a desirable alternative if there was any evidence that smaller school districts would permit a greater range of alternatives for parents. But that is not the case. Decentralization would presumably increase diversity within a given city by giving communities more voice in decisions about staff, curriculum, and style. For parents in any given district, however, the range of choice would be no greater—it might even be less; black parents in black districts, for example, might have more difficulty transferring children to integrated schools than is at present the case. Decentralization would probably not only increase segregation, but by drawing new district boundaries around "neighborhoods," would lock residential patterns into place with new jurisdictions.

Decentralization is a suitable alternative, then, if one believes (*a*) there are no important variations in the demand for education within communities, and (*b*) no values in integration. The first is clearly untrue, for while the major variations in the demand for schooling probably do lie among ethnic and class groupings, residential segregation by ethnicity and class is far from complete. As for the second, whatever one's own view, many black and white parents do prefer integration. Other things being equal one would not want to impede the expression of *that* variation in taste for schooling while allowing the expression of others.

Tuition vouchers would not be subject to this difficulty, for they would permit parents to choose whatever school they liked. Blacks in mostly Negro districts who preferred white schools would not be restrained by their community of origin; upper-middle-

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class families in working-class neighborhoods would not be restrained by a local governing board from enrolling their children in a "free" school. This, of course, is the great appeal of vouchers: by allowing "communities" of very limited liability to come together around schools, vouchers permit the fullest expression of variations in the demand for schooling.

But therein also lies their great difficulty: would not the individual freedom to choose schools also imply freedom to restrict the attendance of others? Negro parents might want to enroll their children in mixed schools, but whites could prefer it otherwise. An unrestricted voucher scheme could harden patterns of segregation even more effectively than decentralization.

There are ways in which these problems might be avoided. If racial discrimination in admission were forbidden, and if fiscal incentives for accepting poor children (and thus promoting economic and racial integration) were offered to schools, many of the problems would probably disappear. If in addition a large proportion of students in all schools were admitted by some device for random choice (a lottery, for example), there would probably be more integration under a system of voucher-financed schools than there is now in most public school systems.* The difficulty is not in conceiving ways to avoid segregation, but in imagining how they might be implemented. It is not easy to see how the legislature in states like New York or Michigan would approve legislation of this sort, when they have recently evidenced such distaste for other, more limited, approaches to school integration.

RACIAL SEGREGATION is not the only major problem that would arise under these schemes. If either neighborhoods or individuals were made the basis of educational choice, the existing class disparities in the allocation of school resources might grow. State equalization formulas would retard this somewhat in many states, but the disparities there are still great. Poor districts—those with low assessed valuation and/or a greater burden of municipal services—typically must tax themselves much more severely to raise school funds than districts with less burden and greater wealth. At the individual level tuition vouchers could avoid part of the problem, at least, by making the size of vouchers an inverse function of family income, and prohibiting parents from spending more on the children's schooling than the value of the voucher. While the first would not be a major problem (schools could be given more money for enrolling poor children), it is hard to see how the second could be effectively enforced without creating the sort of bureaucracy tuition vouchers are supposed to dissolve.

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that under either scheme the educational advantages of wealth would be eliminated. At best they would be somewhat reduced, within the narrow limits that are politically acceptable. Thus, the question is whether the inequalities likely under decentralization or vouchers would be greater than those we now have. If we assume the sort of admissions restrictions discussed just above, present levels of state equalization for decentralized districts, and moderately strong fiscal incentives for enrolling poor children, I suspect there would be little change. There would, of course, still be plenty of private schools outside the system (most of the exclusive schools would not accept lottery admissions), just as there are now; but as is also now the case, they would receive no direct tax subsidy. Within decentralized or voucher-supported schools, inequalities in the ability to support schooling would surely remain; but given the assumptions I have made, it seems unlikely that they would be larger than those we now have.

EVEN THIS CURSORY review of these two

* This discussion is a condensed version of suggestions that can be found in *Education Vouchers,* a report on various voucher schemes produced by several staff members of the Center for the Study of Public Policy, in Cambridge.

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alternatives suggests that diversification schemes are worth considering. On balance, I have come to regard the voucher plan as more desirable. It does not restrict individual choice as narrowly as community government would; it would be likely to result in more integration and provide the foundation for greater diversity.

The problems, however, lie not in the scheme, but in the restrictions I have assumed. Their desirability is probably an inverse function of their political feasibility. The voucher scheme most likely to succeed in a state legislature would be one that satisfies the most powerful interests—none of which are poor or black. Such a scheme would be unacceptable to liberals and radicals. Similarly, the most likely decentralization schemes are those that change the balance of power only slightly. It would be no surprise if the decade passed with little progress on either front.

There are, of course, other approaches to diversification, most of which center on the idea of contracting out the school program. James Coleman has suggested that segments of public school curricula (math or reading) be subcontracted to nonschool agencies, such as community corporations, profit-making firms, or nonprofit institutions. Their scale of payment and/or parents' patronage would be contingent on the contractors' performance in teaching the children. This idea has been carried further by the Office of Economic Opportunity recently, in experiments with contracting the entire school program. The "performance contract" experiments involve conditioning contractors' fees on children's performance. Although this approach has some promising elements —unlike the present school system, educators would be rewarded for doing better with the students they have, rather than for teaching in schools where the students already do well—there is a swarm of problems, including fraud, social class differentials in access to information, and antiunion practices. Chief among the difficulties, however, is that the criterion of success in all cases is the children's standardized test performance and, as I pointed out earlier, there is little evidence that this is salient in any way to later success. It would be perverse to further entrench reliance on test scores, and to restructure incentives more firmly around them—unless we knew that they bear some powerful intrinsic relationship to adult achievement.

THE OUTLOOK FOR SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS toward diversification of the school system is not terribly hopeful. The most desirable scheme—an egalitarian version of tuition vouchers—seems not to have nearly the political promise of performance contracting—the least desirable scheme.

One thing that does seem certain is that for the foreseeable future the main issues in education will center on diversity. This is not a trivial matter, but much of the interest in it—indeed, the concern for the school "crisis"—arose from efforts to eliminate race and class disparities in the outcomes of schooling. There is, however, no evidence that changing the framework of choice in education will have much effect. It may be that the schools' "failure" to affect the transmission of status from generation to generation will only serve to focus attention on the political arrangements governing education, rather than on the more important need to directly attack the underlying social and economic inequalities.

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Gordon W. Keller

Kent State a Year Later

KENT STATE is a school that reflects mainstream sentiments in American life, and thus serves as a symbol of the pathology of the larger culture. This pathology may be understood in terms of institutions and processes out of scale and out of control. One sees at Kent State the difficulty any big institution has in responding humanely to change and crisis.

Both David Sanford in *The New Republic* and I. F. Stone in his biweekly have done good work in describing the situation at Kent, and high marks should go as well to the Akron *Beacon-Journal* (a Republican newspaper) for its honest and tough reporting. One must note as well the immense usefulness of the FBI report on the shootings, without which the struggle for public understanding would be impossible. Both Sanford and Stone, however, have interpreted the events at Kent as having a more explicitly "political" character than I, as a local observer, judge to be warranted. They make the same errors as that of our grand jurors, who also see Kent State in terms of differing life-styles, value systems, and commitments to flag and country. My argument, by contrast, is that the underlying causal factors at Kent State are more diffuse and apolitical than is generally realized.

Most evidence from specialized studies makes clear that political issues count for little among large numbers of Americans, including young people. This also applies to Kent. For example, in the fall quarter, despite a curricular option allowing course credit for political participation in lieu of regular classes, less than 15 Kent students chose to participate in the recent elections. Despite the blood and ink spilled at Kent, it would be incorrect to see the Kent disorders as a manifestation of rising political consciousness among young people. Public sentiment, not only in local Portage County, but apparently countrywide, is running strongly against students. Ohio's Governor James Rhodes' office reported that he received more mail on the Kent shootings than on any other single issue during his eight years in office, and that 85 percent of the mail strongly supported the National Guard.

Kent State represents neither the laxity or liberal promiscuity charged by the Right nor "the closed society in microcosm" charged by the New Left. It rather is a symbol for institutions and systems that have gotten out of human and humane control. Perhaps nothing illustrates so poignantly this lack of sensitivity as the interoffice memorandum reproduced here in full, with only certain names excised to protect sources. The memorandum was circulated by the Registrar's office:

> This is to inform you information has been received that Allison Beth Krause, Student Number 220 58 6598 9, died May 4, 1970.
>
> She was admitted to the College of Education the Fall Quarter, 1969, and transferred to the College of Fine and Professional Arts, January, 1970.
>
> It is recommended that this student's name be deleted from routine mailing lists.

The killings were not in any direct sense politically inspired; they were the work of incompetent men with little experience in understanding student unrest. "Professional rabble-rousers helped stir up trouble at Kent State University and then went on their way," a state senator and a high university administration official explained to the local Rotary Club on May 4, minutes before the shootings occurred. The Kent city police chief attributed the disorders to "Communist agitators," and later described the ACLU as comprised of pinkoes and reds. After the disturbances, the mayor paid tribute to the National Guard, saying they deserved a "great deal of credit" for

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preventing further damage and injury. "I cannot speak with enough praise," said the mayor, "when I speak of the protection of the City of Kent offered by the Ohio National Guard while they were on our streets." Similar misunderstanding is manifest in the grand jury report, especially in its social *obiter dicta* on life-styles and values. Reconstruction of what did happen last May 4 is difficult; understanding is still more so. Let me try.

II

FOLLOWING President Nixon's Thursday speech on Cambodia, students on a warm Friday evening spilled from bars in the compacted downtown area, breaking windows to the tune of about $50,000 and throwing bottles at passing police cars. Later, this was branded a riot by the grand jury, though the damage was not, by comparative standards, extensive nor was there any looting. While such crowd behavior may not be unusual in big football towns on victory Saturdays (Columbus, Ohio, was subjected to more extensive and severe rioting by students celebrating a Rose Bowl invitation), Kent is unaccustomed to both phenomena. Some of the motivation for this spring activism and destruction was surely anger at the invasion of Cambodia, though the tendency to be drawn in by the momentum of events must also be taken into account. The practice in Kent under the last city administration was to notify all bar-owners that trouble was brewing downtown, whereupon drinks would be on the house for a short time and students kept off the streets. This time, as the bars were ordered closed by nervous police, still more students came into the streets, many angry because they were unable to see the end of the Lakers' basketball game. Why the earlier policy was reversed is not known, nor is there public appreciation of the policy change.

The town overreacted. A frightened city administration was seized by an invasion psychology. Convinced then and later that the town was about to be destroyed, that carloads of radical students were descending upon it, that students were armed and dangerous, the city called for the National Guard. After the shootings, not only was the university closed down, but public and parochial schools were closed at police request on May 4, and remained closed for two days. Businesses were closed, liquor sales banned, and curfews imposed. Established communications networks between city and campus collapsed in the early moments of panic, and since then have remained in disrepair.

The Guardsmen were fatigued after difficult duty in a wildcat Teamsters strike in northeastern Ohio, where they had been subjected to insults and rocks. They brought with them to Kent not only their fatigue but also their envy and anger against people of their own age who enjoyed social and educational advantages they lacked. Ill-equipped to control civilian crowds, they came in heavy trucks, with armored personnel carriers and M-1 rifles.

Despite the Guard's presence, a carnivallike atmosphere developed on the campus and persisted during the burning of the ROTC building on Saturday night, through Sunday and into Monday. As several attempts were necessary to set the old wooden ROTC shack on fire, it seems fair to conclude that the burning was not the work of trained indigenous revolutionaries nor of the rumored presence of carloads of SDS weathermen.

Throughout the weekend, a spirit of more or less good fun prevailed, characterized by some cops-and-robbers chases involving students dashing into ground cover while pursued by hovering helicopters, and exemplified by Allison Krause placing a flower in a soldier's gun barrel. And throughout the weekend, except for a few faculty members, the university remained isolated from events on the campus. To this day, it is not quite clear who held operational responsibility for decision-making during that time.

Sunday's calm was disturbed only by the flamboyant presence of Governor Rhodes; with an eye on a tough senatorial primary race coming up two days later, he proclaimed a state of emergency, inveighed against radicals who were "worse than the brownshirts," and left the campus after having prohibited all assembly.

Monday, confused and frightened Guardsmen fired at random into a crowd of students, killing four and wounding nine. Though this was obviously a breach of military discipline, there is little reason to expect the responsible officers to answer for their incompetence. The county prosecutor held a display of "weapons" seized on the campus, including ball bats, track-

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starter pitsols, World War II souvenirs, and decongestants. At this moment, litigation is pending on what seems to have been illegal search and seizure by local authority. University spokesmen explained that it would be necessary to "eliminate" the radicals from the campus and clarified that academic freedom did not include the right to radicalize or propagandize students. National Guard spokesmen testified before the Scranton Commission that the Ohio Guard does not fire warning shots as they could be "dangerous." While the Scranton Commission pronounced the shootings unnecessary and unwarranted, the Nixon administration was busy repudiating that Commission. And the local grand jury exonerated the Guard, placing blame for the killings directly on the university administration! The local judge (unopposed for reelection) then slapped a gag on all public discussion of the jury's findings, permitting President Robert I. White to "comment but not criticize" the report. That injudicious order has since been cut down by a federal district court judge in Cleveland. But the whole affair has been so bizarre that the words "bureaucratic inepititude" are hardly rich enough to describe what has happened here.

III

KENT STATE TODAY looks much like any other Midwestern multiversity. It has most of the strengths and weaknesses of such institutions. Neither students nor faculty are radical. There is no culture of radicalism at Kent, and little understanding of radicalism by leadership elites within or without the university. Civil authority at Kent clearly overreacted to student disorder, seeing in it "revolution, here and now" requiring suppression by gunfire. Students at Kent are relatively clean-cut and well-scrubbed. Some, however, look and act differently. Girls hitchhike. Students sit on steps of buildings downtown, and this bothers the local people who then fear to do business there. Some are dirty and use foul language. These essentially stylistic departures from traditional behavior have been perceived and acted upon as having immediate political motivation and consequence, though in reality they represent only changes in style.

The campus political culture reflects the larger state political culture. Both tend to be status-quo oriented. They are marked by attitudes toward the whole political system, toward its essential fairness and legitimacy, and toward acceptable and unacceptable ways of expressing approval or disapproval of the system. The example of the Columbus football riot is again instructive. A football riot is familiar and understandable. Despite interruption of routine and destruction of property, there is no great alarm. But when even a relatively small number of students visibly depart from traditional mores regarding work and play, love and sex, these departures are understood to be an attack on the American way of life when in fact they are not—at least not yet.

For most of Kent's 21,000 students, politics simply is not salient. Coming from lower-middle-class families, some 85 percent of them from Ohio, they have strong vocational orientations. Large numbers of faculty are native Ohioans, many of them having attended Kent State. Promotions within administrative structures reinforce the inbreeding. Thus the campus is marked by a striking homogeneity of interest, values, and attitudes. A certain leaven in the mixture is provided by the presence of new faculty, about one-half of the total number of 1,000 having been hired within the past three or four years. Still, the campus shares the conservative Ohio political culture.

Though it may be fair to describe Kent State as "unexceptional," neither is it an intellectual wasteland. Kent is caught, as are so many big universities, without adequate public financial support and without sympathetic understanding by the public of the role of the university. Working on many programs simultaneously—e.g., new doctoral programs, Black Studies—without adequate financial resources, it is tempted to substitute rhetoric for reality.

The university is trying to raise itself by its intellectual bootstraps. As it does so, it will increase its tendency to emphasize research at the expense of undergraduate teaching. Ironically, as the university "improves," it will probably do a worse job of preparing its students to live genuinely reflective and humane lives. May 4 has not changed this.

There is a terrible irony when the local grand jury in its ignorance says, correctly I think, that the same conditions which produced May 4 still exist on the campus. Indeed they do. For the university's response has been essen-

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tially twofold: it has inflated its rhetoric about reconciliation even while the realities of genuine community and communication are absent, and it has increased its security forces.

All the irritants in the public realm still exist. At the university itself, ROTC remains on campus, to many a constant denial of the university's claim to neutrality. Faculty and administration remain caught, despite their decent instincts, in the dilemmas of big institutions, isolated both from each other and from public opinion. The local AAUP once noted about the president of Kent State that "pressed against his temple is the muzzle of a long shotgun that reaches to the state capitol." Perhaps the best recent example of this public-relations consciousness is the university's denial of a request by National Educational Television to do a live show on campus unrest with the panel discussion originating on campus. In explaining the decision, the president's executive assistant expressed fear of "bad publicity."

So we have here a university that is not all that liberal, let alone radical, being attacked by local citizens for its liberalism and permissiveness and by the other side as repressive and racist. What ought most to be attacked, however, are the problems of bureaucratic ineptitude, the mindless persistence in routine behavior, which afflicts both the larger society and the university itself. What ought to be attacked is the gap between the university's role in society and public understanding of its mission, especially its responsibility to stand as a conscience speaking to the public and its problems.

The future? The May 1–4 disorders will not likely be repeated, but not because of increased vigilance or sensitivity by the state or the university. The explanation is to be found, once again, in the political culture. Students are not now, as they were not earlier, all that interested in destroying the town or in closing the university. Their apathy may bring, ironically, an interval of peace. It will be a sadder irony should political and educational leaders conclude that the peace was achieved by the killing.

Robert A. Stein

The Average Student: A Useful Fiction

> "Your sister is given to government."
>
> "Given to government, Joe?" I was startled, for I had some shadowy idea (and I am afraid I must add, hope) that Joe had divorced her in favor of the Lords of the Admiralty, or Treasury.
>
> "Given to government," said Joe. "Which I meantersay the government of you and myself."
>
> "Oh!"
>
> "And she ain't over partial to having scholars on the premises," Joe continued, "and in partickler would not be over partial to my being a scholar, for fear as I might rise. Like a sort of a rebel, don't you see." —*Great Expectations*

FOR "THE AVERAGE STUDENT," education means rising but not rebelling. From one or another elitist viewpoint, "rising" is a priori illusory: our best students today see themselves as being "beyond" or above aspirations that authentically motivated their elders. The average student is admittedly a somewhat fictive character, but since the elite student is getting so much attention in the mass media and highbrow journals, it may be worth recalling what the average student is like.

He usually stays near home and attends a public college, though he can sometimes be met at Harvard too, where he will be a stranger. He justifies his experience in terms of vocational goals—and he has to do that

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because of his parents' relatively inferior education. Unfamiliar as he is with the life of the mind, he is nevertheless willing to work hard at learning. He is pragmatic in choosing what he wants to learn and parochial in selecting which "expert" he will listen to. His demands in the classroom are at once naive and searching. He can, of course, be indolent and banal —as can his elite counterpart, about whose drugs and posters and motives he is curious. (A confrontation between the two is apt to create a spectacle of emulation or contempt.)*

Whatever the vocational goal of the average student may be, he has seized upon it, and he knows it. His part-time job experience is not diverse, and he rarely changes the major specified during his freshman year. His parents are not likely to respect their jobs; it is what work brings—a private home, two cars, perhaps greater respectability—that attracts. So the average student is not too enchanted by a future of white-collar employment under GM or IBM, of elementary or high school teaching, of investing or engineering, and in a sense he shares the elite students' awareness that labor can be alienating. He may feel little enthusiasm about his future job, yet looks forward to its financial rewards. Adult life, as he sees it, is an endlessly widening cycle of earning and spending: paying taxes is what defines a citizen. And while responsive to mass media, he sees through its various forms of salesmanship. He cannot rattle off an "analysis" of the military-industrial-academic complex, but he is not dumb about its pressures, nor about what would happen were he to try to change his destiny.

If he has seen *Blow-Up* or *Weekend,* the average student may have felt bewildered, and if he discovers Mailer or Marcuse, it will be in the pages of *Time.* Despite the substantial differences between the average and elite students' cultural equipment, they do share varying amounts of disillusionment. What shape does their disaffection with the lords of the treasury, admiralty, and education take? Seldom divorce outright, but something harder to balance.

The elite student believes that learning is tarnished by the CIA. The average student hardly sees it as ominous, but he finds learning suspect partly because the moral and intellectual virtues glowingly attributed to schools and teachers—often during high school commencement exercises or a freshman orientation lecture—are unreal. He may be inspired to rebel by noting discrepancies between the front page of the catalogue, promising "a flexible, well-rounded curriculum," and such facts of life as not being able to take anything but required courses, including one on the arts or Western civilization which is transparently just a gesture.

He may be inspired by noting that his training is not truly preparing him for a career, or that thinking is a liability because it frightens many teachers. With the help of an apologetic dean, he may be bitterly convinced that he is getting an inferior education because the legislature appropriated too little money for an adequate library or a faculty with prestige degrees. However his impulse to rebel may come about, it is an impulse that implies direct conflict with his vocational goal. He is still living at home. He has a part-time job so that he can afford to put a few frills on the colorless, weekly grind, and he wants to maintain his draft exemption. He cannot afford to indulge his impulse to rebel. Maturing, he knows, is taking it.

Unlike the average student, the elite student can go quite a way toward educating himself in the library, and he can join energetic cliques for partying and protesting, always with fear of the fuzz and the technocrat to keep the psychodrama primed. As the elite student sees it, the black-power movement enacts a desirable sense of community. Hence the elite student usually supports (even before

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* Robert J. Potter's "Portait of a Working-Class College," DISSENT, Winter 1964, pp. 46–49, describes the average students' classroom demands. As for the confrontation of the average and elite student: in effect, they are the working-class soldiers and urban middle-class protesters described in a passage of *The Armies of the Night* (New York: Signet Books, The New American Library, 1968), pp. 286–88, where Mailer sounds like the ideologue of sex he rightly complains about elsewhere. For a sociological description of American college students of the sixties, classifying eight types and their "Stance vis-à-vis American institutions," see Richard E. Peterson, "The Student Left in American Higher Education," *Daedalus,* Winter 1968, pp. 293–317.

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the police are called) struggles that blacks are carrying on effectively by themselves.

BY CONTRAST, WHAT MODELS of courage are available to the average student, what initiations into personal and political integrity? Mostly, the dull, aimless, lonely ambiance of American life. Only in technology does the average student see an intimation of knowledge and reason working for the betterment of man —and technology includes training teachers as well as dental assistants. The average student has been trying to make peace with education since kindergarten (usually, by retreating). The elite student may well end up on the university's pay roll.

The elite student's most worthwhile goal for university reform is to free it from militaristic ties. But no alliance involving the average student has been achieved. For reasons one must respect, the average student cannot easily become a rebel; and the strategy of the New Left has failed to take this into account. The average student is willing to support antimilitaristic politics and he understands (or can learn to understand) the need for uninhibited research within the university. He is no more enthusiastic about serving in the draft than the elite student. But the average student cannot tolerate strategies like protesting against campus employment recruiters, against ranking academic performance, or the blocking of classes—in general, against any concrete form of the university's services for a competitive labor market. How to involve the average student in reform of the university is a complex, difficult matter; unfortunately, the average and elite student all too often find themselves as antagonists.

To put it perhaps too schematically: what for the elite student symbolizes social and political evil is for the average student a sign of the inevitable.

The average student may be temporarily "radicalized" by some brutal police work on a campus or at a Chicago, but he is not likely to find the New Left inspiring. He is lamentably cynical about politics, yet it does not at all follow that he is politically insignificant. Let me therefore make a few observations about what I think will be decisive in shaping his political life.

If there is a single detrimental element of the average students' school, it is the education department. Even though time wasted in education courses is now minimized (compared with the curriculum of the fifties), terribly authoritarian pressures come to dominate the average student through scholastic aptitude and psychological testing, the supervision and evaluation of student-teaching, and the considerable influence of the surrounding public-school systems. Should he not be enrolled in a program leading to a teacher's certificate as well as a bachelor's degree, and thus be exempt from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (it is widely re-

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Whatever Happened to . . .

Appearing in the second day of hearings at Northwest Armory, North and Kedzie Avenues, Craig Connally, 26, an assistant chemistry instructor, raised his arm in a clenched fist when he was sworn in by Sen. William Horsley [R., Springfield], chairman of the Illinois Joint Senate House Committee on Campus Unrest. . . .

Wearing a brown and green camouflage shirt with a Mao Tse-tung medal and Eagle Scout badge pinned to it, Connally told the committee he was advised by an attorney not to testify on the grounds that he didn't want to "violate the separation of the legislature and the courts". . . .

Connally also refused to say whether he knew Clark Kessinger, owner of Harper's Ferry Ordnance, a gun store at 180 N. Wacker Dr.

Kessinger was called to testify yesterday after the committee obtained materials from Connally's class which said "movement" members could get a 20 per cent discount on purchases from Harper's Ferry.

Asked if he solicited business from the revolutionary movement, Kessinger told the committee, "I solicit business from anyone with money."

National secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society in 1964–65, Kessinger described his shop as a sporting goods store but said he had sold between $6,000 and $7,000 worth of guns since he opened in June. He said he has a federal license to sell nonautomatic weapons.

—Chicago Tribune, December 11, 1970

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quired by state law), he is still dependent on his teachers' recommendations for future employment. Nobody likes "troublemakers"—least of all educationists.

Reform requires more active faculty leadership at undistinguished schools than at distinguished ones, but it is less available. For social and professional reasons, the average faculty member tends not to incline to dissent; he is a rather careful, paternalistic worker. Some legitimate and politically neutral demands for reform, such as a wider range of course options, cannot be achieved because there is not enough money for adding facilities and staff. Hence faculty and students are plagued by a sense of futility about their immediate circumstances which reinforces defensiveness and lack of self-respect. To make matters worse, there is widespread anxiety and misunderstanding about the nature of protest and reform. So if political activity is afoot, all an administrator has to do is invoke the specter of violence by mentioning San Francisco or Kent State and everyone will smugly stay cool. (At CCNY that obviously didn't work, but New York City really is a separate matter.)

When it comes to working and living alongside blacks, the average student is as likely not to want to as his parents, yet he accepts black demands for university training: this is precisely the path toward higher status that the average student sees himself as following. And there is nothing objectionable about seeking education for such pragmatic motives. (Dickens did not criticize Pip's wanting to be a gentleman; he was concerned with the sorts of compromises Pip makes along the way, the personal and social blackmail to which he succumbs that Dickens called attention to.) What strikes me as sad, inhumanly blind, and politically liable about the average student is that while he *is* adept at recognizing how certain cues are used to stereotype and oppress people —after all, he has been treated that way himself—his awareness is not at all liberating.

The average student sees through the manipulative techniques commonplace in our culture, yet he remains responsive. Ironically, he has learned from the mass media that candidates are selected for their ethnic appeal, that campaigns are pitched for "the labor vote," "the suburban vote," "the backlash." And the values inherent in stereotypes like "the fraternity man," "the executive," or "the nice-guy teacher" are understood by the average student, whose demonology is as thorough as the elite student's, albeit less dramatic. In judging hippies or activists, his sense of American "fair play" goes no deeper than Eric Hoffer's. Different though their ends are, smear campaigns and campaigns that legitimate public dissent work by similar means, and their impact will continue to determine the average students' tolerance for his elite counterpart—who is as savvy about playing for television as the average student is incapable of turning it off.

Average and elite students both know how desperately we need, in our public life, suasive intelligence, and that what will be decisive ultimately are not chants of "No, no, we won't go" but the outcome of decisions like Judge Wyzanski's ruling on the discriminatory nature of conscientious objection to selective service which specifies only religious grounds, the realigning of international relations and its influence on domestic spending, and the extent to which the welfare state becomes, through legislation and administration, equitable. But meanwhile, average and elite students both know that making it—and having to make it—leaves little elbowroom for acting freely.

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Erazim V. Kohák

Small Truth, Big Lie

ARTHUR LONDON IS *a Czechoslovak Communist currently living in France. A veteran of the Spanish Civil War and the underground resistance, he held a post in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the Communist seizure of power in 1948. Arrested in 1952, he was one of the defendants in the "Slánský Conspiracy Trial." He was condemned to life imprisonment and subsequently permitted to emigrate.*

The Slánský Trials were a culmination of a series of staged trials, which followed the Communist seizure of power. The new regime jailed and executed successive waves of clergy, non-Communist intelligentsia, and representatives of democratic and socialist parties. In early 1952, a number of leading Communists were arrested and charged with conspiring against the State. Of the 14 accused, 11 were executed, the rest condemned to life imprisonment. The trials were reviewed in 1956, 1963 and 1968, the charges quashed, victims rehabilitated, and the trials declared illegal, though the perpetrators were not prosecuted. Since the Soviet occupation, further inquiry has ceased.—E. V. K.

NOW COSTA-GAVRAS, the director of *"Z,"* has made a film out of Arthur London's memoirs in which the main characters are played by Yves Montand and Simone Signoret.

Outside our theaters fashionably avant-garde audiences render the verdict: "It was good, but I enjoyed 'Z' more." The comparison is hard to avoid. Costa-Gavras has used the same cast and the same cinematographic techniques to deal with a superficially similar theme. The cast still is good, and Yves Montand superb. So is the direction—expert and polished, avoiding the cheap dramatic effects that occasionally crept into *"Z."*

Costa-Gavras has succeeded in evoking the slow horror of an unrelenting, dull persistence. There is little historical scope or psychological depth, since the technique, made familiar as "brainwashing," is precisely the process of depriving a man of his past, his world, his soul. It is a process that eliminates all firm reference points and reduces reality to the one-dimensional level of ideology. The purpose of torture is no longer to force a man to act in conformity with the will of his masters, but to render him incapable of action, to make him totally dependent. The petty pedantry of the interrogators is appropriate in a world in which words have taken the place of history, of the world, of conscience. Costa-Gavras has set out to explore not simply the techniques of enslavement, but of ultimate dehumanization—and has succeeded brilliantly. The viewer becomes a part of the experiment, so that by the end of the film, even the documentary footage from the Prague of 1968 becomes a part of the shifting world of images about which the viewers can say, "I liked it, but I liked *'Z'* better."

Perhaps this is why, surrounded by the ghosts of the past, I felt a sense of horror. Not the familiar horror of remembrance, of smiling politely and pretending that the plush, heated world in which one discusses relative entertainment values of *"Z"* and *The Confession* is real —one learns to live with that in time. A different horror, the sense of a monstrous lie. The film is authentic, highly so—and yet, walking out of the theater, one experiences a desperate urge to shout to the innocent, the unknowing, the complacent, "Don't believe it! It's a lie! That *is not* what happened!"

About *"Z"* I had no such feelings. The basic difference is that, in *The Confession, what really happened* matters. In *"Z"* it does not; the events are in a sense ahistorical. They are generic, archetypal—the perennial shabby reality behind autocratic power. It could happen anywhere and often does. By contrast, the Slánský

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trial is an intensely historical event, focused and specific: the final trauma of a vision that has captivated Western social aspirations for almost a century. To be sure, there had been other trials. But in the past, they could be explained away by ideological or contingent factors—struggle against the "class enemy," pressures of a revolutionary situation, inexperience, personal failure, or simply Russian backwardness.

Czechoslovakia was different. There the experiment in the revolutionary triumph of Virtue was conducted virtually under laboratory conditions—in an industrial society with a mature democratic tradition, socialist neighbors, enough support so that the rulers were not embattled and yet not so much that they would be constrained by the prejudices of their supporters. The conditions were, for the first time, "ideal," and the Communist leaders were sure that, also for the first time, "here it would be different." Yet it was not: the horror was not an unfortunate accident, after all. It was a relentlessly logical, necessary outcome of an ideology that made progress into "struggle," difference of opinion a matter of Virtue and Vice, and replaced democracy with the Rule of the Righteous. When the nooses tightened on December 3, Communism lost its innocence. The task remaining to it was no longer a quest for utopia. For the rulers, it became a pursuit of power; for the ruled, a desperate attempt to escape the logic of terror and salvage fragments of a broken dream. The events that have punctuated Communist rule since, the upheavals in Berlin in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, again in Poland in 1970, bear witness to the change. The events of *"Z"* are perennial—the Slánský trial is history, sharp and specific.

Perhaps this is why visual details, harmless in *"Z,"* are so jarring in *The Confession*. The scene is supposed to be Prague, but those are not Prague streets, buildings, sidewalks. It is supposed to be 1952, but the coins "Gérard" pulls out of his pocket did not go into circulation until several months later. Most of all, those are not Czech faces. Yves Montand is an exception: through his powerful performance, he has earned the right to be Arthur London. But that red-haired French actor is not Slánský, that is not Geminder, not Löbl, not young Margolius. These are French actors, in 1970, acting out roles they can neither imagine nor comprehend.

The fault is not the director's. A documentary can be filmed after the events it documents have lost their historic specificity, or it must be filmed by men and in places that share that specificity. As a documentary, *The Confession* would have to be filmed in Prague, with a cast of Czechs for whom the fifties are an irreducible stratum of imagination. It was supposed to be filmed there, but then the tanks rolled again. After that, *The Confession* could no longer be filmed as a documentary, but only as historical fiction—as a parable.

Costa-Gavras makes an attempt at such a presentation. The names of the defendants, including Slánský's, are never mentioned. There are no emblems on soldiers' caps, no flags in the courtroom. The charge of careless documentation could be rejected on the grounds that the film is a parable, presenting no facts but offering the viewer a perspective within which to interpret any set of facts falling within its range.

PARABLE IS a legitimate art form, and can be used effectively. Orwell's *Animal Farm* may well be the best interpretation of the Russian Revolution, far more helpful than many a scholarly tome. But a parable must follow its own rules. It is basically an eidetic description in the strict sense of the first chapter of Husserl's *Ideen*: a delineation of a structural pattern, an "essence," within which a set of contingent facts can be perceived as intelligible. Or, in vernacular, rather than saying what happened, a parable must tell the reader what it was all about.

Yet it is precisely as a parable that *The Confession* is most inadequate. Its opening is almost Kafkaesque: an anonymous arrest of an anonymous protagonist by an equally anonymous conspiracy on unspecified charges. In actuality, however, there was nothing Kafkaesque about the Slánský trial. It did not come as an absurd, irrational non-event, as does the arrest in *The Confession*. Quite the contrary, it was a climax of a series of murders and trials starting with the day of the coup: Jan Masaryk, General Pika, the Socialist MP Milada Horáková, thousands of nameless victims on all levels of the society. The point of the Slánský

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trials was not that an anonymous regime can use force to destroy anonymous victims—*nor even that a given Communist regime did so use it.* The point is that men who destroy the safeguards of human freedom, even when they do it with the best intentions, that Virtue might triumph over Vice, become defenseless in face of the very power they created.

Similarly, in the film the accused are not only nameless but fully anonymous: devoid of historical or human characteristics that would make them credible as types. The film hints vaguely that they were veterans of the Spanish Civil War—some were, though not all. The film similarly notes, much too briefly, the crude anti-Semitism of the trials. It was all too real, and far more vicious than the film shows—yet not all the accused were Jews. They were an extremely heterogeneous group, linked only by a common Party membership. There were the tyrants and the murderers who exploited the aspirations of the workers callously to gorge themselves on power. There were the fanatics, convinced that society can be saved only by the strong hand of the Righteous, who saw the Party as their instrument. But there were also idealists, despairing over a complacent mediocrity that droned on, after Hitler, after Oswieczim, after Mauthausen, as if nothing had happened, driven into a desperate coalition with fanatics and murderers in which they inevitably lost. The accused were a microcosm of the Party. The purpose of the trials was not "justice," not even in some obscure dialectical sense. Nor was it "class struggle." It was simply a lesson in the realities of power, a notice to the Party that autocratic power, once established, becomes autonomous. It cannot be used, for good or ill; it can only be served.

Finally, the film obscures the impact of the trials as well. There is a rather unconvincing scene, mentioning the letter in which London's wife denounced her husband—and the sharply polarized reaction of her fellow workers. (And one's historical sense is again jarred by expressions of sympathy on a crowded streetcar: sorry, C.-G., one *just didn't!*) Some wives wrote letters, others sought a *modus vivendi,* some stubbornly refused any compromise and accepted the grossest, malicious persecution even long after the first rehabilitations. And among the population at large, some, far too many, believed, some withdrew, others hated. But that is not the point: the point is that after the trials it was no longer possible to *support* the regime, not because it was horrible, but because it permitted no support. The dedication which Communism had evoked when it was in opposition was possible only because its power was not total, because a non-Communist regime protected the autonomy of the individual Communist. In power, the Party, by the very logic of its ideology, could accept only total self-surrender, blind dedication. Communism in power destroys its own base of support: it can regain it only by a democratization that eliminates all monopoly of power, including its own.

A parable would not have to mention names or recite historical events. But it would have to show the *logic* of those events—and *The Confession* does nothing of that. All that is left is an analysis, brilliantly acted and directed, of the techniques of brainwashing. If that were all the film presented, it would be legitimate, instructive, though somewhat narrow. The devil of it is that the film claims rather more. It claims to be a documentary, including footage of the Soviet occupation of Prague in 1968. It also claims to interpret, including flashes to contemporary France for interviews with Arthur London and his avowal that for all that has happened, he is still a Communist, convinced that it was all an accident, that it would be different next time—and that there must be a next time. This, finally, is the horror and the lie. By presenting the Slánský trials as a conflict of an anonymous police with an anonymous victim, Costa-Gavras—and Arthur London—sustain the illusion that it was an accident, that terror is a contingent by-product and not a necessary aspect of the Rule of the Righteous.

I have been told that the film is useful in France, where there are still Stalinists. I rather doubt it: the Stalinists have never had illusions about the realities of autocratic rule. Nor is it likely to have much impact on the Leninists. Lenin, though condemning terror, insisted on the rule of the Righteous—and was prepared to accept the cost. The film might be instructive to young idealists who are convinced that terror can be benign, sanitary.

The Confession is definitely a film to see. But it is not a film to believe. That film, documentary or parable, is yet to be made. Again, the fault is not altogether the director's. He

(continued on page 192)

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Henry Pachter

Hitler and His Enemies

THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP: THE ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND EFFECTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, by Karl Dietrich Bracher. With an introduction by Peter Gay. Translated by Jean Steinberg. New York: Praeger. 553 pp. $13.95.

ONE CAN APPROACH the phenomenon of fascism from various angles. The first analyses, mostly by Communist writers, explained it simply as the dictatorship of monopoly capital (a thesis that still lingers in Franz Neumann's *Behemoth,* 1941, and Ignazio Silone's *School for Dictators,* 1937). One could look at it as a European disease of the twentieth century (see Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism* and Ernst Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism*), or as a special form of populism, a potential degeneration inherent in all democracies (J. L. Talmon in *Totalitarian Democracy*). One could treat it as a breakdown of reason under the conditions of monopolism (as in Georg Lukacs's *Destruction of Reason,* unfortunately not available in English) or as a breakdown of nerve (as does Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*). Finally, one could treat it as a specifically German aberration, as George Mosse does in *The Crisis of the German Ideology* (and William Shirer in a bestseller only to be mentioned at a certain distance from this distinguished company).

Karl Dietrich Bracher, of Bonn University, whose earlier works deal with the Weimar Republic, has written a profound study that rejects and combines all these partial views and sees Fascism and Nazism as revolutionary movements directed against the liberal state. "This ideological anti-front was forged [out of] four tendencies—a conservative-authoritarian glorification of the state; an imperialistic nationalism; a nationalistic-statist aberration of socialism seeking to combine social romanticism and state socialism; a racial community ideology." Nationalism was transformed into "radical imperialism," populism into an anti-democratic leader cult. As a historian, Bracher neglects neither the European failure of nerve nor the German and Austrian traditions which prepared Hitler's advent; but he devotes over a hundred pages to the specific problems and events that assured his success. He does not seek the one overriding cause—be it economic, political, biological, psychological, or ideological—but describes a sequence of crises through the unhappy life of the Weimar Republic. These crises might have brought to power a simply reactionary clique, perhaps a military dictatorship (as Stalin expected), or a restoration of the Hohenzollern (which Chancellor Brüning frankly admits in his memoirs was his aim in office). Why did it end with a grotesque maniac with a Chaplin moustache?

Bracher seeks a clue in the person of the "leader"—a rural type speaking a coarse argot; a failure in his native land and a bully in his adopted country, "he represented the disenfranchised man eager to compensate for his inferiority through militancy and radicalism"; a Mack the Knife who promised every Caspar Milquetoast revenge on his oppressors. For that much, Bracher rightly insists, the Nazi movement was revolutionary—a trait that is usually underrated in Marxist analyses of fascism and also by authors who think of Germans as especially "conformist." Such authors forget that, to become a Nazi, a citizen of the Republic had first to question the authorities.

As Theodore Adorno has shown, the trait that distinguishes the Nazi types is not conformism but "the authoritarian character": the middle-class rebel without a cause dreams of

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power and glory; frightened by his loss of status, he flees into fantasies of romantic imperialism; impotent before the new powers of technocracy, bureaucracy, and social democracy, he longs for a "new order" where he might find a place in the shade of power. To achieve that, the S.A. men had to have their raids and "crystal nights," their sadistic orgies of torture, and their race war against inferior breeds.

Bracher makes a special point of the fact that Hitler managed to conceal his revolutionary aims from his bourgeois, military, and aristocratic allies, that he "deceived" them by pretending to have mellowed since he made the Beer Hall putsch and wrote *Mein Kampf*. This was indeed the excuse cited by Hitler's nationalist allies and fund raisers: bankers Schröder and Schacht, generals Schleicher and Blomberg, aristocrats Papen and Neurath—they all had been "deceived." (In DISSENT, Nov.–Dec. 1970, I have shown that Albert Speer could not have been deceived. He went along as long as Hitler provided victories.) If Bracher accepts this legend, he may be the victim of a misunderstanding. In every revolution the activists who go for total power and complete upheaval of the social structure are a minority. The majority are those who feel that continuation of an unbearable condition—the *ancien régime*, the hated Weimar Republic—is the greater evil, and the surrender of power to a Hitler the lesser risk. The German conservatives were eager to dress up their counterrevolution as a revolution. Even as Hitler "agreed" to obtain power by constitutional means, Göring explained: Legality all the way to the top rung of the ladder; but the hangings will take place nevertheless. After that he figured he would send the S.A. home.

At first it seemed as though the schemers in the defense establishment had not been mistaken in their estimate of Hitler's conversion. On June 30, 1934, he staged his "Ninth Termidor"—liquidating the Nazi party's left wing along with some personal enemies and ex-friends. After that, the bourgeoisie felt assured; "nice" people like Schacht, the financial wizard, and Mayor Goerdeler (who later headed an underground opposition) agreed to serve as his bank president, price commissar, etc. Had he not given them the state they had desired and prepared—a strong national and military dictatorship that provided jobs for all and talked back to Western capitalists? Until 1938 none of these people—with the exception of Fritz Thyssen, a bankrupt steel magnate—had any objection to being ruled by Hitler, Göring, and their Gauleiters. Krupp, Flick, Rechberg, Schacht, Hugenberg, Klöckner, Mannesmann, etc., still held economic power in Nazi Germany.

Bracher, who is not interested in political economy, simply states that "the Nazi leadership had respect for the top managers who faithfully paid their Adolf Hitler Fund contributions." The big firms also got most of the industrial assets confiscated from Jewish and foreign owners. As for the small ones, Bracher rightly states that many fell victim to the greed of Nazi leaders and that

> the solutions promised before 1933 played no role in economic policy: nationalization of trusts, profit-sharing in big business, improved pension system, creation of a viable middle class, communalization of department stores, expropriation of large estates, abolition of mortgage and loan speculation [the famous "breaking of the thraldom of interest"]—none of these partly radical, partly romantic-reactionary plans was ever seriously tackled.

There seems to be little doubt that it was not the conservatives but the National-Socialists whom Hitler betrayed.

NEVERTHELESS, HITLER'S DICTATORSHIP was not a "tool of monopoly capital" as the Communists made out in their theoretical bewilderment, but a true revolution in the sense that it brought new strata to the top, ousted a significant part of the former dominant classes for good, set up new machinery to deal with social and economic relations, provided an entirely new cultural environment for German society, and endowed the nation with a new state. It set economic, social, political, and military goals where there had been a blind play of arbitrary forces.

Before 1933, the Nazis pursued the revolutionary aim of abolishing the Republic and its institutions; they used revolutionary means such as the military training of civil-war troups, the deliberate flouting of laws, and murder. After they seized power, they first upset the traditional values of society and the customary rankings—calling on children to inform on

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their parents and teachers and on employees to watch bosses who were insufficiently patriotic, burning books, and in every other way demeaning the habitual German respect for authority, learning, and titles; democratizing the army; infiltrating the administration with deliberate disregard for the civil service order (the famous German *Beamten* mentality); touching even the churches' integrity and setting up a blasphemous "German Church." While destroying all organs of proletarian self-protection, they gave the German worker benefits he had never enjoyed under the republican régime: trips to the Mediterranean on "Strength Through Joy" ships, adoption of May Day as a national holiday, steady employment, a motorcyclette and the prospect of a small car.

While leaving employers in possession of their industrial properties, the Nazis shifted decision-making and controls to central allocating offices. In ideology, too, they imposed on the nation a consciousness that was anticapitalist, antibourgeois, antimiddle-class, anti-Western, antirational. Bracher speaks of "a verbal social revolution." He shows how radically different all relationships between politics and economy, man and nation, party leadership and administration, society and ideology, police and law, education and social rank were in the totalitarian state from anything Germany had known before, and that Hitler's plan to subvert more of the traditional values went even further. It was a state based on a terrorist ideology, begun with terroristic means, maintained and expanded with terroristic methods, and poised to spread terror abroad; it substituted arbitrary power for law, the subordination of all citizens to the purposes of an élite order, the total reversal of a trend that had started in 1789.

Resistance to Hitler, then, would have to be expected first from those who had lived in the spirit of 1789—i.e., the Left. Most German historians have exalted the opposition that developed in conservative circles of the church, the aristocracy, the military, and that led to the abortive putsch of July 20, 1944—too late to save the honor of a class that had followed Hitler into his Third Reich and then into his war, but suddenly found itself staring at military defeat. Bracher shows that the only genuine, instant, and political opposition against Hitler was organized by the labor parties; but it was smashed before the Second World War broke out. Without detracting anything from the martyrdom of Martin Niemöller and Friedrich Weissler, leaders of the Church Bearing Witness, or of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the defeatist theologian, of the thousands of Catholic priests who went to jail, and especially Provost Grüber, Bracher concludes that "discussions about resistance before July 20, 1944, revealed how isolated these views were." Pope Pius XI, the first sovereign to conclude a treaty with Hitler, came to regret it; but when Pacelli succeeded him as Pius XII, he remained silent in the face of Hitler's war.

By contrast, the German generals had prepared a plan to arrest Hitler should war break out in September 1938; their conspiracy was based on the assumption that the Western powers would stand firm in defense of Czechoslovakia, and Chamberlain had been so advised. When instead he went to Munich and handed Czechoslovakia over to Hitler, all resistance broke down in view of Hitler's repeated proof that destiny was on his side and that his political calculations had been correct. For the next six years opposition remained confined to individual acts of sabotage and treason—some of astonishing courage, such as Colonel Hans Oster's betrayal of Hitler's attack plans to the Dutch in April 1940. But any idea of overthrowing the Nazi régime was illusory as long as the army was loyal to Hitler and as long as the subversive officers remained wedded to two unbelievable conceptions which nevertheless appear to have been genuine: that they would shed no blood, not even Hitler's, and that they could not break the oath he had forced them to swear. There was another obstacle. The Allies with whom the conspiring officers were in contact demanded unconditional surrender; but even those conspirators ready to assassinate Hitler were not prepared to abandon his conquests. The illusion that something might be saved, on the other hand, explains a fact that at first sight seems surprising: thousands of generals and other officers, civil servants and politicians were part of the conspiracy that almost took Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, and it is remarkable that their secret was not betrayed—while the Socialist and Communist plots running parallell to the main action were busted by the Gestapo in June.

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THE THIRD REICH WAS NOT SAVED from ruin by its enemies but went down to defeat. Has its idea survived? Bracher devotes a full chapter to the various attempts—happily fruitless so far—to continue or revive it. Of particular interest here is not the ephemeral National Democratic party (which failed to get the 5 percent of the vote required for a seat in the Bundestag) but the widely read *Soldatenzeitung*, which cultivates the memory of Hitler's and the Kaiser's glorious wars, and the "intelligentsia" magazine *Nation Europa* with such luminaries contributing as Sir Oswald Mosley, Maurice Bardèche, and Mrs. Rudolf Hess.

Opinion polls show that there persists a residual core of pro-Nazi feeling, of alienation from the new Federal Republic, of indifference toward the danger of a Nazi resurgence. Though history has shown the absurdity of radical nationalism in the twentieth century, the social and intellectual crises that propelled it into the madness of fascism have only been pushed back in the West and covered over by another authoritarian system in the East. Bracher thinks that the unsolved problem of the national state can turn any European crisis into a crisis of German democracy. He sees a particular danger in the trend away from the politics of participation and toward a "guided society" which opens the door to pseudopolitical movements of a revolutionary-authoritarian character.

This answers the question Peter Gay asks in his magnificent introduction: why should people under forty, for whom the Nazi ghosts are not an ever-haunting experience, study this episode? All too easily do the comparisons drop from their mouths: is not My Lai equal to Auschwitz, the Chicago trial as bad as the Gestapo, the United States today as undemocratic as the Weimar state which gave birth to Nazism? Those who think so should read Bracher's proofs that the Nazi takeover was by no means inevitable; that there is a world of difference between even the gravest mistakes of a democracy and the deliberate evil of a totalitarian dictatorship; that civil liberties must not be despised but continuously defended.

For once, happily, in such a book, the author does not write dissertationese, and the English does not sound like translatese. But if the paperback edition is to reach as wide an audience as it deserves, it would need more helpful notes explaining German institutions and customs; if German terms, such as *völkisch* or *Gleichschaltung*, are untranslatable, the index should refer the reader to the explanation of the term.

Richard Robbins

Can Life Become Better?

THE USES OF DISORDER, by Richard Sennett. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 198 pp. $5.95.

"LOSS OF IDENTITY" and "quest for community"—these phrases, nearly worn out from overuse by pop-intellectuals, are rescued and restored to life by Richard Sennett in this thoughtful, seminal little book about the urban condition in America. "Condition" rather than "crisis," because *The Uses of Disorder* is not concerned directly with the familiar litany of problems: crime, race, poverty, pollution, housing.

Sennett, who teaches sociology at Brandeis University and has been studying carefully the evolution of the 19th-century industrial city into the 20th-century postindustrial metropolis, is of course thoroughly aware of such matters as the failure of urban renewal or the desperate search for revenues to cover city services. But here he is pondering the future of those millions among us who are above the poverty line and beyond the ghetto, of the young people in particular who have rejected suburbia and have been groping toward a new freedom which they associate with an emergent sense of community, possible only in "dense, disorderly, overwhelming cities." If the young are to regain identity, revive community, they must learn to bring "intense family life" out into the neighborhood; they must find a way to mesh centralized authority with decentralized planning; they need to make a virtue of group conflict on a vital, small scale and without violence.

The argument in behalf of such "survival

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communities" owes something obviously to Lewis Mumford, more to Paul Goodman and Jane Jacobs. Still, *The Uses of Disorder* is an original, an interesting new graft on the old tree of social anarchism. To disagree with it (as I will) is only to acknowledge its appealing quality.

SENNETT'S POINT OF DEPARTURE is that "modern urban communities of affluence" are terribly constricting in human terms, however secure from want. In this social world adolescence does not flow into maturity; adult lives become frozen into rigid patterns; new experience is feared; there is a destructive "urge for a purified identity"; a necessary tension ("disorder") is repressed because conflict, as such, is "bad." Psychological malaise finds social expression in the elaborate mechanisms designed to "control" the problems of urban life. City planning, for example, proceeds from elaborate master schemes that override authentic community needs. (Sennett is sensible on the issue of "local community control," unlike some of the New Left romantics. "I cannot believe that whatever a community does by itself is *per se* good because it was self-instituted; people can want to be vicious together. . . .")

In contrast, Sennett sketches out the possibility of a different kind of growth, the achievement of an adult identity, the development of a "caring about" within the social framework of "a new anarchism." Young people have fixed on radical politics as a way into a less constricted community but it is, for Sennett, too limited a forum. He sees the potential for growth and adulthood in the reorganization of city life into clusters of "survivor communities." Here neighborhoods would consist of unstable, yet viable mixtures of social elements—young and old, middle- and working-class, black and white. Family lines, work lines, school lines would all criss-cross, resulting in a creative, loosely-organized "disorder." Control would emerge instead of being "preplanned." "The city as an anarchic system" would be able to live and breathe.

We have here an urban utopia but not a bloodless one, a community that allows for a healthy degree of conflict and disarray. Sennett's view of the new community, informed by insights from psychology, sociology, literature, is attractive and persuasive; but not quite persuasive enough. For Sennett relies too heavily on a change in consciousness, a psychological liberation movement to open the way to structural change. I do not mean that he is enamored of "cultural revolution," that he sees the new life-style of the young as a cleansing force. On the contrary, although he does not refer to the spirit of Woodstock directly, the whole tone of the book is skeptical toward youth for youth's sake. What I do mean is that Sennett deliberately refrains from discussing the economic and political obstacles to future community planning. He is unwilling to acknowledge any structural problems except to say that once we are freed from military-industrial spending the financial resources will be ample for the job of city transformation. Possibly so. But, in the event of a reordering of priorities and a reallocation of money, there is no reason to suppose that "the new anarchism" of the coming generation will somehow just prevail. In the end Sennett's vision depends on faith. And, "old-fashioned" though it may sound, without explicit policies and organized political coalitions, faith in creative "disorder" will have no place to go.

Allen Guttmann

Artless Utopia?

THE SHAPE OF UTOPIA, by Robert C. Elliott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 170 pp. $6.50.

ALL LITERATURE IS UTOPIAN in that fictive worlds are literally *ou topos,* i.e., no place. Implicitly or explicitly, literature is almost always a criticism of life because imagined reality is inevitably comparable to sensibly perceived reality. Actions can scarcely be compared without an implicit judgment. It is a rare author who does not mean his tale "to point a moral." Utopian literature, as a genre, is a blatantly moralistic mode that has always been associated with philosophical discourse. Plato, Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and B. F. Skin-

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ner—a mixed group—have all written utopias. Novelists, however, have tended to write negative utopias, nightmarish visions of totalitarian society; Aldous Huxley, Eugene Zamyatin, and George Orwell are the obvious examples. The philosophers' dreams seem closely related to the novelists' nightmares. Is it, as Robert C. Elliott suggests, a case of *corruptio optimi pessima* (the corruption of the best men is the worst), or is it that utopian thought is always tainted by the thinker's desire to wrest men to his will?

Elliott offers no answer, which is not a surprise, since he did not set out to write a treatise in political theory. He is by no means unaware of moral and ethical dimensions, but he is chiefly concerned with literary form. Although he begins with a reference to Friedrich Engels, it is only to show that even Marx's collaborator responded to the tropes and figurative subtleties of utopian thought.

Elliott argues that utopian and satirical fictions both derive ultimately from the impulses celebrated at the Roman festival of Saturnalia, when slaves mocked masters and masters served slaves, when Libido found outlet and Id had its holiday. In Elliott's analysis, utopia is "the secularization of the myth of the Golden Age, a myth incarnated in the festival of Saturnalia. Satire is the secular form of ritual mockery, ridicule, invective—ritual gestures which are integrally part of the same festival." But while the momentary abolition of socioeconomic distinctions and the general mood of license are indeed reminders of a Golden Age that never was, the alleged relation of satire to utopian fiction is not persuasively argued. It is true enough that satire assumes some kind of norm against which deviation can be measured and by which folly can be mocked, but the norm need not be utopian. Although Swift, to whom Elliott devotes an interesting essay, is certainly satirical and utopian in his *Gulliver's Travels,* there seems to be no necessary connection between a scorn for the way things are and a desire to show that they might be radically improved. Alexander Pope and T. S. Eliot, for example, are two considerable satirists whose tendency was to affirm the political and religious status quo and to shun utopian speculations.

It is also true that most utopians are *not satirists* in any conventional sense of the term. Plato, Thomas More, Francis Bacon, B. F. Skinner? These are men scarcely noted for satirical thrust. Robert Elliott is subtle and persuasive in his commentary on irony and literary play in Thomas More and in B. F. Skinner, but satire is quite another matter. Elliott writes that "the one unanswerable argument for the utopian vision is a hard satirical look at the way things are today," but the argument is all too answerable. The inadequacy of X is no proof of the superiority of Y or Z.

The alleged genetic relationship between satire and utopian fiction is but one aspect of Elliott's book. The discussions of individual works are reasonable and perceptive. Specialists will have to determine whether or not Elliott's analyses of More and Swift are original; the commentaries on nineteenth- and twentieth-century works by Hawthorne, Huxley, Orwell, and Skinner are intelligent but not exactly new. In the penultimate essay, however, Elliott returns to more speculative considerations. He deals, specifically, with the fact that projected utopian societies seem by their exclusion of conflict to exclude literature too. Perhaps, since we have never known what a utopian society might be like, it is more to the point to say that imagined utopias have generally lacked novelistic interest. It may be that nineteenth-century readers were drawn to Bellamy's ideas by the narrative structure through which he presented them, but, if this was so, American society must have been even more barren of literary possibilities than Henry James said it was. "Our imagination of the good life," writes Elliott, "is as barren as our imagination of the bad is rich."

Elliott develops this argument as part of a comparison between the requirements, advantages, and disadvantages of the utopian genre compared to those of the more realistic novel, but my own interests are drawn toward a similar point made by Herbert Marcuse, whom Elliott cites on two occasions. In his *Essay on Liberation* (1969), Marcuse deals with the task which Marx and Engels were historically unable to take up. On the basis of a century's experience unavailable to Marx and Engels, he sketches the outlines of a utopian society on Marxist principles. Marcuse argues that literature and the other arts now have an essentially subversive function. Contemporary culture must not simply be criticized; it must

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be dislocated, disrupted, and "desublimated" so that repression can be identified and ultimately replaced by liberation. In the famous phrases of Engels, there must be a transition from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. The irony is that literature and the other arts are apparently to vanish from the kingdom of freedom which they have helped to create, partly through their destruction of the values of capitalistic society and partly (I assume) by their persuasive projection of utopian possibilities. In Marcuse's speculations, as in Elliott's suggestions, the realization of the dream is also its end. In Marcuse, society itself becomes a work of art which obviates the need of art as we presently know it:

> . . . the aesthetic could become a *gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft* [i.e., a socially productive force] and as such could lead to the "end" of art through its realization. . . . Released from the bondage of exploitation, the imagination, sustained by the achievements of science, could turn its productive power to the radical reconstruction of experience. . . . In this reconstruction, the historical *topos* [i.e., place] of the aesthetic would change: it would find expression in the transformation of the *Lebenswelt* [i.e., world of actual experience]—society as a work of art.

Marcuse's interpretation is less than perfectly clear, but the function of art in utopian society bears remarkable resemblance to the function of free speech in contemporary society as set forth in his famous essay, "Repressive Tolerance." In Marcuse's utopia, it seems likely that error will have no rights, and art—at least as we know it—will have no function at all. Schiller's *Spieltrieb,* the instinct for play, will have to be satisfied by whatever can be socially actualized. The poet will work with people rather than with words.

Is it any wonder, then, that George Orwell chose to cast his most effective attack on totalitarianism in the form of an antiutopia? If the desire for perfection is directed from imagined constructs to the confused, intractable world of men and women in society as we have known it, the desire is liable to meet resistance that only force can overcome. The more complete the design, the more likely that terror will be needed to achieve it. Elliott, who does not make this particular point, notes that Skinner's *Walden Two* concludes with the image of an unoccupied throne:

> The implication to be drawn from the last paragraph of *Walden Two* is that, had Frazier been on the throne, *Walden Two* would have developed into a tyranny. Skinner seems not to recognize what a near thing it was.

I am quite aware that I have used Elliott's valuable little book for speculations which may run counter to its author's. It is to Elliott's credit that his work encourages one's *Spieltrieb.*

Joseph Clark

Change under Communism

CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS, edited by Chalmers Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 358 pp. $8.95.

AFTER THE 1956 UPHEAVALS in the Communist world, and with the open outbreak of conflict between the Soviet and Chinese regimes, it became difficult to maintain the old belief that Communism was unvaried and unchanging. Yet, no matter how much things Communist change, much remains the same. Quite apart from fundamental matters such as dictatorship, you still can't seem to buy fresh vegetables and fruit during the long Russian winter—unless you are part of a very small privileged group. One recalls, years back, the special delight of a diplomatic reception in Moscow where you got fresh oranges and hid them in your pockets to bring home to the kids. There was some trepidation about how the secret police might view those bulging pockets, but it was worth the embarrassment. Today, 17 years later, one talks with correspondents fresh from the Russian steppes, and they still get their oranges at diplomatic parties. As a Western correspondent completes a tour of duty in Moscow and returns to sum up his impressions, there's a depressing similarity between his story and those written during the years of the transition from "socialism" to "communism."

Here's a volume of essays by various scholars that analyzes changes in the Communist coun-

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tries since the death of Stalin. Chalmers Johnson develops the thesis of a "built-in boomerang" in Communist economic modernization. Communist regimes are usually devoted to industrialization since they have been established mainly in backward, agrarian countries. But once the regime has progressed to jet aircraft, computers, and nuclear reactors, the old controls are no longer adequate. It is forced, Johnson notes, to relax the terror that forms the major control of totalitarianism. And the reasons flow from the modernization process itself. Among those cited by Johnson are: efficient manufacture of advanced technical products requiring a long developmental period, which in turn requires tranquility; the need for foreign trade dictates some accommodation to the international system; there is a need to compete in innovation and "innovators may not be ideologically pure. . . ." Such reasons impel Communist regimes seeking modernization toward a market system. But Johnson is not a dogmatist, and he recognizes that "neither the market system nor Communist command economies have proved particularly efficient in managing today's unprecedentedly complex economies."

A high point in this symposium is the essay by Richard Lowenthal, who is well-known to readers of DISSENT. He writes on the conflict between Utopia and Development in Communist policy. Despite the twisting of Marxist doctrine to place the locus of proletarian revolution in the underdeveloped Third World, Lenin started from a Marxist assumption. The assumption, of course, was that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved in the advanced capitalist countries and move on rapidly to utopia. That the Bolsheviks seized power in backward Russia, Lenin attributed to one of the "zigzags of history." The utopia of worker management and the withering away of the state, described so vividly in *State and Revolution,* became instead a dictatorship *over* the workers. As early as 1919 Lenin demanded of the Russian workers "absolute submission to the will of the Soviet director, or the dictator, during work." Instead of utopia we had what Lowenthal calls the "dictatorship of development." This, in turn, required totalitarianism. But in time totalitarianism became a fetter on further development. Lowenthal's underlying thesis is that "although the conscious purpose of a totalitarian dictatorship is to change the social structure without changing the political system, the planned social change results inevitably in unintended and indeed unforeseen political change."

With an assist from "exogenous" factors, Yugoslavia, of all the Communist lands, has made the most significant moves away from massive coercion and toward self-management. China has zigzagged between developmental emphasis on material rewards and an extreme utopian rejection of such incentives. Generalizing, Lowenthal suggests that the trend in most Communist countries is from totalitarian to authoritarian systems. The dilemma of these regimes, he finds, is that they need a limited pluralism and still must keep things under tutelary control.

AS IN MOST such collections of essays, the book has an uneven quality. A chapter that contains some fruitful lines of analysis is the one by H. Gordon Skilling on "Group Conflict and Political Change." Skilling rejects the idea that a Communist system can ever be fully totalitarian; nor will it be fully pluralist, he argues. There are always conflicting groups and group interests, as he sees it.

He describes four types of Communist regimes: first, the "quasi-totalitarian," in which he includes Stalin's Russia and Mao's China before the Cultural Revolution; second, the "consultative authoritarianism" of the GDR, Rumania, and Bulgaria; third, the "quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism" of Hungary and Poland during the 1953–56 thaw, and the Soviet Union under Khrushchev; the fourth type, so far rare in Communist history, "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism" as in Czechoslovakia between January and August 1968, and in Yugoslavia after the break with Stalin, but especially after 1966. Though it's easy to differ with Skilling he opens up helpful avenues for scholarly investigation.

R. V. Burks's essay on "Technology and Political Change" investigates the economic factors that inhibit innovation and balanced growth under the centrally directed nationalized economies. Thus, the Soviet Union today faces an acute shortage of computer installations and Burks suggests that "The basic obstacle to innovation in Communist countries is the inability of Stalinist central planning to provide automatic institutional responses to new situations."

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LETTERS

Israel and Vietnam

Editor:

The threat to Israel's survival compels democratic socialists to reconsider their attitude toward American foreign policy in the face of unabated Communist expansionism in the Near East as well as Southeast Asia. One such effort is Irving Howe's "Vietnam and Israel" (September–October 1970), which poignantly reveals the moral dilemma, but which unfortunately leaves the necessary questions unanswered.

(1) The first question is, "Why is it our duty to support Israel?" Is it in the interest of the survival of the State of Israel *qua* Israel? In defense of a democratic state? In defense of valid American interests? In the interest of socialism? Or, is it possibly in defense of the principle that every state, without regard to its internal structure or government, has the inherent right to exist free of foreign aggression, direct and indirect, and that it is a proper exercise of American foreign policy to come to the aid of a nation so threatened? The only affirmative reason advanced for justifying American and world support is that Israel is a democratic state. Is this inserted to logically exclude the right of survival of non-democratic states (such as Vietnam, for example)?

(2) "Are Israel and Vietnam the same or different in principle?" Howe, like many socialists, raises the differences to the level of principle, thus overlooking the underlying identity: —that the enemy is the same, to wit, Communist expansion (à la Brezhnev or Mao), —and that therefore the problem is the same in principle, although, of course, it will differ in practice for each case. In my view, the correct and principled position is to support our basic Vietnam commitment, but to vigorously oppose at every step the various strategies short of a political settlement expressing the will of the Vietnamese people. Already we see emerging the first outlines of a Far East settlement, including also Red China. Only American and non-Communist resistance there, as in Europe and in the Near East, will have averted World War III and will have made this possible. Therefore, despite the differences, it is all one struggle.

(3) "How far are you prepared to go in defense of Israel? To the brink of war? Beyond it?" Howe refuses to answer this vital question "in a phrase." But this is an evasion, because it is "the" question, and more than a phrase is required. It is just this refusal to face even "agonizing" alternatives that Russia considers in her calculations. Let me translate the question to one in terms of the realities: "Suppose the Arabs, spurred on by the Russians (as in 1967), but this time with open and direct Russian military support, repudiate the settlement framework of the November 1967 U.N. resolution and threaten once more to engulf Israel, and Israel is unable to cope with this alone, should the United States support Israel, even at the risk of war with Russia?"

Since history has proven that aggression can be discouraged only if the aggressor knows that force will be met by force, then only a courageous "Yes" to the question can weight the balance in favor of peace. Is it not patent that it was the sober United States policy of show of force in the Middle East, coupled with a principled initiative for a peaceful settlement, that has kept open the prospect of peace? Must we not support this policy with all the risks it necessarily involves—and say so?

ELIAS M. SCHWARZBART ■

Spain

Editor:

American liberals and radicals have just fumbled an issue so vital I am moved to speak in the hope it might still be picked up.

The anti-Fascist protests throughout Spain sparked by the recent Basque court-martial got shamefully little support from us. All through Europe people demonstrated in sympathy at Spanish embassies and consulates. Franco was flooded with protests—both official and popular—against this military trial of civilians. But not much happened in the U.S., perhaps the one nation whose sentiments were likely to influence Franco. Finally I saw mention in the press of two American protests—one by AFL–CIO President George Meany, the other by a "group of writers, publishers, intellectuals, and political figures calling itself the Spanish Emergency Committee 1970" (*New York Times,* 12/21/70).

Meany's statement was strong, urging the U.S. government "to bring to bear full diplomatic and economic pressure on the Spanish tyrannical regime to end its barbarism," and "free trade unions everywhere to consider joint action . . . with a view of assisting democratic forces inside Spain" (*AFL–CIO News,* 12/26/70). The weight of world opinion persuaded Franco to commute the Basque death sentences.

But why do I consider U.S. public opinion—and public policy—most important? Why say perhaps we can still pick up on the issue Americans fumbled so shamefully? Consider the following two news items:

On December 21 Franco's principal assistant, Vice-President Admiral Carrero Blanco, told the Spanish parliament the recent *anti-government activity* around the country was Communist-inspired and that the armed forces would *be strengthened to combat it* (my emphasis). The Spanish economy was strong enough, he said, to permit reorganization and reinforcement of the armed forces, and

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the chiefs of staff were studying plans to perfect their armament and training. "He did not elaborate," concludes the short item in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*.

On January 6 an item in the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, also with a Madrid dateline, supplies the elaboration: "The United States has agreed to loan Spain five destroyers, four ocean minesweepers, two submarines, three landing ships, an ammunition ship and an oiler, Navy Minister Admiral Alfonso Baturone said yesterday. He told a meeting of government officials that the costs of the material, part of the U.S.-Spanish Friendship and Cooperation Agreement signed last year, originally was estimated at $88 million." Need the Spanish admirals say any more succinctly that these 16 U.S. warships will be distributed about Spain's seaports with a deadly aim?

To Bilbao to squelch the Basque dissidents who started the latest ruckus. To Gijon to take care of the Asturian miners with their predilection for troublesome strikes. Cádiz and Málaga will corner between them those volatile Andalusians who can't stomach the absentee landowners who keep their stomachs empty—with perhaps a slight land expedition to barren Estremadura, where the slaughter of thousands of Loyalists in the Badajoz bullring is still vivid in memory. To Almeriá too, to keep an eye on those resentful people still sickening from the radioactivity of the American nuclear bombs that fell in the sea there two years ago. To Valencia of course—a radical hangout—and not to forget Barcelona.

In jagged mountains 40 miles from Barcelona stands the famous old Benedictine monastery of Montserrat. Here it was, says the *New York Times* (12/14/70), that some 280 Catalonian artists and intellectuals conducted a 48-hour sit-in to protest the Basque trials. The abbot "had resisted repeated calls by the Government to evict the demonstrators. At one point, an official reportedly told the abbot by telephone that the meeting was 'a provocation.' 'So was the Burgos court-martial,' the abbot reportedly replied." The Catalonian spirit is as independent as the Basque. In Barcelona this spring I heard a few thousand participants in a Palm Sunday religious ceremony sing in Spanish, "We Shall Overcome!" There will be U.S. battleships in the colorful Barcelona harbor—unless we stop them from getting there.

Remember the arms embargo against Loyalist Spain? From 1936 till '39 the legal government, the democratically elected Second Republic, desperately needed arms to quell an insurrection. Aid was refused by the U.S.—and France and England —while the opposing forces got help aplenty from their fellow-Fascists, Germany and Italy. No need to rehash all that. We cannot have forgotten how that embargo first threw the Spanish people into the clutches of the Russian commissars and then turned the country over to Fascism.

In 1970 the present Spanish government requested armaments—16 battleships—to maintain itself in power and quell possible revolt. I do not know how close the Spanish are now to significant revolt. Reliable press reports over the past couple of months have indicated a broad range of increasing opposition to Franco, from Right to Left. Things are shaky in Spain and unrest is likely to continue.

And I remember how my prophetic Barcelona friend looked at me when I asked that naive question: what were the prospects of overthrowing the dictatorship? "What can they be?" she shrugged bitterly. "The minute anything starts your battleships will be waiting in our harbors to suppress it."

I resented the "your"—but cannot disclaim responsibility for that eventuality until I have at least tried to keep it from happening. Neither can you.

We must hold back those battleships now, and we must guard against future U.S. aid to Spain to be used in suppressing popular revolt. To what avail work to elect congressmen and senators to office if we can't get them to move on this? And we must pull together that old labor-liberal coalition we used to talk about, to tackle this issue in an effective, well-planned way, but fast!

It may be that together we can move to stop the U.S. battleship loan to Franco. And, my friends, what courage it will give the Spanish people when they see Americans care!

EVELYN MILLER STAHL ■
Philadelphia

Women in Universities

Editor:

Alice Rossi's article "Women—The Terms of Liberation" in your November–December issue is one of the best yet in the current rash of articles about, by, for and against women. As a fellow-sociologist, I find that the article speaks very much to my own condition and fulfills the limited purpose it sets for itself.

One aspect of the situation of educated academic women that I would have liked to see treated more extensively forms part of a general concern with rigidities in university structure. Some changes could be made relatively easily, which would benefit both women and men, including those women who for many years have been part of the academic world, usually on the margins. These might include much greater flexibility, on the model of "lateral entry," in admitting women to full participation, even if they have not always earned the usual "points" in terms of a more conventional career. It should also be possible to work out joint appointments not only between departments, but also between different types of universities and colleges. Such rotating or time-sharing appointments would be especially useful for people with unusual specialties, and might give both men and women a very welcome alternation between a large university and a small college. Increased flexibilities of this sort

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might go part of the way toward solving situations in which highly trained academic women continue for years to teach introductory courses without ever finding the opportunity to develop their own specialization. It would be good if DISSENT continued its concern with these, and broader, questions in this area.

HANNA PAPANEK ■
University of Chicago

Editor's Complaint

Editor:

I'm amazed that you thought my private correspondence with Theodore Draper so interesting, or illuminating, or typical, or—just what *did* you think?—that you would want to devote two pages of DISSENT to its reproduction [DISSENT, September–October 1970]. Since the entire exchange concerned an erroneous reference to Mr. Draper in an article published in *The Antioch Review*—an unintentional and regrettable lapse on the part of a young and inexperienced writer—and my subsequent misunderstanding of Draper's insistence on a printed correction, I am reluctant to add these few lines to the Letters column of your next issue. (After all, the sum of this collection isn't worth one good paragraph by Whitaker Chambers or Dalton Trumbo. I mean, if you're just interested in preserving the epistolary form.)

In the Summer 1970 issue of *The Antioch Review* we printed a very prominent notice of correction—I am enclosing a copy of it with this letter—in which we sincerely and unambiguously stated our regret at having printed the erroneous reference to Mr. Draper. Either Draper did not bother to check that issue (the next one published after my last letter to him) before turning over to you the files of our correspondence, or else he did not believe that I had misunderstood his interest and that I was quite willing to fullfill my initial assurance to him, or both.

Theodore Draper is a formidable and invaluable scholar, but he is also a pompous, imperious and, apparently, paranoid person. It is absurd that a commonplace autorial and editorial lapse could be inflated, with your assistance, to the dimensions of a serious political conflict.

Although you didn't ask my permission to print my letters to Draper, you have my permission to print this one.

LAWRENCE GRAUMAN, JR.
Editor, *Antioch Review*

THEODORE DRAPER *replies:*

Mr. Grauman is bluffing again. It is a bad habit. I asked DISSENT to publish the correspondence because there seemed no other way to teach him a lesson. His letter to me of June 25, 1970, clearly indicated that he sought to evade the responsibility of correcting the "erroneous reference." His excuse was that he had assumed I "no longer cared about a printed retraction." This assumption was pure invention on his part, as the published correspondence shows, but the issue was not merely whether I cared but whether *he* cared.

In my reply of June 30, 1970, I assured him in no uncertain terms that he had an obligation to make a public retraction. The last I heard about it was a two line note from his secretary dated July 2, 1970: "Mr. Grauman will be in transit for the next two weeks, and will be in touch with you as soon as he returns to Yellow Springs." Mr. Grauman did not get in touch with me. Without advising me, he went ahead with his note of correction in the Summer 1970 issue of *The Antioch Review*, while DISSENT was going to press. I can hardly be blamed for not knowing about his belated intentions. [The Summer 1970 issue of *Antioch Review* arrived in New York in October.—ED.]

The dates must be kept in mind. The original "erroneous reference" appeared in *The Antioch Review* of Summer 1969. It took four letters by me and three more issues of his magazine to get a retraction out of him. He does not bother to explain why he needed so much urging and so much time to publish a simple retraction. What prevented him from publishing it in the very next issue after I had brought the facts to his attention? Evidently Mr. Grauman has now decided to add insult to injury. Too bad: he seems to have learned nothing and forgotten everything.

Paranoia because I defended my good name? What should one call Mr. Grauman?

(*Correspondence concerning the above matter is now closed.*—ED.) ■

Imperialism in Canada

Editor:

Henry Pachter, in his article "The Problem of Imperialism" (DISSENT, September–October 1970), states in a footnote on pp. 463–64 that Canada, among other nations, is economically independent. This is not true.

(1) 1963 figures show the following:

NON-RESIDENT CONTROL AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED CANADIAN INDUSTRIES: (1963)

	percent of total controlled by all non-residents.	*percent of total controlled by U.S. residents.*
Manufacturing:	60	46
Petroleum & Natural Gas:	74	62
Mining and Smelting:	59	52
Railways:	2	2
Utilities:	4	4
TOTAL:	34	27

Thus, not only is much of Canadian industry in foreign hands, 80 percent of that control is American.

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(2) There has been a change in type of investment from portfolio to direct investment. Between 1867 and 1965 the proportion of total foreign investment that was direct grew from 7.5 percent to 58.3 percent. The effect of this has been to generate self-financing through retained earnings and depreciation reserves. In other words, foreign-owned Canadian companies pay for their further operations through their extraction, processing, and marketing of Canadian resources, goods, and services.

(3) It has been argued that Canada is now entering a stage of growth in which the flow of funds from Canada to the U.S. is greater than the reverse process. Gonick argues that between 1960 and 1967 $1 billion profit in excess of what Canada gets in the form of capital imports was sent by Canadian subsidiaries and affiliates to their parent companies.

(4) If one breaks down the sectors of the economy into their different types of products one finds that foreign control is even greater. For example, 97 percent of the automobile and spare-parts industries were foreign-controlled in 1963, rubber was the same, the electric industry was 77 percent foreign-controlled, agricultural machinery was 50 percent, and so on.

Canada is not economically independent, many Canadians know this and there is a growing debate in Canada over the Americanization of not only industry but such areas of life as the content of textbooks and the staffing of the universities. It does not help this debate to have the issues obscured by incorrect statements in your journal.

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HENRY PACHTER *answers:*

First of all, I should like to take this opportunity to correct a few inaccuracies in my essay. The name of Peru's President, before the recent upheaval, was Juan Velasco Alvarado; Bolivia's President, Alfredo Ovando Candia. The Hochschilds and Patinôs, I am glad to be told, are no longer in the mining business. On the other hand, I think I did refer to the $21 billion U.S. investment in Canada and Australia, and I devoted a full section of my article to "international corporations."

At the latest point available to me, 1967, U.S. investments in Canada mounted to $18.1 billion, Canadian investment in the U.S. to $2.6 billion. Canada has about one-tenth of the U.S. population; the figures, therefore, are not astonishing. But those $18.1 billion, of course, constitute too large a percentage of Canada's total investment, and I wholly agree that Canada might want to curb further encroachments by U.S. capital. In the footnote referred to, however, the point was precisely that Canada *can* do so because it is sovereign—or "independent"—in the formulation of her economic policy. The passage the footnote refers to says that to have access to Canada's mineral resources, the U.S. does not need to be the overlord but can buy what it needs. As Mr. Pokrant's table shows, mining and oil account for most of the U.S. investment in Canada, while the figure for "manufacturing" is raised by the automobile industry. But the point at issue is not the percentage of foreign investment itself; the question is whether Canada can decide for itself whether it wishes to attract foreign capital or to curb its inflow. I placed it with Chile and Australia in the category of countries that are sovereign in their economic policy.

As to American cultural imperialism, I cannot wait to get back to the Adirondacks and to listen to Canadian broadcasts, and I sincerely hope that Canadian college professors select the best textbooks available, of whatever nationality. In this respect I wonder whether Canadian textbooks contain information as to Anglo-Canadian investments in the province of Quebec similar to the statistics Mr. Pokrant has quoted.

Mr. Pokrant is entitled to quote investment statistics, but he need not for that purpose misuse a footnote of mine that refers to quite a different matter. ■

SMALL TRUTH, BIG LIE (continued from page 180)

was working with highly personal memoirs of a man seeking a personal rehabilitation of an ideal. Other available documents, such as the memoirs of Slánský's widow, suffer from the same defect. But other information is gradually becoming available. The report of the Czechoslovak commission charged with investigating the events and practices of the fifties, the so-called Piller Commission, was suppressed in Czechoslovakia—but it did appear in the West (*Der unterdrückte Bericht,* Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970). There are men and women who remember, not only in Czechoslovakia, but in the West, where they can speak. I can appreciate why they have not spoken: to revive the horror is an act of courage and agony. Whatever the defects of Arthur London's book, it is a book written in blood, and I appreciate it for that. But other books need to be written, books which neither condemn nor apologize, books which remember. Someone must speak out for the dead, not only for the survivors. When those books have been written, I hope Costa-Gavras will come back to make the film he did not make this time, a film to tell the truth. ■

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

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

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

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